SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: LABELING THE MILITANTS "BRN-C"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007573

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: LABELING THE MILITANTS "BRN-C"

REF: BANGKOK 6595 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d,b)


1. (C) SUMMARY/COMMENT: Thai officials and foreign
observers have struggled to identify the militant movement
responsible for the resurgent violence in far southern
Thailand that has claimed over 1,000 lives since January

2004. The initial government response -- to blame criminals
or local political feuds -- has gradually given way to the
reality that an undefined movement is seeking to undermine
state control. This cable outlines the growing consensus
among Thai and foreign observers that a core group of native
militants -- labeled the "BRN-C" -- is tapping into a much
wider and looser network of disaffected youth, recruited
through Islamic "pondok" schools, to carry out the attacks.


2. (C) Defining what exactly constitutes the "BRN-C"
remains difficult. Militant cells in far southern Thailand
are amorphous and have a difficult-to-characterize
organizational structure. The identifiable organization that
does exist appears to be based at the village level, has no
identifiable leadership, and has failed to publicize its
goals. The BRN-C, a faction of an old insurgent group from
the 1960s, may have supplanted or absorbed other leading
separatist groups. Because of its largely unstructured
nature, the reach of the BRN-C is probably limited and should
not be overemphasized when looking at the reasons behind the
resurgent violence. Many ordinary citizens in the South who
remain deeply estranged from the Central Thai government
after decades of neglect are still willing to work through
the system rather than support militants, e.g., by voting in
elections, taking an interest in local bread-and-butter
issues, etc. END SUMMARY/COMMENT

HOW ARE THE MILITANTS ORGANIZED?
--------------


3. (C) Militant cells in far southern Thailand are
amorphous and have an organizational structure that is
disparate and difficult to characterize. The identifiable
organization that does exist appears to be based primarily at
the village "grassroots" level. The groups have no clearly
identifiable leadership or credible "spokesman in exile," and
have not articulated any demands. Some speculate that this
"silence" is a designed security measure. However, it is
more likely a reflection of a lack of overarching leadership
or clear objectives. Coordinated violence (as opposed to the
more common isolated daily incidents) appears to be directed
through a loose network. Recruited individuals -- almost
always young Malay-Muslim males tapped at Islamic schools
("pondoks") are contacted by cell phone or word of mouth,
given instructions for an attack, and afterward return to
home life. Contacts between individuals appears to be the
basis of organization rather than membership in a formal
group.


4. (C) That said, there is growing consensus among the
media and other observers of far southern Thailand that much
of this organized violence across provinces is being directed
by a core group often called the Barisan Revolusi Nasional
Coordinate (BRN-C). Thai government sources are generally in
agreement, with officials often citing the group -- both
publicly and privately -- as the source of organized attacks
in the region. Anthony Davis, the long-time resident Thai
analyst for Jane's Defence Weekly, told poloffs that he and
many of his contacts in the Thai security services believe
that the BRN-C is providing guidance for the disparate cells
and has become the primary facilitator of the organized
violence afflicting far southern Thailand.


5. (C) This may be an oversimplification of a less
organized and more fluid system of violence, and the "BRN-C"
may be turning into a convenient label for a far more complex
and fluid situation on the ground. Some observers speculate
that the BRN-C may be little more than a name given to what
are largely independent cells, who are working autonomously
except on the rarest of occasions. Others argue that Thai
security forces -- desperate for an identifiable enemy to
fight or parlay with -- might be overstating the capabilities
of the BRN-C.
WHAT IS THE BRN-C?
--------------


6. (C) The BRN-C of the 1990's was a faction of the
original Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN) founded
in 1961 which has long called for an independent Pattani
state. The core members of what is now called BRN-C are
probably an amalgamation of committed individual militant
members from different separatist groups. Membership is not
exclusive and committed militants might be members of other
groups as well. Tony Davis and staff members of the Centre
for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC - see reftel) report that the
BRN-C's leadership is based in the northern Malaysian town of
Kota Baru, but has operational cells in the southern Thai
provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani. Davis and HDC
claim that Malaysian authorities are aware of the presence of
the BRN-C leadership in Malaysia.


7. (SBU) The original BRN was formed in response to RTG
efforts to nationalize traditional pondok Islamic schools in
the early 1960's. The Thai government has long viewed
pondoks as the key component of their policy of assimilation
and has had various programs over the past decades to
register and force Thai national curriculum into the schools.
For Muslims in the South, the pondoks are seen as preserves
of their ethnic Malay cultural identity and are a central
feature of village life. The Thai national curriculum --
with its strong Buddhist overtones -- is seen as a direct
affront to their culture and religion. The BRN-C reportedly
focuses on the pondoks for organization and recruitment
activities, targeting teenagers and young men at the schools.
An Amcit academic noted that these youths -- who have few
prospects for employment after their education is complete --
have a stronger sense of Muslim identity than past
generations and a growing sense of anger at their perceived
mistreatment by the central Thai government.

HOW LARGE IS THE BRN-C?
--------------


8. (C) While there is growing consensus that members of the
BRN-C are probably the organizing element behind the
coordinated attacks which have occurred in the South over the
past several years, there is little information available on
the group's size. The number of active members of the group
is probably very small -- perhaps only a few hundred members
-- and this core group probably does not take a direct role
in all the coordinated incidents. Instead, the BRN-C appears
to be able to multiply its forces by calling on individual
Malay-Muslim youths, tapped at pondoks, and organized at the
village level as an auxiliary for larger attacks. These
youths are given instructions to carry out individual attacks
and do not appear to have any knowledge of cell structures or
a larger organization.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OTHER SEPARATIST GROUPS?
--------------


9. (C) Other leading separatist groups do not appear to be
playing a lead role in the major incidents in the South, or
have been absorbed or supplanted by the BRN-C. (NOTE: This
does not mean that the factionalization of the separatist
groups, witnessed in 1970s and 1980s, has ended. END NOTE)
Bersatu -- the supposed "umbrella" organization of southern
separatist groups -- and its exiled leader Wan Khadir Che Man
have no known involvement in operational attacks in the
South. A noted Thai journalist with close contacts in the
Muslim South told poloffs that Wan Khadir "would be killed"
if he returned to Thailand by young militants who consider
him a "sell-out." Another observer described the Pattani
Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP) as basically a criminal
organization -- committing violence or providing expertise
for profit either for separatist objectives or on behalf of
criminal gangs. Most observers call the Pattani United
Liberation Organization (PULO),often the most vocal of
separatist groups, "just a web-page," with little involvement
or knowledge of operational attacks. However there are
reports that one of PULO's exiled faction leaders, Shamsuddin
Khan, may have contacts with BRN-C (reftel).
COMMENT: OLD GRIEVANCES STILL CENTER OF SOUTHERN VIOLENCE
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Over the past several years Southern Thailand has
experienced a series of organized attacks which many
observers attribute to what looks like the most credible
operational separatist group in the South: the BRN-C.
However, these incidents are only one part of a larger
situation that includes other violence (daily shootings,
arson, etc.) which is probably not the work of an organized
militant group, but the result of crime or simply angry
people acting alone. There is no shortage of reasons for
local Malay-Muslims to decry decades of "injustices" from
corrupt and inept Thai officials and security forces. But in
our view, BRN-C should not be made out to be a larger than
life organization. What the BRN-C has apparently been able
to do is harness widespread frustration and anger to
manipulate and mobilize parts of the Southern Thailand
Malay-Muslim population -- especially the angry young males.


11. (C) We should also be careful not to overstate the
importance of BRN-C for another important reason: most
southern Thais themselves don't credit BRN-C or other
separatist groups for being the primary source of the
violence. When asked who is behind the violence most
southerners blame criminals, internecine struggles between
the police and army related to smuggling and other illicit
activities, manipulative politicians -- and sometimes the
U.S. Government -- more that separatist militants. Put
simply, the BRN-C lacks street credibility. Unlike the GAM
in Indonesia or the MILF in the Philippines, amorphous
southern Thai separatists are not seen as spokesman for, or
defenders of, the larger community. The separatists are not
providing services to locals and are not a serving as the
political voice of local aspirations. As the 76 percent
local participation rate in last February's national election
demonstrates, most southern Thais remain part of the process
in Thailand, no matter how disaffected they fell or how much
they dislike the current administration. They do not seem
inclined to support the aspirations of the small, violent
minority who are members of hard-core militant groups such as
the BRN-C.


12. (C) While it would be a mistake to dismiss the ability
of the BRN-C to perpetrate violent acts, the organization is
not the powerful "silent hand" controlling the violence as
depicted in some accounts. This is good news in the sense
that there is still not an overarching political movement in
the South demanding autonomy or independence or otherwise
confronting the RTG on behalf of Southern Thailand's Malay
Muslims. However, it is bad news because the loose
organization of the militants makes it extremely difficult
for the RTG to successfully disable the actual perpetrators
of the violence. Even if PM Thaksin were to design and
employ an effective short, mid, and long-term strategy to
address underlying local grievances -- and he continues to
grasp for such a strategy -- it will take years for the
policy to take effect and to have an impact on ingrained
mindsets. In the best case scenario, an enlightened
government policy would ameliorate the violence somewhat (and
reduce opportunities for exploitation by outside terrorists
and extremists),but some level of tension and unrest would
continue -- as it has for most of the past 100 years. END
COMMENT
BOYCE