ELECTORAL GUARANTEES DECISION BOLD BUT RISKY MOVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010892

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PINR CO
SUBJECT: ELECTORAL GUARANTEES DECISION BOLD BUT RISKY MOVE
FOR COURT; URIBE REMAINS STRONG FAVORITE

REF: A. BOGOTA 10686

B. BOGOTA 9896

C. BOGOTA 8695

Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker, Reasons: 1.4 B & D.

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Summary
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1. (C) The Constitutional Court's ruling in favor of the
Electoral Guarantees law was a bold but risky move that some
say could call into question the court's legitimacy. The
court essentially rewrote the law to avoid sending it back to
the Congress for amendments. A Congressional rewrite would
have likely made it impossible for President Uribe to run
given the short time left before campaigns start. However,
the court may have overstepped institutional boundaries and
solidified opposition to its "activist" character. Despite
murmuring that the court's decision places too many
restrictions on Uribe's campaign, the president remains the
overwhelming favorite. He will win or lose based on the
electorate's judgment of his record, not because of the
court-imposed campaign restrictions or the effectiveness of
opposition figures. The perception that the decision was
tough on Uribe can only help him, as it increases the
likelihood that all will perceive the election, and thus the
result, to be fair. End summary.

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Court Rewrites Electoral Guarantees Law
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2. (U) The Constitutional Court essentially rewrote major
portions of the Electoral Guarantees Law in its 7-2 vote to
uphold the measure, a decision that gave the green light for
President Uribe to run for reelection. The court approved
verbatim 12 of the law's 52 articles, rewrote substantially
another 20, partially struck down 18, and threw out another
two. As one of Colombia's four co-equal high courts, the
Constitutional Court's ruling is binding.


3. (U) The court's rewrites included:

--Political Activity by GOC employees: the Court changed the
law to prevent employees from engaging in partisan campaign
activities.

--Spending limits: the Court reduced the incumbent's spending
limit to a level significantly below that for challengers
(the incumbent limit for 2006 is the same amount as in the
2002 campaign).

--Campaign donations: the Court eliminated the provision in
the law allowing corporations to donate to campaigns; now
only individuals may donate.

--Presidential community council meetings: the Court ruled
that Uribe's weekly meetings cannot be televised live on
public television.

--Use of Presidential Palace: the Court added language
prohibiting the incumbent from using the Palace for partisan
campaign events.

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Decision a Mixed Blessing for Uribe
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4. (C) The decision was a mixed blessing for Uribe. It was
friendly in that it allows him to launch his reelection
campaign; the court could have struck down the law as
unconstitutional, either in whole or in significant part (as
the two dissenting judges wished),or returned the law to the
Congress for a rewrite. The latter option would have likely
resulted in Uribe losing the right to run again because the
Congress would not have had time to correct deficiencies and
obtain the court's blessing before electoral campaigns start.
The decision was unfriendly to Uribe in that it places a
number of key restrictions on his ability to campaign.

According to the court, Uribe must announce his reelection
bid by November 28 and the campaign restrictions outlined
above kick in from that date.

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Legitimacy in Question?
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5. (C) According to Uribe loyalists, the court's decision is
consistent with its "activist" character and calls into
question the court's long-term legitimacy. Some of post's
contacts in Uribista circles (in the presidency and the
Congress) tell us that a second Uribe Administration could
push (either via the Congress or public referendum) to
abolish the court, arguing that it "legislates from the
bench." Such a move appears to have important adherents in
the legal community as well. Nevertheless, it would be a
challenging legal prospect and could be distracting for an
administration that will confront significant security and
economic/tax issues if it has a second term.


6. (C) Prior to the 1991 Constitutional reform,
constitutional issues were decided by the constitutional
chamber of the Supreme Court. One option for constitutional
reforms would be to return to that system. It was a less
activist court, more "respectful" of government perogative.

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Uribe's Next Steps
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7. (C) Uribe's first step after announcing his candidacy by
November 28 will be to choose a political party to serve as
his vehicle (see Ref C for information on the pro-Uribe
parties). The Conservative Party (PCC) is holding a national
referendum November 27 to decide whether to support Uribe in
coalition or run its own candidate. Party head and Senator
Carlos Holguin publicly stated that the PCC might run its own
candidate if Uribe announces that his vehicle party is the
nascent National Unity Party. (Comment: Holguin's threat
means little in real terms; the PCC has no-one that could
challenge Uribe and the vast majority of its members are
staunchly pro-Uribe. End Comment.) The most likely
scenario, according to pundits, is that Uribe will select the
dormant "Colombia First" movement that brought him to power
in 2002, in order not to offend the egos of the leaders of
the four major pro-Uribe parties. The other parties would
then join with Colombia First in coalition. Uribe must
formally register his candidacy by January 28.

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Opposition Strategy
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8. (C) Opposition leaders, including members of the Liberal
Party (PLC),Democratic Pole (PDI),and Democratic
Alternative (AD),tell us that the presence of three or four
leading opposition candidates on the ballot might force Uribe
into a second round. (Electoral rules mandate a second round
runoff between the top two first-round finishers if no
candidate attains 50 percent of the vote.) Current public
opinion data does not support their optimism, however. A
wild card is two-time former Bogota mayor and independent
Antanus Mockus, who may be the only rival that could run
close to Uribe in a second round. Mockus announced his
candidacy on November 19. In a head-to-head contest against
Uribe, however, it is not clear that Mockus would have the
star quality needed to outshine the charismatic president.

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Comment
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9. (C) Uribe's campaign abilities are immense and his
ability as president to make news is unmatched by any
candidate. He will win or lose based on the electorate's
assessment of his record, not because of court-imposed
campaign restrictions or the effectiveness of opposition
figures. The court's decision raised hackles among the
political class for a number of reasons, some legitimate,

some not. The court was making a political point in its
decision about the importance of ensuring that all candidates
have as fair a chance as possible in an environment where one
candidate is the 800 pound gorilla. If Uribe is reelected,
challenging the court could be a luxury he can do without.
More immediately, the perception that the court's decision
was tough on Uribe can only help the president, as it
strengthens the likelihood that all candidates will be forced
to admit the campaign, and thus the result, was fair.
DRUCKER