UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN MEETS FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 001750

SIPDIS

FOR P, WHA, WHA/AND. NSC FOR INTER-AMERICAN DIRECTORATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL CO
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN MEETS FOREIGN MINISTER
BARCO


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Foreign Minister Carolina Barco told U/S
Grossman on February 14 that the GOC was satisfied with the
international donors conference in Cartagena, in particular
with USAID Administrator's speech and the NGO declaration.
The latter would be a solid foundation on which to deepen GOC
collaboration with civil society. Barco had spent the day
preparing for her Feb. 15 trip to Caracas with President
Uribe. Like the President (septel),she too was pessimistic.
The GOC was putting the final touches on 17 new extradition
requests to Venezuela. Problems continued on the communiqu,
with the GOV balking at any references to terrorism and
ongoing bilateral mechanisms. U/S Grossman urged Barco to
hold firm on the need for an explicit commitment to fight
terrorism from Chavez. Barco said the GOC continued to look
for mechanisms to build confidence and bind Venezuela to the
fight against terrorism. Barco had conferred with Spanish
officials on counter-terrorism mechanisms on their borders
with France and Morocco, to explore whether this was
something Uribe could suggest to Chavez. The Spanish told
Barco that Chavez was trying to improve relations with PM
Zapatero; the GOS was receptive as long as it was convinced
Chavez was not engaged in activities to destabilize the
region. GOS officials expressed particular concern about El
Salvador and Nicaragua. The U/S, Ambassador and FM welcomed
press statements from Paraguay regarding the links between
the FARC and the kidnapping of former President Cubas'
daughter. This made the FARC an international problem,
subjecting nations to international commitments including
relevant Security Council resolutions. Barco raised recent
reports of Russian arms sales to Venezuela, expressing
concern some would find their way to the FARC. Finally,
Barco thanked U/S Grossman for the level of support for
Colombia in the Administration's FY 2006 budget request. U/S
Grossman stressed the strong USG commitment to the GOC,
despite competing priorities. To sustain this support, he
encouraged the GOC to adopt a good demobilization bill and
continue its efforts to improve the human rights situation,
including investigation and punishment of those responsible
for the Mapiripan massacre and the Arauca killings, as well
as resolving the case against Lt. Colonel Orozco. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Under Secretary Grossman and the Ambassador met
Foreign Minister Carolina Barco and Vice Minister Camilo
Reyes late on February 14. U/S Grossman opened by expressing
U.S. gratitude for GOC efforts to free the three U.S.
hostages. He also expressed condolences for COLMIL losses in
recent FARC attacks, and for the emergency situation caused
by recent flooding and loss of life in the Santander and
Norte de Santander departments. He told Barco the U.S. would
contribute $50,000 toward the relief effort as a sign of
solidarity with the GOC.


3. (C) U/S Grossman briefed the FM on his meetings with
President Uribe, Senator Rafael Pardo and NGOs earlier in the
day (septels),noting Uribe's pessimism about the upcoming
meeting with Chavez, the success of the Cartagena conference
(including USAID Administrator Natsios's speech),and U.S.
views on the demobilization law which the Congress was
scheduled to discuss in special session beginning February

15. On the law, U/S Grossman stressed the importance the
U.S. placed on a strong law that provided for peace with
justice and dismantled the paramilitaries.

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CARTAGENA CONFERENCE
--------------


4. (C) Barco said the GOC was pleased with the Cartagena
conference, underscoring her delight with Natsios' remarks
during the intergovernmental session, and satisfaction with
the NGO declaration (septel). The GOC had worked hard to
make the GOC-NGO dialogue a constructive one. GOC officials
now believed that there was a stronger basis on which to
accelerate and deepen collaboration with civil society.

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GETTING READY FOR CHAVEZ
--------------

5. (C) Barco apologized for not traveling to Cartagena with
U/S Grossman to see Uribe, explaining that she had spent the
day preparing for the upcoming encounter with Chavez. The
GOC was preparing 17 new extradition requests for terrorists
operating in Venezuela. She had met the Spanish Cooperation
Minister to explore whether counter-terrorism mechanisms put
in place with France and Morocco could be applicable to the
situation with Venezuela. For example, the French and
Spanish had exchanged judges and other Ministry of Interior
personnel which had enhanced communication and coordination
when information on ETA movements emerged. Barco said the
GOC continued to look for ways to increase the level of
confidence with the GOV and secure a stronger commitment to
fight against terrorism. The GOC was also trying to secure
better mil-to-mil cooperation on border issues, including the
possibility of personnel exchanges, but the GOV remained
reticent to collaborate on issues dealing with security.
Barco also reported that the Spanish told her Chavez was
making a particular effort to reach out to the Zapatero
government on a variety of issues. The Spanish were willing
to engage Chavez, she said, but only if they were convinced
he would refrain from destabilizing actions in the region.
In that regard, the Spanish expressed particular concern
about El Salvador and Nicaragua.


6. (C) Barco reviewed the difficulties with the communiqu
she had been negotiating with her Venezuelan counterpart,
noting that the GOV continued to resist any references to
terrorism and was now questioning every bilateral mechanism
in operation. The GOV was willing to say it would fight
against delinquents but not terrorists. The reference to
terrorism and the status of bilateral mechanisms would remain
in brackets in the text for the two presidents to negotiate.
U/S Grossman suggested that if these issues could not be
resolved, no communiqu could be a better solution. In
particular, if the GOV continued to resist an explicit
reference to terrorism, Uribe would be free to publicly state
the problem and highlight Chavez' unwillingness to commit to
fighting terrorism.


7. (C) The U/S, Ambassador and FM all welcomed press
statements from Paraguay earlier in the day regarding the
links between the FARC and the kidnappers (and killers) of
the daughter of former President Cubas. U/S Grossman
underscored the importance of identifying the international
aspects of FARC activities which made the problem subject to
international agreements, including Security Council
resolution 1373 and others that committed nations to fight
international terrorism.


8. (C) Drawing on the earlier discussion with President Uribe
over which neighboring countries were pro-actively fighting
against terrorism (septel),U/S Grossman asked for Barco's
views on Brazil. Barco responded that Brazil did not/not
touch the issue of terrorism during discussions on the row
between Colombia and Venezuela. Rather, President Lula and
FM Amorin simply continued to reiterate Chavez's interest in
resolving the situation. Nonetheless, Barco stressed that
she maintains a constructive relationship with her Brazilian
counterpart and that "he never closed the door" during the
crisis. She also noted that Lula had prevented FARC
participation in this year's "Davos alternative meeting" in
Porto Alegre. Regarding Colombia's other neighbors, Barco
emphasized that all were subject to retaliation from the FARC
but Peru had been and continued to be the most collaborative.
The Ambassador noted President Uribe's interest in exploring
with President Gutierrez of Ecuador and others the
possibility of their making public statements against
terrorism, if not against the FARC.


9. (C) Barco also reported that Minister of Defense Uribe had
had a good meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld in Munich but was
unsuccessful in arranging a meeting with his Russian
counterpart. The GOC remained concerned about reports of
Russian arm sales to Venezuela, noting that some of these
weapons would likely end up in the hands of FARC soldiers.
U/S Grossman agreed and said the U.S. had tried to enlighten
the GORF about Chavez intentions and actions and dissuade
Moscow from making the sale, but to no avail.
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BUDGET/HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
--------------


10. (C) Barco expressed gratitude for the Colombian portion
of the Administration's FY2006 budget presented to the U.S.
Congress on February 7. The GOC was making progress, had a
ways to go, and counted on continued U.S. backing. U/S
Grossman underscored the USG commitment to the GOC,
emphasizing its ongoing moral, political and financial
support. The Ambassador noted that the underlying consensus
of support for Colombia in Washington was holding, despite
competing priorities such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and various
domestic issues. The FM asked whether the request for
Colombia would get through the Congress. U/S Grossman
responded that the Administration had put an honest budget
forward and would fight for it. That said, as budgets got
tighter, the GOC had to persevere in making the case and show
forward movement. In particular, the GOC had to get a good
demobilization bill adopted and continue its efforts to
improve the human rights situation. This should include
investigation and punishment of those responsible for the
massacre in Mapiripan and the killings of the three trade
unionists in Arauca, resolution of the case against Lt.
Colonel Orozco, and progress on other outstanding human
rights cases.


11. (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Grossman.
DRUCKER