Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK7527
2005-12-07 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: RTG QUIETLY REACHES OUT TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER TH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007527 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS EAP, EAP/MLA, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: RTG QUIETLY REACHES OUT TO
SEPARATIST GROUPS

REF: BANGKOK 7090

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007527

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS EAP, EAP/MLA, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: RTG QUIETLY REACHES OUT TO
SEPARATIST GROUPS

REF: BANGKOK 7090

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)
has been quietly meeting in northern Malaysia and in Europe
with purported leadership figures from some of the prominent
southern Thai separatist groups -- including the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C) -- in an attempt to
facilitate a dialogue with the Thai government. Prime
Minister Thaksin has apparently given his approval for
continued exploratory talks in Europe and has given one of
his closest advisors responsibility for following the
discussions. The high-level interest of the RTG in exploring
the possibility of some form of negotiated end to the
southern conflict is a positive sign. That being said, it
seems unlikely to us that exiled separatist leaders have
significant, if any, operational control over militants in
the South. It is also unclear to us how these groups would
be positioned to address the central issue: widespread
estrangement of southern Malay Muslims with the Thai
government. END SUMMARY


2. (C) The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC,) also
known as the Henri Dunant Centre, based in Geneva, has been
working quietly in Thailand, northern Malaysia and Europe
over the past year in an effort to identify possible
interlocutors among Thai separatist groups. They are
attempting to establish a reliable dialogue partner for the
Thai government and to facilitate talks between the
separatist groups and the Thai government. HDC also aims to
encourage cooperation between the Malaysian and Thai
governments to address their common challenge along the
border. (NOTE: HDC's work is carried out very quietly. They
requested that information about their activities be kept
confidential. END NOTE)

SIPDIS


3. (C) HDC staff members involved in the project told
emboffs that they had met with members of the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C),Pattani United
Liberation Organization (PULO),the Pattani Islamic
Mujahideen Movement (GMIP),and Wan Khadir Che Man, the
leader of Bersatu -- a separatist "umbrella" organization.
HDC noted that all of these groups made varying claims of
responsibility for actions in southern Thailand. However,
BRN-C appeared to play the more central role (NOTE: Septel
will detail how BRN-C is increasingly perceived to be the
leading operational organization in the South. END NOTE).
HDC confirmed press reports -- publicly denied by the RTG --
that Wan Kadir Che Man has been in direct contact with
representatives of the Thai government.


4. (C) HDC's primary interlocutor in Europe is Shamsuddin
Khan, reportedly PULO's exiled leader. Khan has apparently
been attempting to bring the disparate elements of PULO and
other separatist groups together. He has been involved in
previous "talks" with the RTG and was the primary
interlocutor during a series of negotiations between the RTG
and separatist groups which occurred in Cairo and Damascus in

1994. HDC senior staff members believe Khan "has open lines"
to separatist groups and can legitimately speak on their
behalf. They claimed that the Thai National Intelligence
Agency (NIA) agrees Khan could play a constructive role in a
negotiation. HDC is attempting to arrange a meeting in
Geneva between Khan and a retired Thai Army General as early
as this month. Apparently the BRN-C leaders are unwilling to
talk directly with RTG officials in Malaysia, but indicated
that Khan would serve as their intermediary.


5. (C) HDC staffers indicated that Prime Minister Thaksin
is personally aware of their efforts and reported that
Pansak Vinyaratn -- Thaksin's chief policy advisor --
approved ongoing exploratory talks. Thaksin has reportedly
tasked Pansak with handling contacts between HDC and the
separatists.


6. (C) COMMENT: This is all good as far as it goes, but is
unlikely to have an impact on the violence in the South any
time soon. We do not believe the exiled leaders involved in
these discussions exercise operational control over the
disparate militant cells who are actually carrying out
attacks. Furthermore, these exiled leaders represent an
older generation of ethnic Malay separatist whose struggles
of past decades mean little to a new generation of angry
Malay youth. Thaksin's support for HDC is a positive sign,
showing that the PM is open to this kind of dialogue as part
of a possible solution to problems in the South. But
valuable as dialogue may be in educating RTG officials on
Thai Muslim attitudes and grievances, it does nothing to
address fundamental causes of the conflict, particularly the
deep-seated sense of "injustice" felt by the majority of
Muslims in the far South. END COMMENT
BOYCE