Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK7454
2005-12-02 07:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON PRIVY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER TH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007454 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR/B
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON PRIVY
COUNSELOR PALAKORN

REF: BANGKOK 5503

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007454

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR/B
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON PRIVY
COUNSELOR PALAKORN

REF: BANGKOK 5503

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador called on Privy Counselor
Palakorn Suanrath to discuss the situation in southern
Thailand. Palakorn -- who served as director of the Southern
Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) prior to its
2002 dissolution by Prime Minister Thaksin -- is known to be
a close advisor to the royal family on the South. Palakorn
believes Thaksin's decision to give the police primacy in the
South -- coupled with a personal lack of understanding of the
situation -- has exacerbated the violence in the region. He
emphasized the ethnic rather than religious nature of the
conflict. Palakorn was dismissive of the National
Reconciliation Commission and said efforts to establish a
dialogue with separatist groups would likely end in failure.
Ambassador expressed serious concern over past
"disappearances" and rumors that the government might use
extra-judicial killings (EJKs) to target suspected militants.
END SUMMARY


2. (C) On November 30 Ambassador called on Privy Counselor
Palakorn Suanrath. Palakorn -- who served as director of the
Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) from
1997 to 2001 -- is known to be a close advisor to the royal
family on the South and travels with the Queen to the region
during her annual visits (NOTE: Biographic information
attached. END NOTE).

THAKSIN MISSTEPS FUEL THE PROBLEM
--------------


3. (C) Palakorn said that Thaksin's decision to give the
police primacy in the South shortly after taking office in
2001, coupled with a lack of understanding of the historical
factors, has exacerbated the violence in the region (reftel).
He lamented that Thaksin had ignored the successful policies
created in the 1980s by then Prime Minister Prem and
characterized Thaksin's dissolution of the highly successful
SBPAC and the combined Civilian, Military, and Police command
(CMP-43) in April 2002 as the "turning point" in the unrest.
Thaksin's advisors convinced him that the joint commands were
"Democrat Party institutions," which could not be trusted.

Palakorn expressed concern that Thaksin was still not getting
reliable information on the situation from his senior
advisors.

CONCERN OVER DISAPPEARANCES
--------------


4. (C) Palakorn said that Thaksin's decision in 2001 to
appoint Police General Sant Sarutanond as Police
Commissioner-General was another turning point in the
southern situation; "that's when people started to
disappear." He believes that General Sant was directly
involved in the disappearance of prominent Muslim lawyer
Somchai Neelapaiji in March 2004 and that Thaksin either
approved the operation, or was at least aware that government
agents would carry it out.


5. (C) Ambassador strongly emphasized USG concern over this
and other reported cases of disappearances. He expressed
deep unease over recent speculation that that RTG planned to
take a more aggressive approach to the South, potentially
leading to EJKs of suspected militants. Palakorn said he had
also "heard these reports," but indicated that specific
concern over Interior Minister Chitchai's involvement in
ordering such operations may be overstated. He opined that
Chitchai, while an advocate of harder measures, understood
the potential negative ramifications of EJKs and was looking
at several different approaches to dealing with suspected
militants.


6. (C) Palakorn believes that General Sonthi Boonyaratglin,
the recently appointed Thai Army commander, will not have a
significant impact on southern policy. Many had hoped that
Sonthi, a Muslim, would act as a moderating influence.
However, Sonthi -- who is "a Bangkok Muslim" -- has little
experience in the South and does not have special access or
influence.

NO END TO VIOLENCE WHILE THAKSIN IN POWER
--------------


7. (C) Palakorn opined that it was possible to reduce the
intensity of the conflict in the South to the levels seen
over the previous twenty years, i.e. prior to 2004. However,
he indicated that this process would probably take years, and
would not happen until Thaksin was out of office. He
emphasized how much antipathy many southern Muslims feel
toward Thaksin and the Thai police. He also noted that it
would take some time for the majority of "insurgent cells" --
made up primarily of young men -- to break up.

THAILAND'S TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP WITH MALAYSIA
-------------- -


8. (C) Palakorn indicated that former Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir's visit to Thailand on November 21 and 22
was considered a success by the royal family, but that
Thaksin's relationship with his Malaysian counterparts
remained troubled. He noted that Thaksin blamed Malaysian
Prime Minister Badawi for not cooperating with RTG efforts on
the South. However, Thaksin himself had made little effort
to reach out to Badawi and failed to understand Malaysian
concerns over the situation.

DIALOGUE WITH SEPARATISTS WILL NOT PRODUCE RESULTS
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Palakorn said it would not be possible for the RTG
to establish a meaningful dialogue with leading separatist
groups. He said that recent reports that the RTG was quietly
reaching out to the Barasi Revolusi Nasional Coordinate
(BRN-C) and other separatist groups -- while likely true --
would not prove successful. (NOTE: septel will report on RTG
exploratory talks with separatist groups. END NOTE) He said
that in the past the RTG had limited success in setting up
informal talks in Malaysia with separatist leaders. However,
given the personal animosity felt towards Thaksin by the
militants and the fractured relationship with Malaysia, a
similar rapprochement was unlikely.

LOW EXPECTATIONS FROM THE NRC
--------------


10. (C) Palakorn said he has very low expectations for the
National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) and questioned
whether its chairman -- former Prime Minister Anand
Panyarachun -- understood the South well enough to present
recommendations that would ameliorate the situation.
Moreover, while Anand intends to finish the commission's work
he feels that he has been "set up" by Thaksin and that the
government has little intention of following his
recommendations.

QUEEN REMAINS FOCUSED ON PLIGHT OF SOUTHERN BUDDHISTS
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Palakorn accompanied the Queen during her recently
completed month-long annual visit to the South. She is
"saddened" by the extreme security measures in place for her
when she is in the region -- she only travels by helicopter
-- and feels she has been "cut off" from the local populace.
He indicated that the Queen remains concerned about "innocent
Buddhists" hurt in the conflict. The Ambassador asked if she
was also concerned about Muslim victims of the violence.
Palakorn respond that "until a few months ago 99 percent of
the victims were Buddhists." (NOTE: Our information suggest
that while a majority of victims are Buddhists, a significant
number are Muslims. END NOTE)

SITUATION IS LOCAL/ETHNIC NOT INTERNATIONAL/RELIGIOUS
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Palakorn emphasized that the conflict in the South
remained primarily based on ethnicity and not on religion,
and that the sense of Malay identity, rather than Islam,
remains the core factor in the unrest. He noted that
following the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, there
were greater calls for Islamic solidarity in the South, but
this remains a secondary factor in the conflict. He
emphasized that there are no indications of direct outside
involvement in the South.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Palakorn offers a rare glimpse of the royal
family's views on both the southern situation and Thaksin.
Palakorn indicated that the King was carefully considering
how to address the South in his birthday remarks, set to be
delivered on December 4. The speculation from such a well
placed and high-level source that Prime Minister Thaksin
might have been aware of the planned disappearance of the
lawyer Somchai is troubling. Post will continue to
forcefully advocate at all levels strong U.S. views about
respect for human rights in the South. END COMMENT
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: PALAKORN SUWANRATH
--------------


14. (C) Privy Counselor Palakorn Suwanrath was born on July
14, 1948, in Bangkok, to a prominent family. His father,
Phuang, was a well respected technocrat who worked
extensively with the royal family. Palakorn spent his early
life in Songkhla, where his father was posted, before moving
to Bangkok to pursue his secondary education. He obtained a
BA in political science from Chulalongkorn University and a
MA in political science from Ohio University. He attended
the National Defense College in 1994.


15. (U) In 1973 Palakorn became a career Ministry of
Interior (MOI) officer, starting in the Policy and Planning
Bureau. He worked his way through the ranks, eventually
becoming the Vice Governor of Satun in 1989 and Vice Governor
of Prachuap Khirikhan in 1991. Palakorn became Governor of
Pattani in 1992 and Chiang Mai in 1996.


16. (U) In December 1997, he was appointed Director of the
now-defunct Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center
(SBPAC),located in Yala, while serving concurrently as
Deputy Perm-Sec at MOI.


17. (U) Beside his Interior posts, Palakorn has also served
as a board member of the Expressway and Rapid Transit
Authority of Thailand, Chairman of the Executive Board of the
Metropolitan Electricity Authority, Chairman of the Executive
Board of the Provincial Electricity Authority, and as a board
member of the Electricity-Generating Authority of Thailand
(EGAT) and the Government Savings Bank.


18. (C) On July 18, 2001, Palakorn resigned his position at
the SBPAC -- 7 years before his slated retirement. The
following day he was appointed Privy Counselor by the King.
At that time there was widespread public speculation that he
was forced to resign because of conflicts over the handling
of the southern situation with then Interior Minister
Purachai Piamsombun and Prime Minister Thaksin. Most
observers saw his immediate appointment to the Privy Council
as a sign of the King's displeasure with Thaksin. However,
Palakorn told the Ambassador that this was not the case. He
said during his father's funeral in April 2001 the King
informed him that he would be given a "special position" in
the future. Palakorn says he was tapped to join the Privy
Council on July 9, 2001, obligating him to resign immediately
from the MOI. Palakorn explained that his current position
on the Privy Council precluded him from talking publicly
about the timing of his appointment, which fed speculation
that the appointment was a deliberate slap at Thaksin by the
King.


19. (C) Palakorn is married to Khunying Dhasaniya; they
have a grown son. END BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
BOYCE