MGLE01: JUMBLATT'S STRAIGHT TALK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 003291


NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: IS LE KPAL PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: JUMBLATT'S STRAIGHT TALK

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per section 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador on the
afternoon of October 6, Druse leader Walid Jumblatt flatly
stated his belief that the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and
the series of bombings committed since then, were the work of
the Syrian regime, specifically Bashar Assad. His colleague,
Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, who was also
at the luncheon, stated the Syrians "are on the
counter-attack, similar to what they did last November and
December." Hamadeh maintained the Syrian campaign began with
the July 12 assassination attempt on Minister of Defense
Elias Murr, and has been increasing in tempo. Jumblatt said
the international community should send Bashar another
message, warning the Syrian president not to destabilize
Lebanon. Regarding the recent public dispute over the
intentions of Palestinian militias in Lebanon, Jumblatt
suggested now was not the time to raise an internal conflict
over militias and arms that have been there a long time
because it would shift the focus from Mehlis -- and away from
Syria. Jumblatt also criticized the extended absence of Saad
Hariri, who he believes is now heavily influenced by the
advice of President Chirac. Concerning a possible visit to
Washington, Jumblatt adopted a relatively disinterested pose,
despite his earlier requests for Embassy assistance. His
plans are now open-ended and, having missed his original
Georgetown lecture date, he may not travel until after
Ramadan. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador hosted a lunch for Druse leader Walid
Jumblatt on Thursday afternoon, October 6. (Jumblatt was on
the Embassy compound to also obtain a visitor's visa, whose
issuance required a waiver from the Department due to
intemperate comments made by the Druse leader in 2003.) Also
attending the luncheon were Ministry of Telecommunications
Marwan Hamadeh (an assassination target in October 2004) and
former member of parliament (and aspiring presidential
candidate) Dr. Ghattas Khoury, as well as Poloff and Pol
Specialist. Jumblatt appeared tired and was quiet at the
outset of the meeting, but became more animated as the
discussions progressed, particularly when he recalled
anecdotes from the civil war. He fondly remembered the time
his forces inadvertently shelled the residences of both the
U.S. and Spanish ambassadors, even though what they were
really trying to hit was the Baabda palace -- which according
to the old warlord, "is really quite difficult to do."

SYRIA'S CENTRAL ROLE
--------------


3. (C) The primary topic of conversation was the role of
the Syrian regime in Lebanon's instability. Jumblatt clearly
stated that Bashar Assad and his regime were responsible for
the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, as well as the recent
series of events which were increasing tensions -- the recent
more aggressive posture taken by Palestinian militias in the
Biqa and their enclave located south of Beirut, strong
attacks against the government in Parliament by Hizballah
representatives, as well as the long string of unsolved
bombings in and around Beirut. Marwan Hamadeh categorized
these developments as a "counter-attack" orchestrated by the
Syrian regime under the direct supervision of Bashar Assad to
ensure its survival and escape from the intense international
pressure. Hamadeh maintained this most recent Syrian effort
dates back to the July 12 attempted assassination of Minister
of Defense Elias Murr, and it has increased in tempo and
aggressiveness.


4. (C) Jumblatt suggested to the Ambassador the time was
right to send a message to Syria -- to warn it to cease its
campaign of violence and destabilization in Lebanon. When
asked what form this warning should take, Jumblatt smiled and
suggested "perhaps a message from Iraq." Hamadeh took a more
serious tone, but he concurred with the Druse leader and
insisted Syria was now calling in all its resources and would
escalate the situation as we come closer to the release of
the Mehlis report. All three guests inquired about the
report, and while the Ambassador said he did not know its
contents, he urged his guests to continue to support the work
of the Mehlis investigation and to ask their political
colleagues to do likewise. He stressed that the difficult
part would come with the release of the report, when its
findings had to be effectively implemented by Lebanon's
judicial system. Jumblatt and Hamadeh both felt that UN
investigative and judicial assistance was critical in the
post-report phase and hoped the UN effort would continue.


5. (C) Addressing the political climate, Jumblatt
acknowledged that tensions had increased, especially
concerning the recent attention given to arms held by
Palestinian militias. Jumblatt argued that pressure at this
time was counter-productive because it took the focus off the
real culprit and source of instability -- the Syrian regime.
He reasoned that those Palestinian groups, and their arms,
had always been a part of the Lebanese political landscape.
He agreed that the issue needed to be addressed, but he
argued not at this time. It simply took pressure off Syria
and increased Sunni-Shia tensions. The Ambassador noted that
it was not the Lebanese Armed Forces that had raised the
tensions recently, but rather Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC had
changed the status quo.


6. The conversation turned to political personalities and
how they were performing in office. Khoury, Hamadeh, and
even a grudging Jumblatt, agreed that PM Siniora was punching
well above his weight class. His unyielding defense of the
government and his non-sectarian tenor in yesterday's debate
in parliament impressed even previous detractors. Hamadeh
and Jumblatt both believe he is not being well served by a
hit-and-miss collection of cabinet members, but overall his
performance both in New York and, more importantly, at home
has been unexpectedly sound and reassuring. (Comment:
Jumblatt has been known to grumble about Siniora. We
attribute his positive attitude today to the fact that
Siniora called Jumblatt and met with him yesterday, the first
face-to-face meeting since mid-July. Jumblatt's notorious
paranoia, we have discovered, worsens when he feels he is
being ignored. End comment.)


7. (C) The same could not be said for Sa'ad Hariri, whose
frequent and lengthy absences are clearly getting on the
nerves of other political leaders. Jumblatt sarcastically
asked, "where is our majority leader?" Hamadeh suggested
that Hariri receives far too much of his advice from
President Chirac, who himself is far too conservative because
he feels partly responsible for assuring Rafiq Hariri shortly
before his assassination "not to be concerned because he
(Chirac) had delivered a message." Even Dr. Khoury, who owes
much to the Hariri bloc, suggested that the least Sa'ad
should do during the holy month of Ramadan is to show up in
Lebanon for a few days and host Iftar dinners for his anxious
followers. Regarding the almost invisible Samir Ja'ja,
leader of the Lebanese Forces, Jumblatt curtly and
dismissively stated, "he is the least of my concerns."

WASHINGTON VISITS


8. (C) Jumblatt was noncommittal on rescheduling his
Washington trip, saying that his Georgetown University
sponsors had suggested waiting until after Ramadan. (Note:
Jumblatt's Georgetown lecture was originally scheduled for
October 4, but Jumblatt himself asked that it be postponed to
ensure sufficient time for U.S. visa adjudication. End
note.)

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Walid Jumblatt displayed his usual sang froid and,
when interested, had a comment on nearly every issue. His
unequivocal belief that Bashar Assad and his regime are
directly responsible for the full range of activities that
have destabilized Lebanon was of note, as was Marwan Hamadeh
belief that the Syrian regime will likely attempt
increasingly risky behavior to escape the corner it now finds
itself. End comment.


FELTMAN