Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BEIRUT3498
2005-10-26 16:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: FM SALLOUKH DISCUSSES MEHLIS AND

Tags:  IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY 
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O 261653Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0403
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 003498 


NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015
TAGS: IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: FM SALLOUKH DISCUSSES MEHLIS AND
LEBANON-SYRIA

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 003498


NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015
TAGS: IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: FM SALLOUKH DISCUSSES MEHLIS AND
LEBANON-SYRIA

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh was
enthusiastic in his support of the Mehlis report findings,
but was reluctant to send a Lebanese representative to next
Monday's planned UNSC meeting of foreign ministers. He
considers this meeting strictly an affair between Syria and
the Security Council. With respect to next week's
anticipated UNSC resolution calling on Syria to cooperate
fully with the on-going investigation, Salloukh cautioned
against imposition of sanctions and urged patience. He
soft-pedaled the October 25 border incident in which a
Lebanese army civilian employee was killed by hostile fire
from Syria, and again urged patience. He insists that
Lebanon and Syria are making progress on normalizing
relations, despite the absence to date of specific actions.
End summary.


2. (C) Lebanese FM Fawzi Salloukh, joined by aide Rami
Mourtada, received the Ambassador and poloff on October 26.
Salloukh, as a member of the Shia community, owes his
position to support from Hizballah and Amal's political
monolith. But in recent weeks, and particularly following
the September New York Core Group meetings on Lebanon, he has
displayed an independent streak in defending the programs of
Prime Minister Siniora, and doing little to affiliate himself
with the Shia leaders of Hizballah and Amal.

UN DEBATE ON THE MEHLIS FINDINGS
--------------


3. (C) FM Salloukh declared that Boutros Assaker, the MFA's
#2 official now in New York, had delivered an effective
explanation of the situation in the country to the UNSC the
previous day. The foreign minister indicated he had sent
Assaker a detailed letter of instruction that corresponded to
decisions reached in last Saturday's meeting of the Council
of Ministers and was pleased that his government's position,
as well as its request for an extension of the Mehlis
Commission, had been well received by the Council. Salloukh
said the GOL was now awaiting the response of the Security
Council.


4. (C) Salloukh informed the Ambassador the Cabinet was

unified in its approach. He said the government believes
that although Detlev Mehlis had diligently uncovered a
significant amount of critical information, the investigation
was not complete, and -- in a surprising comment -- that an
extension even beyond December 15 may be necessary.
Commenting on the unanimity of the Cabinet, he stated, "All
of us are looking for the truth."


5. (C) When asked how he thought the international
community could best compel Syria to cooperate, FM Salloukh
(who is not unsympathetic to Syria) recommended a strongly
worded resolution that spells out what was required of the
Syrian regime. But he also advised that sanctions would not
work. Salloukh insisted the Syrian regime in the last few
days had signaled it was now willing to cooperate fully with
the investigation, but he also admitted that there has been
"conflict" among the Syrian ruling elite, particularly
between Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara and his deputy,
Walid al-Mu'allim. But even with this internal Syrian
debate, Salloukh maintained things could be resolved to the
satisfaction of the Security Council.

AWAITING THE LARSEN REPORT
--------------


6. (C) Concerning the imminent release of the Roed-Larsen
report on implementation of UNSCR 1559, FM Salloukh rather
anxiously asked the Ambassador what it might contain.
Salloukh suggested that the situation in Lebanon had improved
significantly over the past year, perhaps in an effort to
blunt the expected criticism from the UNSYG's report.


7. (C) When asked whether the GOL would be sending a
official to present Lebanon's case in next week's meeting of
foreign ministers, Salloukh said he would simply follow the
instructions of the Council of Ministers, which as of this
time had not made a decision on the matter. While stating,
"If the Cabinet says to go, I will go...," he also said he
believes Monday's meeting was really between Syria and the
Security Council members. "We have said our piece and made
our request."

NORMALIZING LEBANESE - SYRIAN RELATIONS
--------------


8. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concern that Syria
did not appear to be taking any positive action to improve
Lebanese-Syrian relations, Salloukh maintained that Syria
wanted normal relations, but because of international
pressure found it "difficult" to take concrete steps, such as
showing an interest in demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian
border or discussions to establish normal diplomatic
relations.


9. (C) Salloukh rebuffed the Ambassador's observation that
Syria usually represented a one-way street for Lebanon. He
pointed out that commercial border traffic had recently
improved and that "infiltration" across the borders appeared
to have fallen off during the last two weeks. But he
acknowledged these steps were not enough, and conceded that
Lebanon had to insist that Syria discuss normal relations,
and do it soon.


10. (C) Salloukh suggested that "perhaps after New York,"
Syrian and Lebanese officials could meet to begin a dialogue
on the mutual interests of the two countries. Displaying an
interesting empathy with the Syrian predicament, Salloukh
argued that issues such as border demarcation could not be
discussed while Syria was the focus of both the Mehlis and
Larsen reports.


11. (C) As he had preented earlier, the foreign minister
argued for patience, saying, "we inherited a large hill, we
have to start removing these heaps until we reach the paved
road." He believed the fact that Syria is also suffering
from poor relations with its close neighbor Lebanon would
compel the Syrian government to seek normalized relations.

INCIDENTS ON THE BORDER
AND IN AIN EL-HELWEH
--------------


12. (C) The foreign minister briefly addressed two
incidents: last week's firefight just outside the large Ain
el-Helweh refugee camp in Sidon and the October 25 shooting
which killed an Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) civilian surveyor
near the Lebanon-Syria border in the southern Biq'a Valley.
Salloukh said he had just met with Sidon-based MP Bahiya
Hariri (sister of former PM Rafik Hariri) who assured him
that tensions had eased and that the civil authorities, as
well as representatives from Amal and Hizballah, were
effectively dealing with the matter. There were still two
suspects wanted by the authorities, but Salloukh said he
believed the issue was being resolved. With regard to the
fatal border shooting on October 25, Salloukh unconvincingly
said he only knew what he read in the newspapers that
morning. He admitted it was "not a good indication," but
indicated the facts were murky. "It is a pity and we are
investigating." He did say it illustrated the need to settle
the border, and not just in the Biq'a, because "there are
many places where the border is in question."


13. (C) Salloukh finished the meeting with an observation it
was too early to decide whether an international tribunal
would be required to adjudicate cases resulting from the
Mehlis investigation. As with other matters, he counseled
patience.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Foreign Minister Salloukh supports Mehlis'
findings, he has requested continued UN support to Lebanon's
judiciary and security services, and he indicated a desire
for Syrian cooperation with the investigation as well as
normal relations between the two countries. But he also
displayed passivity toward compelling immediate Syrian
movement on a number of issues, and specifically, early
discussions on normalizing relations. He would not be a
strong ally in 10/31 discussions in New York. End comment.


FELTMAN