CD BRIGADE COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 010419

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR INL/LP AND WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PTER MOPS CO
SUBJECT: CD BRIGADE COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON
ERADICATION OPERATIONS - GOOD IDEAS, BUT EXPENSIVE



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a visit by NAS Bogota and INL
personnel on October 27, the Counter Drug Brigade (CD BDE)
Commander made twelve recommendations to improve the CD
BDE's support to spray operations. His principal
recommendations included standing up a fourth combat
battalion with air assets to provide support to
eradication's third spray package, targeting high
concentration areas and hitting them more than once a year,
and improving maintenance and intelligence. Most of his
recommendations come with a price tag. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On October 27, the NAS Bogota Director traveled to
the CD BDE headquarters in Larandia, Caqueta, as part of a
familiarization/courtesy call on Brigadier General Luis
Felipe Paredes, Commander of the CD BDE. The NAS Director
was accompanied by two INL program officers from Washington
and NAS Bogota's CD BDE program manager.


3. (SBU) During the course of a briefing, General Paredes
made twelve recommendations on how to improve eradication
operations.

(1) Spray the same area three times during the year. This
would be a powerful economic disincentive by denying growers
and narco-terrorists any profit from successive crops and
would defeat their tactic of rapid replanting of sprayed
crops (Note: It would also mean spraying replanting well
before they were ready for harvest).

(2) Orient efforts towards spraying in zones containing the
highest concentration of illicit crops and the most numerous
production and processing facilities for coca. General
Paredes specifically mentioned targeting Meta, Caqueta,
Putumayo, and Narino departments.

(3) Improve the maintenance and operational readiness of
spray aircraft and Plan Colombia helicopters.

(4) Create a fourth combat battalion to provide operational
security to the third spray package. (NOTE: Given the need
for battalion training, rotation, and rest, the three CD
battalions can only support two of the current three spray
packages. As a consequence, the third spray package
operates without CB BGE ground troop support, except for a
Quick Reaction Force in case of an emergency. We also have
discouraged this option because of the cost.)

(5) Increase the number of helicopters and crews so as to be
able to support a fourth combat battalion by providing
transportation for them. (Note: The Plan Colombia
helicopter program can only support two locations or spray
packages at any one time.)

(6) Streamline the process to provide faster human rights
certification of military units to operationally support the
CD Brigade during spray missions, so that we can spray where
the troops already are.

(7) Strengthen the property and asset forfeiture efforts in
areas sprayed to dissuade re-planting and further
cultivation in surrounding areas.

(8) Assign a member of the Colombian Judicial Police to the
Quick Reaction Force. This would allow arrests to be made
during CD Brigade operations. (NOTE: At present, the only
arrests that can be made by CD Brigade personnel are of
persons who are caught while committing a crime. CD Brigade
members are not allowed to enter houses from which shots are
fired at spray planes, for example.)

(9) Increase civil-military operations in the spray area.
This includes proving basic information on the spray program
and the CD Brigade's mission.

(10) Strengthen all-source intelligence gathering and
sharing between the CD Brigade and NAS elements.

(11) Continue training with U.S. Special Forces instructors.

(12) Improve the CD Brigade's basic equipment (i.e.,
helmets, bulletproof vests, assault weapons, etc.)


4. (SBU) Comment: The CD BDE Commander's recommendations
are worth considering. A few of the recommendations could
be implemented with no major funding impact. However, most
of them would require major financial outlays.
Consideration of training and equipping a fourth combat
battalion for the CD BDE would involve purchasing four UH-
60s. With a spare parts package, the purchase of additional
UH-60s would cost approximately USD 19 million each, for a
total of USD 76 million for transportation support alone.
End Comment.

WOOD