Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK7073
2005-11-15 03:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

DISCUSSIONS ON SOUTHERN TROUBLES WITH OBSERVERS IN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PTER TH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007073 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER TH
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS ON SOUTHERN TROUBLES WITH OBSERVERS IN
SONGKHLA

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON. REASON: 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007073

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER TH
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS ON SOUTHERN TROUBLES WITH OBSERVERS IN
SONGKHLA

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON. REASON: 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: During a one day visit to Songkhla in
southern Thailand, Thailand Desk Officer and Emboff met with
several prominent local observers to discuss the causes and
possible solution to the area's ongoing turmoil. The
observers were opposition Democrat Party (DP) MP Niphon
Bunyamanee, Prince of Songkhla University researcher Zakee
Pitakumpol and Islamic Committee of Songkhla Department of
Academic and Foreign Affairs Head Wisoot Binlateh. While
none supported the separatists action, neither did they
support Thaksin's approach to resolving the conflict, or the
methods of the security forces. Each stated that Thaksin's
often harsh rhetoric and strong-arm treatment by security
personnel had alienated the Thai Muslim population and left
them distrustful and fearful of the RTG's intentions. They
also in large viewed the ultimate solution as better RTG
recognition of the Thai-Malay culture, respect for Muslim
schools, more spending on education and job training, and
investigation of and trials for any government officials
engaged in brutal practices against local civilians. End
summary.

LOCAL OPPOSITION MP SAYS THAKSIN IS THE PROBLEM


2. (C) Songkhla MP Niphon said that a political solution is
the only option for the government. The "Oum Kha" or
literally "take away and kill" methods many believe the
police practice on separatist suspects has embittered the
Thai Muslim population in the region and Prime Minister
Thaksin's public statements on the situation too often has an
incendiary effect. Niphon blamed the Prime Minister for the
most recent surge of violence in the historically restive
deep south by disbanding in 2002 a long successful joint
Army-Police-Civil Southern Border Provinces Administration
Center formed some twenty years earlier by Prime Minister
Prem. This group had functioned well as both a center for
intelligence collection and a conduit for grievances.
Thaksin's replacement of this group with the deeply despised
police destroyed the intelligence network and exacerbated
tensions between the central government and the local
population, Niphon said.



3. (C) Niphon said that the public in the south is deeply
suspicious of police involvement in the disappearance of
local Thai Muslim's considered troublesome by the Thai
authorities. Niphon claimed that at the time prominent
Muslim lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit disappeared in March,
2004, 105 persons had already disappeared under unexplained
circumstances. By now, Niphon continued, the numbers had
gone close to 300, with no credible investigation. Added to
the distrust of the police are the "tough" comments by the
Prime Minister that further alienate the Thai Muslim
population. The government needs to win the population's
trust, said Niphon, not exacerbate distrust of the
government's intentions. Niphon also criticized what he
viewed as Thaksin's war of words against Malaysia.

SEPARATISTS' AGENDA


4. (C) Niphon said that the separatists are trying to drive
a wedge between the Buddhist and Muslim communities by their
attacks on monks and temples. Though the attacks have
increased tensions, they have not yet gone so far as to
destroy inter-communal relations in the south, he added.


5. (SBU) Niphon listed steps he considers essential to
resolving Thailand's southern conflict. These included:

- immediate cessation of "oum kha" operations by security
personnel;

- decentralization of government

- more participation by all communities in the reconciliation
process, including
local and religious leaders;

- double the budget for education;

- stop talk of banning religious pondok schools;

- provide more financial support for the pondok schools;

- more respect shown to Muslim teachers (ustaads);

- reform the police and judicial system and institute better
criminal investigation techniques;

- promote labor skills training;

- promote increased business investment in the region.


ISLAMIC SCHOLAR CITES WIDESPREAD FEELINGS OF INJUSTICE


5. (C) Prince of Songkhla University researcher Zakee
Pitakumpol said that in his view, not much of the National
Reconciliation Committee's (NRC) interim recommendations have
been implemented by the government. He expressed his faith
in the NRC, opining that if the RTG follows the NRC's interim
and final recommendations, whatever they turn out to be, the
situation will definitely improve from the present state of
affairs. As in the case of Niphon, Zakee blamed Thaksin for
the current violence, but also acknowledged that the
separatists appeared to be trying to separate the Thai
Buddhist and Thai Malay Muslim communities.


6. (C) Zakee said that there is a deep feeling of injustice
felt by Thai Muslims in the region. Government talk of
abolishing the Pondoks increases fears that the government is
promoting the dominant Buddhist culture over the Thai Malay
Muslim culture. What especially hurts the Muslim community
is the lack of legal action against abusive authorities. In
answer to poloff's question, Zakee said that a trial of those
responsible for the deaths in custody of the 80 odd Muslims
at Tak Bai would be well received by the Thai Muslim
population as a sign of good faith. When asked what the U.S.
could do to promote more respect for human rights Zakee
answered that human rights training for the police would be a
good area to consider.


7. (C) Zakee said that he agreed with a set of ideas
advanced in a recent speech by former Prime Minister (and
Deputy Prime Minister in Thaksin's first government) Chavalit
Yongchaiyut. These points included the support of cultural
and religious diversity; a step-back of opposing groups to
allow discussion by representatives; promotion of stronger
local government and creation of a separate administration
zone status, such as enjoyed by Bangkok, in Pattani.


8. (C) When asked about the role of international jihadism
on separatists, Zakee responded that there was likely some
influence, but not much. He concluded, however, that the
hardened attitude between the Thai Buddhist and Muslim
communities created by the violence will take "a long time to
heal."

ISLAMIC COMMITTEE MEMBER CALLS FOR RESPECT FOR THAI MALAY
MUSLIM CULTURE


9. (C) Islamic Committee of Songkhla Department of Academic
and Foreign Affairs Head Wisoot Binlateh said that the RTG is
indifferent to cultural differences in the deep south. It
looks at everything through the prism of economic development
without seeing the cultural sensitivities that are affected
by this development, he added. Unhealthy social vices
inevitably accompany this development and it clashes with the
largely rural and conservative Thai Muslim society. Wisoot
added that in the public schools the Buddhist religion and
culture is emphasized and the "historical realities" of the
region are ignored. The government must accept these
historical grievances and recognize the identity of the Thai
Muslims. In response to a question on the introduction of a
standardized curriculum, Wisoot said that Islamic ustaads
should be the instructors to Muslim students in the Pondoks
and that the curriculum must reflect the "true history" of
the region.


10. (U) When pressed to offer a way to reduce the tensions
between central authority and local religious leaders, Wisoot
suggested that the government establish a religious training
center for the ustaads. He also said that the government
should set up a college to train religious leaders (Imams).



11. (C) Comment: Although these observers were not a
complete cross section of opinion in the region, they
represent significant political and religious constituencies.
Their basic positions were close. While none supported the
separatists action, neither did they support Thaksin's
approach to resolving the conflict, or the methods of the
security forces. Clearly, the government has a "hearts and
minds" problem with many of those in the south that it is
professing to protect. This situation will have to change if
Thaksin hopes to achieve a real and durable resolution of the
ongoing turmoil.
BOYCE