2004 COUNTER-TERRORISM WRAP-UP

id: 25049
date: 1/6/2005 20:25
refid: 05BOGOTA162
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



-------------- header ends --------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 000162

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2015
TAGS: PTER SNAR PHUM ASEC CO
SUBJECT: 2004 COUNTER-TERRORISM WRAP-UP

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In spite of limited air mobility and ground
support/fixed wing aircraft and the challenge of supporting
some 17,000 troops of Plan Patriota operating in hostile
jungle, the security forces made great advances in 2004,
re-taking 11 FARC-run villages and destroying over 400 FARC
camps. Elsewhere in the country, the police and military
maintained an unprecedented high operational tempo against
all illegal armed groups, which led to the capture of several
important terrorist commanders and hurt active combat units.
Interservice cooperation is improving, and the recently
appointed high command is one of the most skilled and
U.S.-friendly in Colombian history. Desertion and
demobilization programs have removed approximately 10,000
terrorists from the battlefield. End Summary.

--------------
Plan Patriota
--------------


2. (C) Plan Patriota phase 2B (a more than 17,000 troop
effort targeting the FARC in southern Colombia) operations
destroyed 420 FARC encampments, occupied 11 formerly FARC-run
villages, killed or captured almost 500 guerrillas, and
clearly brought the fight to the enemy. The FARC is spending
more of its time thinking about its own preservation than
coordinating offensive operations. The group failed to pull
off a major attack in Bogota in 2004. Plan Patriota troops
seized nearly 250,000 kilograms of FARC rations, over 200,000
gallons of fuel, 500 vehicles, and numerous other supplies.
Almost 300 kilograms of cocaine, five HCL labs, and 1,277
hectares of coca have been destroyed. Occupying troops also
have found FARC code books, financial information, and other
strategic paperwork that provide valuable intelligence. GOC
operations have forced senior FARC leaders to withdraw
rapidly (they even reportedly captured Secretariat member
Mono Jojoy's trademark black beret). In one case, they found
evidence that the U.S. hostages had recently been kept in a
destroyed camp (GOC forces remain committed to the hostages'
safety, but a chance encounter remains possible).


3. (C) The military is struggling with the logistical
challenge of supporting 17,000 troops in the vast, hostile
area of operations. Limited air mobility and ground
support/fixed wing aircraft are serious constraints. GOC
forces are taking casualties, and there are few resources
available to MEDEVAC wounded soldiers from increasingly
remote areas. Sixty-seven Colombian soldiers have been
killed and 328 wounded in combat since phase 2B began in
February. Landmines are one of the leading causes of deaths
and injuries. The security forces are enduring more than
1,600 long, painful cases of leishmanaisis from jungle
living. Half of an entire mobile brigade had to be taken out
of operations to recover from the disease. Plan Patriota
leadership is revamping the soldiers' leave schedule and
improving medical assistance in the field to address the
problem.

--------------
Elsewhere in the Country
--------------


4. (C) Military and police set records for operations against
high value targets, active combat units, and support elements
of all three terrorist organizations, the FARC, ELN, and
paramilitaries.


5. (C) The most important commanders killed or captured
during the year included:

--FARC General Staff Member Ricardo Palmera, "Simon Trinidad"
(extradited to the U.S. on December 31),

--FARC drug-runner/financier Omaira Rojas-Cabrera, "Nayibe
Rojas Valderrama" or "Sonia,"

--FARC Teofilo Forero Mobile Column (TFMC) operations chief
Humberto Valbuena, "Yerbas" (replacing "El Mocho," killed in
2003),

--FARC international liaison chief Rodrigo Granda,

--ELN senior field commander Jose Ramiro Velez, "El Viejo,"
and

--Erminson Cabrera, brother of FARC General Staff member
"Fabian Ramirez" and suspected replacement for Sonia.

--Jose Maria Barros Ipuana, "Chema Balas," believed to be one
of senior AUC commander Jorge Tovar's deputies and implicated
in a massacre of 12 indigenous people in April.


6. (C) Operations against paramilitary groups are at record
highs. For example:

- Over 530 paramilitaries were killed and 4,450 were captured
in 2004, an increase of approximately 80 and 60 percent,
respectively, compared to 2003, according to the GOC.

- When AUC Commander Jorge Tovar kidnapped a former senator,
the GOC ordered the authorities to arrest Tovar wherever they
could find him, including inside the concentration zone in
Cordoba Department.

- The GOC refused to accept known drug trafficker Juan Carlos
Sierra as an AUC negotiator and ordered the authorities to
arrest him.

- During operation "Santuario" in September, the military
killed and captured hundreds of members of the Self-Defense
Forces of Casanare (ACC),which is not participating in peace
talks and was responsible for a large percentage of the
violence on the eastern plains.


7. (U) Violence indicators nationwide are improving.
According to the National Police, murders decreased by 16
percent in 2004 (22,700 in 2003 and 19,010 in 2004),
kidnapping fell 44 percent, terrorist acts fell 42 percent,
and extortion fell 15 percent in 2004.

--------------
Interservice Cooperation a Priority
--------------


8. (C) Despite resource shortages and the service-centric
approach of former Army commander General Carreno, which
forced each service to look out for its own interests,
interservice coordination improved in 2004. With the naming
of General Castellanos to head the Army, Colombia perhaps now
has the most professional, internally cooperative,
U.S.-friendly high command in its national history, and for
the first time is experimenting with a joint operational
structure in the traditional divisions, to mimic the success
of U.S. combat commands. The military created a joint
Caribbean Command and a joint intelligence coordination
center, both of which are headed up by U.S.-friendly generals
with proven track records.

--------------
Deserters and Demobilizations on the Rise
--------------


9. (C) The various deserter and demobilization programs have
now removed about 10,000 active terrorists from the field
(more than 6,000 individual deserters from all groups, about
1,000 paramilitaries from 2003 collective demobilizations,
and close to 3,000 paramilitaries from late 2004
demobilizations) since President Uribe took office in 2002.
The AUC peace process also is sowing deep divisions among the
paramilitary leadership and forcing them to distinguish
between drug traffickers and bona fide members of the
movement. AUC commanders Carlos Castano and Miguel Arroyave,
both wanted in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges, were
killed or forcibly disappeared by fellow paramilitaries.
However, the lack of an adequate legal framework to deal with
those accused of violent crimes, the institutional weaknesses
of the demobilization process itself, and the inability of
the security forces to significantly increase their presence
in areas of demobilization are all threats to the process.


WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================