ICRC CHIEF REVEALS FARC AND ELN CONTACTS ON POLICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 011862

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SNAR CO
SUBJECT: ICRC CHIEF REVEALS FARC AND ELN CONTACTS ON POLICE
HOSTAGES; OFFERS VIEWS ON ELN AND FARC PEACE TALKS

REF: BOGOTA 11611

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

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Summary
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1. (C) International Committee of the Red Cros (ICRC)
Colombia Head of Delegation Juan Pedro Schaerer said December
21 the FARC and ELN had called him the previous day to make
arrangements to transfer 29 police hostages to ICRC custody.
The army located the hostages before the ICRC could finalize
transfer arrangements. Schaerer said it was likely the
guerrilla groups wanted to hand the hostages over to the ICRC
to embarrass the GOC. With regard to the December 12
international commission proposal for a security zone for
GOC-FARC hostage exchange talks, Schaerer characterized
President Uribe's quick and public acceptance of the proposal
as "unnecessary" but said he "would not be surprised" if the
FARC also accepted the terms. According to Schaerer, the
FARC Secretariat is divided on how to respond, and the fact
that it has not yet answered is probably a good sign, since a
"no" response could have been issued quickly. The FARC's
acceptance would be ironic, he said, because only the FARC
has troops currently in the zone and therefore only the FARC
would have to "demilitarize" in that area. Schaerer said the
ELN is financially weak and fears a FARC attack in Arauca,
following the ELN's killing of a major FARC leader in that
area. Schaerer plans to visit Havana mid-January to meet the
ELN and discuss how the ICRC could support the GOC-ELN talks.
End summary.

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FARC and ELN Call ICRC
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2. (C) Schaerer told D/Polcouns December 21 the FARC called
him on December 20 to say it had 29 police hostages from the
FARC/ELN December 17 attack near San Marino (Choco
Department) and wanted to hand them over to the ICRC,
"quickly, very quickly, today." Schaerer said he started to
make arrangements for a helicopter, eventually obtaining one
in Medellin from the Antioquia Governor. Some 30 minutes
after the FARC call, the ELN phoned Schaerer to say it had
the 29 hostages and needed to hand them over soon. Schaerer
told the ELN of the FARC call and asked if the ELN was
coordinating with the FARC. The ELN said it was, and
explained that the FARC's communications capability "was not
strong at the moment," hence the ELN assistance. (Schaerer
said the FARC call was on a very poor quality line, whereas
the ELN call was clear.) Schaerer flew to Medellin and
started to make arrangements to place ICRC emblems on the
helicopter. He informed the GOC ("they were very pleased")
and the army ("they did not seem to have an idea of where the
hostages were"). While Schaerer was awaiting a further call
from the FARC/ELN to tell him where the helicopter should go,
the army called Schaerer to say it had custody of the
hostages. (FYI, Embassy had released four Blackhawk helos on
an emergency basis the day before to help GOC rescue efforts,
at some cost to spray operations. Since the rescue, they are
back in the field.) Schaerer said a total of less than three
hours had elapsed from the time the FARC made the initial
call to the time the army phoned to say it had the hostages.

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ICRC Assessment of FARC/ELN Calls
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3. (C) Schaerer said he believes the FARC/ELN had always
intended to hand over the 29 hostages to the ICRC in order to
embarrass the GOC. The FARC has done this before. Schaerer
speculated the FARC/ELN might have wanted to accelerate the
release of the hostages to the ICRC because of GOC military
pressure, and perhaps released them rather than wait for the
ICRC to arrive for precisely this reason. In Schaerer's
view, the FARC/ELN was probably not under strong military
pressure, however, because the groups have a significant
presence in the area and the military "was only flying
helicopters."


4. (C) Schaerer said it is difficult to assess how well the
military did in locating the hostages. He was concerned that

the military might have been listening to his conversations
with the FARC and ELN but, since neither group told him where
the hostages were being held, he is not concerned that GOC
telephone intercepts led the military to a specific hostage
location. (Such a situation, had it occurred, would have
damaged the guerrilla groups' confidence in its
communications with the ICRC, he said.) The FARC called
Schaerer again on December 21 to ask the ICRC to issue a
statement to the effect that the FARC had intended to release
the hostages all along. Schaerer told the FARC he had
already responded to press inquiries on the subject, referred
them to the articles, and declined to issue a further
statement.

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FARC and the International Commission Proposal
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5. (C) Schaerer said it was "unnecessary" for President
Uribe to accept immediately and publicly December 12 the
international commission's "security zone" proposal for
GOC-FARC talks on a hostage exchange (reftel),but he "would
not be surprised" if the FARC also accepted the zone. The
FARC was in a tough position now, because it has guerrillas
currently in the zone (some permanent, others entering and
leaving) and would have to remove them. It would be ironic,
Schaerer said, if the FARC had to "demilitarize" the security
zone while the GOC did not because there were no security
forces present. Schaerer expressed doubts that the proposed
40 international observers (whom he said would be drawn from
the militaries of the international commission countries:
France, Switzerland, and Spain) could cover the 65 square
mile security zone territory, especially at night, but later
said if the FARC accepted the proposal he would expect it to
respect the demilitarized nature of the zone.


6. (C) In Schaerer's view, the FARC Secretariat is divided
on how to respond to Uribe's acceptance of the security zone
and the fact that the FARC has not yet answered it is
probably a good sign, since a "no" decision could be issued
very quickly. Schaerer said Manuel Marulanda, "Mono Jojoy,"
and Raul Reyes were "not open" to exploratory talks with the
GOC, whereas Cano and "Catatumbo" "were more open." He said
press reports that the commission had met with Catatumbo were
false; the ICRC accompanied the commission's preparatory team
and there were no meetings with the FARC. The ICRC
understands that the commission emailed the security zone
proposal to Reyes on December 12. According to Schaerer,
Reyes never uses his computer personally, for security
reasons. Schaerer said it was likely that a lower level
person logged on for Reyes, printed the proposal or placed it
on a disk, then delivered it to Reyes, who in turn shared it
with other Secretariat members. This process could have
taken a day or two, or over a week, depending on the location
of the parties.


7. (C) With regard to substantive FARC negotiating
objectives, Schaerer said the FARC knows it cannot expect
Uribe to return 500 FARC prisoners to the FARC ranks, nor can
it expect Uribe to secure the return of "Simon Trinidad" and
"Sonia," both imprisoned in the U.S. He said he is not even
sure the FARC knows yet what its bottom line is if it
eventually meets with the GOC. "They are very difficult to
understand," he said.

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ELN Weak, Worried about FARC; ICRC Travel to Havana
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8. (C) Schaerer said the ELN is weak because it has lost
significant revenues that it previously obtained from "oil
taxes" in Arauca, obtains less income from kidnappings, and
does not (unlike the FARC) get involved in large-scale
narcotics trafficking. He is unsure of the exact number of
hostages the ELN holds (NGO estimates are about 500, although
it is not clear how many have died in captivity),but said
the percentage of hostages to ELN fighters was high, much
higher than for the FARC, and maintaining the hostages alive
is expensive. (Schaerer was scathing about the ELN's
reliance on civilian kidnappings for income and its use of
anti-personnel mines, both of which he characterized as
"serious international humanitarian law crimes.")


9. (C) Schaerer said the ELN is very concerned about the

consequences of its recent killing of Arauca FARC leader "El
Che." Schaerer is not sure if the ELN knew what it was doing
when it killed El Che, but he said the ELN is worried and
convinced the FARC is planning its revenge.


10. (C) Schaerer said he plans to visit Havana mid-January
to meet with the ELN regarding the status of the GOC-ELN
talks and discuss ICRC assistance. (The GOC-ELN talks will
resume in Havana late January.)
WOOD