HOW THE 731 COALITION LOST THE SOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000157

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PTER IZ
SUBJECT: HOW THE 731 COALITION LOST THE SOUTH

REF: BASRAH 146

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: On December 26, the Basrah Regional
Coordinator met with Gali Najm Muter, the Iraqi National Accord
(731) representative in Basrah. Gali attributed the poor
showing of 731 in Basrah and the other southern provinces in the
December 15 election to intimidation campaigns run by the
Unified Iraqi Coalition (555) and election fraud. He urged the
REO to come up with funds to counter "Iranian influence" in the
south. The real reason why voters in the southern provinces
voted for 555 over 731 was most likely because they believed
that the 731 list's political parties had incompatible
platforms. End Summary.

Shocked at the Results
--------------


2. (C) On December 26, the Basrah Regional Coordinator met
with Gali Najm Muter, the Iraqi National Accord (731 List)
representative in Basrah and discussed the results of the
December 15 election, in which Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National
Accord (731) party won only two of Basrah's sixteen seats in the
National Assembly. Gali said that he and his party were
"shocked" at the results, and that prior to the election he
believed that 731 would win five or more seats. The Iraqi
National Accord party had been active in Basrah for over two
years, he said, and had four seats on the Basrah Provincial
Council. "We were doing just fine until December 15," he said.

Why 731 Lost
--------------


3. (C) Gali said that the intimidation campaigns run by 555
opponents prior to the election had impacted his party's ability
to campaign effectively (see reftel). Posters had been the
primary way that most political parties in Basrah campaigned for
the election, and many of 731's posters were torn down in the
period before the election. Moreover, several people in Basrah
were shot and killed while hanging up 731 posters, resulting in
people being afraid to campaign.


4. (C) Fraud and illegal campaigning on election day also
affected the outcome of the vote, according to Gali. He said
that he had personally observed campaigning for 555 going on
near polling centers in Basrah and knew people who were able to
vote multiple times. He said his party had filed over 500
complaints with the Basrah and Baghdad offices of the
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq over illegal
campaigning activity and voter fraud. Many demonstrations would
take place in Baghdad and Basrah in reaction to perceived
election fraud and illegal campaigning activity by 555, he
predicted.


5. (C) Gali acknowledged that internal divisions in the 731
coalition could have played a role in 731's poor election
results. In particular, he described the Iraqi Communist Party
(17) and Al Qasimy Democratic Assembly (41) as "unpopular" in
Basrah. He had contacted Allawi prior to the elections and
advised him that these parties would lose them votes in the
south. (Comment: The Iraqi Communist Party, which was founded
in opposition to Saddam's regime, is seen as being intrinsically
opposed to Al Qasimy Democratic Assembly, which has a Ba'athist
foundation. The presence of these two parties in the same
coalition was perceived by voters in the south to be a sell-out
by both in order to win votes. End comment.)


6. (C) In the end, Gali said that 731 could not realistically
hope to form a coalition with other lists that would enable them
to acquire more seats than 555, and he recognized that 555 would
be the winner of the majority of National Assembly seats. When
asked if he believed that 731 would be able to cooperate with
555, he answered philosophically, "Nothing is impossible in
politics."

Iranian Influence Threatens Iraqi Sovereignty
-------------- --------------
--------------


7. (C) Gali went on to urge the U.S. Government to take an
active stance against "Iranian influence," the encroachment of
Islamic religious extremism into politics and society, in the
southern provinces. He said that extremists were using religion
as a "veil" to hide their real objectives - personal gain and
power over Iraqi affairs. Iranian agents and extremists were
spreading their influence through well-financed welfare programs
targeting populations that were open to persuasion because of
the years of poverty and devastation they experienced under
Saddam's regime. In the same way that the United States rebuilt
Japan and Germany after World War II, Gali said, it should
rebuild Iraq and provide a counter force to religious extremism
coming from Iran. He suggested that the U.S. Government provide
funds to an organization or NGO headed by his party that would
"educate" the populace by teaching patriotism and democracy and
explaining the role of the United States in helping the
reconstruction of Iraq.
"Iraqi Unity" Strategy Backfires
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Comment: Gali is a well-respected member of the Basrah
Provincial Council and has won support among the religious Shia
population in Basrah for the secular 731 list because he himself
is a "seyyid," or descendent of the prophet. His dismay at
731's poor showing in the election was sincere and heartfelt,
but the reasons for this probably have more to do with the
internal divisions in his party than he wanted to admit.
Intimidation campaigns and electoral fraud may have impacted the
vote to some degree, but the real reason why voters in the
southern provinces voted for 555 over 731 is most likely because
the 731 list included parties with widely divergent political
philosophies. Although Allawi himself is a popular figure in
the south, his attempt at forming a coalition with diametrically
opposed political parties lost critical support for the 731
list. End comment.
GROSS