OPPOSITION A ROLL: FORCE CABINET TO QUIT, GET

S E C R E T BEIRUT 000541


DEPARTMENT FOR NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION A ROLL: FORCE CABINET TO QUIT, GET
SYRIA TO BIQA'A

REF: A. BEIRUT 523

B. BEIRUT 533

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, based on 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Chattering away at a 2/21 dinner hosted by Boutros
Harb, leading members of the Christian opposition and Walid
Jumblatt's bloc were visibly buoyed by what they saw as three
victories earlier that day: the largest anti-Syrian
demonstration in Lebanon's history, Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri's acquiesence to a confidence debate on the Karami
government, and President Bush's strong call in Belgium for
Lebanese independence. They told the Ambassador that, with
the need to react to Hariri's death, legislative elections
have fallen lower in their list of priorities. Now, they
define their goals as 1) forcing a credible investigation
into Hariri's assassination, 2) toppling the Karami
government, including its intelligence chiefs, 3) achieving a
significant Syrian withdrawal and shuttering of Syrian
intelligence headquarters in Lebanon. Only then should
legislative elections be held, they said, as only those
achievements will tip the elections in their favor. The
opposition politicians were divided on how loudly to call for
UNSCR 1559 implementation, which they described as being
increasingly, and successfully, portrayed as a "Christian"
issue, with potentially divisive results. Most preferred to
rest on the safer "Taif accord" principles of Syrian
redeployment, while urging the U.S. and international
community to keep the pressure up on UNSCR 1559. They were
relatively relaxed about Hizballah, believing that getting
Syria out of Lebanon would in itself force Hizballah to move
into the Lebanese mainstream. End summary.

UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, OPPOSITION
IN UPBEAT MOOD AFTER "TRIPLE TRIUMPH"
--------------


2. (C) Christian opposition politician Boutros Harb hosted
a 2/21 dinner that included (inter alia) the Ambassador;
Qornet Shehwan Christian opposition politicians Nayla
Mouawad, Gebran Tueni, Amin Gemayal and Nassib Lahoud; and --
in what he described as his first evening social event since
the 10/1/04 assassination attempt against him -- Druse MP
Marwan Hamadeh. Compared to their bleak moods since Hariri's
assassination (and their generally doomsday, naysayer
outlooks),the politicians were almost giddy over the day's
events.


3. (C) They spent considerable time reveling in details of
the day's demonstration (in which all had participated,
Hamadeh leaning on a cane),the largest anti-Syrian gathering
in Lebanon's history. They all remarked on how correct the
security forces had been in general. "You could see it in
their eyes -- the soldiers were proud of us!" Nayla Mouawad
proclaimed, citing speeches that called for the Lebanese army
to be the only army on Lebanese soil. They also figuratively
slapped the Ambassador on the back in joy for President
Bush's strong remarks about Lebanon delivered in Brussels
earlier that day; several guests later got SMS text messages
on their phones with quotes from President Bush's remarks
with Jacques Chirac.


4. (C) Harb's dinner guests also spoke with pride about
their session that morning with Parliamentary Speaker Nabih
Berri, in a meeting before the formal demonstration. Berri
had "tried everything" to get the 40-some opposition MPs to
agree to resume work on the draft electoral law, Lahoud said.
But the group had pushed for the Speaker's acquiesence with
their call for a special session -- now scheduled for
February 28 -- to debate the Karami government, with the
possibility of a vote of confidence. (See ref a for Berri's
version of this meeting.) Harb's guests all agreed that
pushing Berri into the corner on this issue was a good show
of strength.

OPPOSITION PRIORITIES: WHAT
IS NEEDED BEFORE ELECTIONS
--------------


5. (C) As he had with the Hariri family immediately prior
to the Harb dinner (ref b),the Ambassador asked what was the
purpose of the Parliamentary debate, when the pro-Syrian
votes would presumably carry any vote of confidence. With
others temporarily deferring to him, Lahoud said that the
value of this postponement of the electoral law debate was
clear only in the context of the overall opposition
priorities, which he defined as follows:

-- Full and credible international investigation into the
Hariri murder.

-- Resignation of the Karami cabinet, including security
chiefs Jamal al-Sayyed at Surete General, Raymond Azar at the
LAF G-2.

-- Significant Syrian withdrawal ("preferably all the way"
to Syria but at least to the Biqa'a Valley),with a closing
down of the Syrian Military Intelligence headquarters in
Lebanon.

Only then, Lahoud specified, did the opposition want to face
elections. If legislative elections have to be delayed
beyond the April 17 commencement in order to finish the list
of priorities, "we can live with that," Lahoud said.

STRIVING FOR A TECHNOCRATIC CABINET
TO OVERSEE THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked what the point was of toppling
an unpopular, ineffective, directionless government like the
cabinet of Prime Minister 'Umar Karami. "It would be a
victory!" Mouawad said. "The people would see that they
don't have to live with what Syria forces on us!" Others
agreed that it would be a rallying call for the opposition,
just as the other steps would be as well. The Ambassador
noted that assembling a new cabinet would require
consultations with President Lahoud, whom all of them had
largely avoided since Lahoud's 9/3/04 term extension: would
then agree on consultations with Lahoud? Yes, Hamadeh
responded, "we will follow the constitution" (and its call
for Parliamentary consultations with the President); we have
to respect the constitution."


7. (C) Everyone agreed that what they desired was a
"technical" cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and composed
of a small number of ministers holding multiple portfolios,
but none of whom (including the PM) would be a candidate for
legislative elections. The Ambassador noted that Minister of
Justice Adnan Addoum, a Sunni not running for Parliament,
would appear to fit the criteria they described. "No!" cried
Mouawad. Lahoud said that "you know what we mean -- people
not involved in politics." When the Ambassador asked who,
specifically, could serve as the non-political Sunni Prime
Minister, Hamadeh said, "well, it could have been (current
Minister of Economy and Trade) Adnan Kassar, if Adnan hadn't
been part of this government."

DISMANTLING THE 'MUKHABARAT' REGIME
--------------


8. (S) As part of the cabinet-toppling exercise, Lahoud
emphasized that Jamal al-Sayyed (chief of Surete General) and
Raymond Azar (head of the LAF's Deuxieme Bureau, or G-2)
"have to go." They are the ones, "especially Jamil," who
enforce the Syrian domination of Lebanon. The opposition
strives to rid Lebanon not only of Syrian interference but
also the "whole culture of a 'mukhabarat' (intelligence)
regime." Jamil will "not go quietly," but he should be
forced to leave, even if only on the excuse of the enormous
breach of security that occurred with Hariri's murder.
"Everyone knows" Jamil al-Sayyed had to have been complicit
in Hariri's murder, Hamadeh insisted, adding that
Presidential Security head Mustafa Hamdan (rumored to have
plotted the attack against Hamadeh) should be added to the
list of security chiefs to be sacked prior to elections.
Only if these security chiefs go can the opposition be
assured that they won't be defeated by "dirty tricks."

CLOSING DOWN RUSTOM'S HOUSE OF HORRORS
--------------


9. (S) Regarding Syrian withdrawal, Harb's feisty dinner
guests made the same arguments as Hariri's family had earlier
in the evening (ref b): the goal is total withdrawal of all
Syrian forces, but a redeployment to the Biqa'a Valley would
be sufficient to build support for opposition candidates in
the elections. They spent considerable time emphasizing the
need for the Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters
in Anjar be closed and its head, Rustom Ghazaleh, be
withdrawn to Syria. Gemayal noted that, with SMI having
penetrated so much of Lebanese institutions, Syrian influence
would still be great. But Ghazaleh's departure would change
the atmosphere to the point that the opposition would
benefit.

TAIF VS. 1559
--------------


10. (C) On the question of a redeployment to the Biqa'a,
the Ambassador cautioned the opposition figures that the U.S.
would continue to look for ways to push for full
implementation of UNSCR 1559. The dinner guests expressed
relief and support for that position but then launched into a
lengthy debate about their own public positions. All agreed
that UNSCR 1559 implementation was essential to their hopes
for Lebanon. Some -- most vocally Gebran Tueni, joined by
Mouawad -- pressed for the opposition to include support for
UNSCR 1559 explicitly in its platform. But Gemayal, Lahoud,
and Hamadeh pushed back. UNSCR 1559 can divide the
opposition, they cautioned; the Sunnis and Shias in
particular are suspicious of it. The Syrians have
persistently and successfully portrayed UNSCR 1559 as a
Franco-American/Zionist tool in order to re-establish
"Christian dominance" in Lebanon. The opposition --
extremely weak in terms of Shia support and potentially weak
in terms of Sunni participation, if the Hariris adopt a
standoffish attitude -- should build a movement on consensus.
There is a consensus in Lebanon in support of Taif. Thus,
it is far better to use Taif now, as a unifying call, and,
after electoral success, then a new government and new
Parliament can embrace UNSCR 1559 and push for its full
implementation.

'LEAVE HIZBALLAH TO US'
--------------


11. (S) Lahoud brought up Hizballah: "We know that this is
an important issue for you -- and it's an important issue for
us." The Ambassador commented that disarming militias is a
requirement of UNSCR 1559, and the subsequent report from the
UNSYG made it clear that Hizballah is the most significant
foreign-funded militia in Lebanon. Yes, Lahoud said, but
"let us concentrate on Syria first. If we get Syria out, we
can deal with Hizballah ourselves." The Ambassador noted
that many GOL officials insist that only Syria could disarm
Hizballah, so, by this rationale, the sequencing of Syria's
departure must be carefully considered. His words echoed by
nods around the table, Lahoud said that Hizballah Secretary
General Nasrallah will move Hizballah away from armed
activities and into the political mainstream if his Syrian
overlords are kicked out of Lebanon.


12. (S) Above all, Lahoud said, Nasrallah wants to be a
national politician. "He's not going to use arms against us;
we can handle him." The Ambassador noted that Hizballah's
armed activities extend beyond the blue line, and we insist
that its international activities be stopped immediately.
Emphasizing that the opposition firmly supported the
principle that political parties not bear arms ("we learned
that lesson the hard way, in the civil war"),Lahoud said
again that the greater danger to Lebanese democracy and
sovereignty was Syria, not Hizballah. Fix Syria, and the
Lebanese can fix Hizballah.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) As is clear from ref b, the Hariri family (the most
dominant Sunni faction in the country) and the more closely
aligned Druse-Christian opposition are thinking alike: while
not explicitly calling for a postponement of spring
legislative elections, they are clearly moving in that
direction, unless we can force a Syrian withdrawal (or
redeployment to the Biqa'a) prior to the April 17
commencement of elections. At this point, with a defined set
of priorities and a groundswell of popular disgust against
Syria, the opposition is, unusually, on the offensive. By
contrast, Karami's cabinet and the Presidency seem almost to
have evaporated into thin air. But we doubt that real
underpinnings of Syria's domination of Lebanon -- SMI, the
mukhabaret, etc. -- are in the same disarray as Karami's
political ministers. And there is always the danger that
Lebanon's confessional demons will come to the fore, driving
wedges between the tenuously united opposition forces. As
for the debate of Taif vs. 1559, we recommend not spending
much time worrying about it: the opposition's desire to use
Taif in order to build a broader alliance does not contradict
or undermine our 1559 arguments (particularly as we know
that, privately, most are with us on full implementation of
UNSCR 1559).


FELTMAN