PEACE COMMISSIONER RECAPS YEAR-END STATUS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 012031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER RECAPS YEAR-END STATUS WITH
ELN, FARC, AND AUC

REF: A. BOGOTA 11926

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) On December 28, the Ambassador reviewed all peace
processes with Colombian Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos
Restrepo. Regarding the ELN, Restrepo told the Ambassador
that he had successfully resisted ELN pressure -- abetted by
the French and especially the Norwegian facilitators -- to
move the talks from Cuba to Europe. With regard to the FARC,
Restrepo said Raul Reyes was not interested in the
international commission's proposal to get the humanitarian
accord discussion underway, was unhappy that the GOC had
united the French and the Swiss into a commission so that he
can no longer play one against the other, and was also
unhappy that the commission was not pushing for the GOC to
cede territory to the FARC in a new "despeje." He said that
Reyes had tried to engineer a private meeting with the Swiss
representative in order to "punish" the French for their
cooperation with the government. Regarding the
paramilitaries, Restrepo said there was no clear timetable
for demobilization of all remaining groups, but he was
optimistic that the majority would demobilize before February

15. Restrepo expressed frustration over GOC failure to name
a senior official to manage implementation of reinsertion and
the Justice and Peace law, and agreed that bringing the ELN
to accept the Justice and Peace law would be difficult. End
Summary.

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GOC-ELN TALKS TO REMAIN IN THE REGION
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2. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said GOC
December 17-22 talks with the Army of National Liberation
(ELN) in Cuba were positive. In Restrepo's view, the ELN had
one primary goal for this round: to get agreement to move the
discussions to Europe, with appropriate guarantees against
arrest, a step they could play as a weakening of the European
designation of the ELN as a terror organization. Restrepo
expressed the belief that the ELN did not want to continue
talks in Cuba because of Castro's "control" over them, and
because the Cuban venue would not afford them the
"legitimacy" they sought from the talks. The Norwegian, and
to a lesser degree the Swiss facilitator, were prepared to
concede the transfer immediately. Restrepo described a very
difficult session with the Swiss and especially with the
Norwegian; he said the Spaniard was a secondary but helpful
player. But, in the end, GOC refusal to consent to the
transfer absent substantive concessions from the ELN carried
the day.


3. (C) Restrepo expressed frustration with the lack of
substantive points raised by ELN leader Antonio Garcia and
the ELN side; in his view their comments were general and
vague. Restrepo found Garcia to be out of touch with
Colombian reality and with his own organization. But Garcia
was able to control his "explosive" personality and remained
cordial throughout the talks. It seemed to Restrepo that
Garcia has become more pragmatic through time and his ideas,
as well as those of the other ELN interlocutors, seemed less
fundamentalist than in the past. In Restrepo's view, the ELN
wants to escape the "terrorist trademark" but is not willing
to accept the conditions of the Justice and Peace law, which
will be a problem in the future, both in the talks with the
ELN themselves, and in their side-effects on the paramilitary
peace process. Restrepo said he sees only the alternatives

of forcing the ELN to accept the Justice and Peace law or
amending it. He speculated that the GOC might be able to
negotiate with the ELN about prison conditions and locations
-- for example, in the case of Garcia, there might be an
agreement for him to serve his time in Venezuela.


4. (C) Restrepo described the current ELN membership as the
"diverted sons of the Catholic Church." They are "justice
fundamentalists" who, compared to the FARC or AUC, care less
about money and more about ideology. For example, the ELN
ideology asserts that the suffering of kidnap victims is a
response to GOC "injustice" and, amazingly, makes the victims
"better persons." Restrepo confessed that if it were not for
the many lives that could be saved with an agreement with the
ELN, he would not waste his time in talks with the group.
(The Ambassador noted that a peace process with the ELN would
also serve to isolate the FARC as the lone hold-out from
peace talks and would allow the government to concentrate its
forces against them, as well give added legitimacy to the
peace process with the rightist paramilitaries.)

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IS THE FARC CORNERED?
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5. (C) Restrepo said that Raul Reyes, international
coordinator and principal spokesperson of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),has argued for years against
FARC leaders like Alfonso Cano that there should be no
movement on hostages or other negotiable topics. Reyes
argued he could get the best deal by going around the GOC and
negotiating with the French and the Swiss, trying to play
them off against each other. Restrepo said that the French
and Swiss representatives had never met until he introduced
them during his latest trip to Paris, following authorization
from French Foreign Minister Douste-Balzy, with whom he had a
"tough but very constructive" discussion. Restrepo again
characterized the Spanish as a helpful but secondary player.
In that meeting, he invited them to come to Colombia to view
the El Retiro site where the government already had said that
humanitarian accord talks might take place.


6. (C) Upon arrival at the site, facilitated by the ICRC,
the French and Swiss representatives quickly concluded,
according to Restrepo, that a detailed proposal for security
arrangements could be elaborated that would form the basis
for a meeting between the GOC and FARC representatives on a
"humanitarian" exchange of prisoners. Their proposal emerged
shortly thereafter and was accepted by the GOC that same day
(reftel); there is still no word from the FARC.


7. (C) Restrepo noted that, as the Spanish, French and Swiss
representatives were departing from their survey of El
Retiro, an urgent call from Raul Reyes was passed to the
Swiss representative; Reyes wanted to meet with him alone,
without the Frenchman. Only with difficulty did Restrepo and
the French representative dissuade him from accepting.
Restrepo characterized Reyes' call as an effort to "punish"
the French for its cooperation with the GOC and the Swiss.


8. (C) Restrepo said that he has heard through several
sources that Reyes was upset by the GOC's acceptance of the
commission's proposal and that it had put Reyes in an
uncomfortable position within the FARC leadership. Restrepo
commented that Reyes's failed strategy has hurt him
politically within the organization and is likely to
stimulate further disagreement within the FARC leadership.
It is unclear whether the FARC will accept the commission's
proposal, but Restrepo views the GOC as having the upper hand
this time around. The key is to avoid any further
negotiation of the French-Swiss proposal; the FARC must take
it or leave it.


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PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION CONCERNS
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9. (C) Restrepo said that, despite efforts by United-Self
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) leaders to recreate a
unified negotiating table after the two-month demobilization
suspension, the AUC has been unable to restore unity; he is
able to discuss demobilization dates, procedures, and details
bloc-by-bloc. The Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) decision to
demobilize was critical to unfreezing the process. There is
still no demobilization timetable for all groups, but he was
optimistic that the majority of the remaining blocs would
demobilize before February 15. The Mineros Bloc, with 1,000
members, plans to demobilize in early January. The
symbolically important Self-Defense Mid-Magdalena Bloc of
historical AUC leader Ramon Isaza, with 650 troops, is likely
to demobilize before the end of January. Discussions with
the Elmer Cardenas bloc are going well. But Restrepo is less
confident about demobilization of the AUC "North Bloc" with
3,000 members under leader "Jorge 40," because regional
pressures and a genuine FARC security threat could hamper the
demobilization before February 15.


10. (C) Restrepo expressed frustration that President Uribe
has failed to accept the recommendation from him and several
others in the government for appointment of a senior
official, with a track record for good public administration
and his own political base, to manage reinsertion and
implementation of the Justice and Peace law. Restrepo agreed
with the Ambassador's comment that Minister of Justice and
Interior Pretelt sees creation of such a position as a
weakening of his own authority and expressed puzzlement
because he believes Pretelt will leave the government anyway
after elections. Restrepo
said the lack of clear action on these critical processes as
a serious problem, which is why he had publicly criticized
GOC management in testimony to Congress the previous month.
The Ambassador noted that he already had praised Restrepo's
testimony to other GOC officials and expressed concern about
the slow pace of implementation of the Justice and Peace law.

WOOD