COLOMBIAN THINK TANK SEEKS TO ADVANCE ELN PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010498

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS PHUM SNAR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN THINK TANK SEEKS TO ADVANCE ELN PEACE
THROUGH US/EU ENGAGEMENT

REF: BOGOTA 10106

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) The consultative process underway between the National
Liberation Army (ELN) and Colombian advisors is unlikely to
lead to substantive peace talks with the GOC unless the
international community, especially the United States, nudges
the parties forward, according to Ideas for Peace (Ideas Para
La Paz) Director Sergio Jaramillo in a November 2 meeting
with the Ambassador. He probed whether the U.S. (and perhaps
the UK on behalf of the EU) would be willing to have a
"non-meeting" with ELN spokesperson Galan, to convey the
international community's interest in peace and to stress
that the process would not be indefinite. The Ambassador
emphasized that neither the USG nor the Colombian government
was willing to negotiate with terrorists unwilling to
renounce terrorist activity. Jaramillo said he would convey
to the ELN that abandoning terrorist action now was a
critical step to advance any negotiations domestically and
international support. End summary.

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ELN Intransigent Despite Dwindling Numbers
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2. (SBU) On November 2, Ideas Para La Paz Director Sergio
Jaramillo briefed the Ambassador on the status of the ELN's
"Peace House" project outside Rio Negro, Antioquia. ELN
leader Gerardo Antonio Bermudez Sanchez, a.k.a. "Francisco
Galan," is participating in discussions with various members
of civil society, the private sector, and members of
Congress. Five "guarantors" (Grupo de Garantes -- Moritz
Akerman, Daniel Garcia-Pena, Alvaro Jimenez, Gustavo Ruiz and
Aleja Vargas) support the effort. With the concurrence of
the GOC, think tank Ideas Para La Paz is serving as the
technical secretariat to the process. Jaramillo told the
Ambassador that the ELN's political significance continued to
surpass its dwindling size (roughly 3,600). While the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),paramilitary
forces, and desertions had worked to reduce the overall ELN
rank and file each year, the communities in ELN strongholds
remained dedicated to the ELN's social revolution ideology.
Both Galan and the guarantors asserted that the debilitated
ELN was ready to get serious about the peace process and use
the Peace House as a confidence-building measure towards
larger issues.


3. (SBU) Jaramillo admitted that the ELN retained more
autonomy and internal coherence than many believed.
Nevertheless, he was skeptical about the ELN's readiness and
willingness to negotiate. He recounted earlier ELN offers to
reach a deal, all of which failed to advance past initial
stages. He acknowledged that the Peace House initiative did
not have any notable advantages over the June 2004-April 2005
Mexican-mediated discussions, which collapsed when the ELN
walked away in April.


4. (SBU) Jaramillo added that the ELN had become increasingly
fragmented as their numbers dwindled. The control of the
Central Command over some local fronts was also in doubt.
Nonetheless, according to Jaramillo, the ELN believed it
needed concessions from the GOC to prove to the rank and file
that it had won social improvements for the Colombian people.


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Probing for U.S. Involvement
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5. (C) Jaramillo probed for U.S. willingness (and that of UK
on behalf of the EU) to have a role in the process. He asked
whether a U.S. official would consider meeting Galan: (1) to
convey the international community's interest in peace and
that the ELN was still on the radar screen; and (2) to
impress upon the ELN that time was running out and they

needed to negotiate. Jaramillo said one encounter with a
U.S. official emphasizing these points could make the
exercise relevant and increase the chances of forward
movement.


6. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. strongly supported
the idea of a serious peace process with the ELN, but the
U.S. would not negotiate with active terrorists, nor would it
counsel the GOC to do so. He reminded Jaramillo that the GOC
had made several good faith offers over the last year -- all
rebuffed by the ELN. The GOC's final stand was that it would
not negotiate with a group that refused to renounce
kidnapping and terrorist attacks during talks. Jaramillo
acknowledged the point but said the ELN could not take the
risk by unilaterally starting the peace process. The
Ambassador countered that neither the GOC nor the United
States would condone the ELN's continued terrorist activity
while it purported to negotiate peace to "meet the ELN
halfway." The ELN must renounce terror and become serious
about moving from terrorist activity to the political
mainstream. Even if the rank and file caused a rare
cease-fire violation, it would be a vast improvement over the
current ELN leadership blanket approval of terrorist
activities.


7. (SBU) Jaramillo said he would tell Galan that a cease-fire
would be a necessary step to progress any further. He
recognized that the ELN had rejected GOC offers over the last
few years because of its unwillingness to negotiate with
Uribe. However, the likelihood of a second Uribe term
coupled with an increase in attacks against the ELN might
persuade them to seek a deal.

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Time Running Out
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8. (SBU) In an aside to the PolCouns, Jaramillo said he
doubted the ELN would be able to extend the Peace House
discussions past the original December deadline. The GOC
seemed reluctant to let the pre-negotiation process drag on,
possibly due to the ELN's historic difficulty with
negotiations or as a counterbalance to having denied the
request by the paramilitaries to extend their demobilizations
past December 31, 2005. In any case, Jaramillo said he
sought to make the ELN's dialogues "meaningful" and hoped he
could motivate Galan to advance negotiations in time.
WOOD