AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PARAMILITARY ISSUES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 011742

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2015
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PTER SNAR CO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PARAMILITARY ISSUES WITH
SENATOR PARDO

REF: BOGOTA 5619

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D.


1. (C) Summary: On December 15, Ambassador hosted a
breakfast for Senator Rafael Pardo, Liberal Party
presidential nomination candidate, and prominent critic of
the GOC on paramilitary (AUC) demobilization and the Justice
and Peace Law. Pardo criticized the law as weak on justice,
reparations, and dismantling AUC criminal structures.
Ambassador stressed our consistent public call for the GOC to
effectively implement the law. Ambassador and Pardo agreed
on the importance of USG continuing to state our desire that
AUC narcotraffickers spend time in prison and be extradited
to the U.S. Pardo conceded that the paramilitary peace
process is irreversible and doubted the AUC would consider
going back to fight the Colombian state. He expressed strong
concern about the degree of AUC meddling in Congressional
elections slated for March 12. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador met for over two hours on December 15 with
Senator Rafael Pardo Rueda, minister of Defense under
President Gaviria, and current candidate for the Liberal
Party's presidential nomination. The majority of the
discussion centered on paramilitary (AUC) demobilization and
implementation of the Justice and Peace Law. (Comment:
Pardo was a vocal, leading critic on several important
elements of the law during its debate in the Congress. End
Comment.) Pardo reiterated his criticism of the law, stating
it was weak on justice, reparations, and dismantling AUC
criminal structures. Ambassador replied that the law had
passed with ample majorities in Congress and that the GOC was
genuinely committed to implementing it effectively and as
quickly as possible. Ambassador reviewed for Pardo USG
resources committed to the process to date and said the U.S.
was looking for ways to do more. Ambassador stressed the
need for the Colombian private sector to greatly improve its
efforts to offer gainful employment for reinserted AUC
members.


3. (C) Pardo claimed that the GOC had no interest in seeing
leading AUC drug traffickers in prison. He stated that
recent case of alias Don Berna, who was moved from a maximum
to medium security prison, was a bad sign for the Colombian
public, showing that Don Berna was effectively calling the
shots. Ambassador stressed that the USG has been very
insistent, both publicly and privately, that we wanted to see
Don Berna and other leading AUC criminals in jail, and
eventually extradited to the U.S. Pardo recognized that the
USG had played a key role in keeping pressure on the AUC
leadership. Ambassador reminded Pardo that the GOC's
decision to suspend the extradition of Don Berna was
conditioned on his continued cooperation on demobilization
and that the suspension would be reviewed after he is
processed formally under the Justice and Peace Law.


4. (C) Pardo expressed strong concern over the level of AUC
influence/intimidation in the current Congressional campaign
season, which ends with elections on March 12. He stated
that the most important short term goal of the AUC is to
elect enough members of Congress sympathetic to its cause to
reform the Constitution to block extradition. (Comment: Any
legislation to modify extradition, in general terms, would
require modifying the Constitution. Constitutional reform is
a lengthy process that requires approval by the majority of
members of both houses. See Reftel for observations on the
level of AUC influence in the current Congress. End
Comment.) Ambassador recognized Pardo's concern as
legitimate and said he would look for opportunities to
express publicly that AUC members who meddle in the electoral
process be stripped of any and all Justice and Peace Law
benefits.


5. (C) Despite his misgivings about the strength of the law
and the pace of its implementation, Pardo acknowledged that
the paramilitary peace process is irreversible and doubted
that the AUC would consider going back to fighting the
Colombian state. He said that the AUC's game plan is to
manipulate the political process, primarily through the March
Congressional elections, and not to challenge the GOC
militarily.
WOOD