MGLE01: HIZBALLAH'S CABINET SHUFFLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 002386


NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN/POUNDS, NEA/RA FOR CHARLES LAWSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015
TAGS: KISL KPAL LE PGOV PTER SENV
SUBJECT: MGLE01: HIZBALLAH'S CABINET SHUFFLE

REF: BEIRUT 2285

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Introduction and summary. Hizballah gained all its
cabinet demands as Prime Minister-designate Fouad Siniora on
July 19 announced his cabinet lineup that included Fawzi
Salloukh as Foreign Minister, Trad Hamadeh as Labor Minister,
and Hizballah member MP Mohammed Fneish as Energy and Water
Minister. According to our Shia sources, Hizballah was
sincere in demanding that it nominate the Foreign Minister in
Siniora's cabinet. It was not an issue of sabotaging
Siniora's government formation, but rather an attempt to
defend against UNSCR 1559's call for Hizballah disarmament.
Hizballah and Amal nominated former diplomat Fawzi Salloukh,
who is not a member of either party, but who would likely
work against full implementation of UNSCR 1559. Hizballah
retained Trad Hamadeh at the Ministry of Labor because they
are pleased with his job performance. Hizballah sought the
Ministry of Energy and Water mainly to provide an example of
competence in the provision of public services and to protect
the status quo in the Wazzani/Hasbani watershed. Hizballah
is not looking to create new water disputes with Israel,
however. As a part of its election deal with Amal, Hizballah
will also gradually acquire two-thirds of the Shia Director
General posts in the GOL ministries. Speaker of Parliament
Nabih Berri is increasingly viewed in the Shia community as
beholden to Hizballah. End introduction and summary.

Hizballah sincere about Foreign Ministry
--------------


2. (C) On July 15, Shia journalist Abbas Sabbagh told
econoff that his sources in Hizballah sincerely sought a
sympathetic Foreign Minister to hinder implementation of
UNSCR 1559. Hizballah's push to nominate the Foreign
Minister in Prime Minister-designate Fuad Siniora's cabinet
was not about sabotaging Siniora's government formation.
Sabbagh interviewed Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim
Qassim on July 12, who said that Hizballah wants a Foreign
Minister who is "more flexible" on UNSCR 1559. Hizballah had
vetoed Hariri ally Ghazi Youssef for the post. Qassim was
adamant about a Hizballah-nominated Foreign Minister,
according to Sabbagh, suggesting that Hizballah both placed a
priority on the Foreign Ministry and believed it plausible
that the party could choose the next Foreign Minister. Amal
and Hizballah jointly nominated former diplomat and
nonpartisan Fawzi Salloukh (reftel).


3. (C) In a separate meeting on July 15, Hizballah expert
Professor Nizar Hamzeh of the American University of Beirut
concurred that Hizballah sought a sympathetic Foreign
Minister, rather than to sabotage Siniora. Hamzeh, who has
met Salloukh, said Salloukh would resist UNSCR 1559, but is
not a tool of Hizballah. Salloukh is closer to Speaker of
Parliament and Amal leader Nabih Berri. As current Secretary
General of the Islamic University in Southern Beirut,
Salloukh is also close to Berri ally and acting Chairman of
the Higher Shia Council Sheikh Abed al-Amir Qabalan. Another
candidate for Foreign Minister, career diplomat and current
Ambasador in London Jihad Mortada, was closer to Hizballah,
but fell out as the second choice for Foreign Minister.

Hizballah sought Labor and Energy and Water
--------------


4. (C) Sabbagh's sources in Hizballah consider the
nomination of Salloukh a joint nomination with Amal, leaving
two more posts to be filled by candidates closer to
Hizballah. Hizballah nominated the Labor and Energy and
Water portfolios, leaving Health and Agriculture for Amal.
According to Sabbagh, Hizballah wanted to retain close ally
(but non-party member) Trad Hamadeh as Minister of Labor.
Hizballah is satisfied with Hamadeh's performance in Prime
Minister Najib Mikati's interim government, particularly in
his decision to allow Palestinians to work in selected
non-professional occupations. Sabbagh explained that
Hizballah has never been at odds with the Palestinians and is
more sympathetic to their plight than other Lebanese parties.
Hizballah did not participate in the "War of the Camps"
during the civil war. Today, Hizballah remains close to
Palestinian militant groups HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ). Sabbagh said that when he went to interview
HAMAS and PIJ officials in south Beirut, he found that
Hizballah security agents manned the security perimeter for
HAMAS and PIJ offices. Only when Sabbagh entered the offices
did he see Palestinian guards.


5. (C) According to Sabbagh, Hizballah nominated MP
Mohammed Fneish from Tyre, who is a member of Hizballah, to
head the Ministry of Energy and Water (MOEW) because he has
proven to be a quality MP and because he has a plan to reform
electricity fee collection. The water part of the portfolio
is secondary. According to Sabbagh, Hizballah wants to
protect the status quo of Lebanon's water use in the
Hasbani/Wazzani region, but is not interested in provoking
new disputes. Hizballah wants to keep the Shebaa Farms as
its only "front" with Israel. MP Mohammed Raad, head of
Hizballah's 14 member Parliamentary bloc, was Hizballah's
original choice, but the party preferred to keep him focused
in the Parliament, according to Sabbagh.


6. (C) Hamzeh opined that Hizballah's primary objective in
its service ministerial portfolios will be to set an example
of good provision of public services. Similarly, leading
Shia politician and MP Yassin Jabber told DCM in early July
that Hizballah was seeking the energy portfolio in order to
demonstrate that it could run this troubled ministry
effectively, and thus draw a contrast with the two preceding
Amal-affiliated energy ministers who failed to improve
Electricite du Liban's notorious service and finances. If
services continue to lag under the tutelage of
Hizballah-nominated ministers, then it could call on Iranian
aid to bail it out. For example, should the MOEW fail to
provide adequate power, Hizballah could ask Iran to agree to
sell fuel at cost to the MOEW. Iranian aid would, of course,
be limited to Hizballah-led ministries. Hizballah's
secondary objective will be to stay informed. Hizballah had
relied on Syrian intelligence during the Syrian occupation to
keep it informed of cabinet decisions, but now it must rely
on itself.

The bill comes due: more DGs for Hizballah
--------------


7. (C) Sabbagh told us that part of the cost for
Hizballah's political rescue of Amal by forming a joint list
in the parliamentary elections is Berri's obligation to allow
Hizballah to nominate senior government officials. Prior to
the elections, Berri had control over nominating Shia
government officials, and he rejected anyone with ties to
Hizballah. Hizballah is seeking two-thirds of the
Shia-allocated Director General (DG) posts, including
Director General of the Surete General, for its members and
associates over the next few years. Hizballah realizes that
it will take time to acquire two-thirds of the DG posts
because it must wait for current DGs to vacate their
positions (retirement or resignation) in order to create
openings. Hizballah is not demanding the dismissal of
sittings DG's.


8. (C) Both Sabbagh and Hamzeh agree that Berri is seen in
the Shia community as beholden to Hizballah for its election
support. They are also in accord that Berri's Amal would
have lost many of its seats in the elections, and Berri
himself would not have been re-elected as Speaker of
Parliament without the Amal-Hizballah alliance. Hamzeh
suggested that Berri could become more and more a puppet of
Hizballah.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Sabbagh's access to Hizballah may be more extensive
than we previously thought. Hizballah approached him in the
last few weeks to offer him bribes to write favorably about
the party in the Arabic-language newspaper, "An Nahar."
Apparently, Hizballah was not satisfied with its previous
inside man at "An Nahar." Sabbagh told Hizballah that he
welcomed increased opportunities to interview Qassim and
other party officials, but said that he would not go as far
as the party wanted in painting it in a favorable light. End
comment.


FELTMAN