A/S RADEMAKER'S MEETINGS AT THE ARF SEMINAR FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGKOK 007045

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, ISN
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM PHSA PINS PTER TH ARF
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S MEETINGS AT THE ARF SEMINAR FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The U.S. delegation at the ARF CBM Seminar on
Missile Defense, held in Bangkok October 6 and 7, was led by
Acting A/S for International Security and Nonproliferation
Stephen Rademaker. In the plenary session and side meetings
with numerous participants, Rademaker stressed three key
themes: 1) ARF needs to be strengthened as a forum for
discussing serious security matters; 2) the U.S. is sincere
about promoting transparency on missile defense and other
security issues; and 3) the U.S. is honestly working to
correct misperceptions about missile defense. Experts from
the U.S. Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Missile Defense Agency gave presentations
explaining U.S. missile defense policies and programs,
seeking to address concerns and misconceptions of other
countries regarding missile defense. Several other countries
expressed their opinions concerning missile defense and its
relationship to the further proliferation of missiles and
missile technology. On missile defense, countries lined up
as expected: Japan, Korea, and Australia explained why they
endorse missile defense and how it promotes peace. China and
Pakistan gave presentations arguing that missile defense is
destabilizing. Co-chair Thailand stressed the need for
greater transparency and further need to dispel
misperceptions about missile defense.


2. (C) A/S Rademaker also used his visit to urge countries to
endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP). He urged
Thailand and other countries that have not yet endorsed PSI
to consider endorsing it as soon as possible, and reiterated
the suggestion of a group endorsement during the upcoming
Asian Senior Level Talks on Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo
early in 2006. A/S Rademaker also took advantage of the
visit to urge countries to sign Article 98 agreements with
the United States. END SUMMARY.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PLENARY SESSION
=================================


3. (SBU) During the Plenary session of the ARF Seminar, a
number of countries made presentations outlining their views
on missile defense, proliferation and other issues. Among
these:

--Australia outlined its rationale for supporting missile
defense, characterizing missile defense as part of a "layered
approach" to combating the growing threat posed by
proliferation.

--Japan explained that its planned deployment of missile
defense would be strictly defensive and not be used to defend
"third countries". MOFA U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Division
Senior Coordinator Suzuki Hideo also explained how the GOJ's
carve out exception to Japan's three principles on the
non-export of weapon systems to allow joint development of
missile defense was a limited exception to that rule.

--Singapore focused primarily on the threat posed by
proliferation and gave a comprehensive explanation for its
endorsement of PSI.

--Korea explained that missile defense can reduce the threat
posed by ballistic missiles by rendering them ineffective.
The Korean delegate also explained that Seoul is considering
PAC-2 or PAC-3 or equipping destroyers with AEGIS SM-2 as
ways to implement its own missile defense program.

--China gave five reasons why it opposes missile defense: 1)
it does not deter, but rather stimulates the spread of
ballistic missile technology; 2) missile defense undermines
mutual trust; 3) missile defense harms regional stability,
especially on the Korean Peninsula; 4) missile defense
technology cooperation promotes the proliferation of
ballistic missile technology; and 5) missile defense
jeopardizes the peace and security of outer space.

--Malaysia acknowledged the threat posed by WMD proliferation
and terrorism but expressed concerns that missile defense
could lead to an arms race in Asia.

--Pakistan gave four reasons why it opposes missile defense:
1) its prohibitive cost; 2) the likelihood of missile
defense leading to an arms race; 3) because no weapon systems
is "purely defensive" technology cooperation will lead to
proliferation; and 4) missile defense systems based on boost
phase intercept and mid range intercept would weaponize
space.

--Russia explained that, while missile defense is not a
panacea, it could be stabilizing so long as countries worked
to create "architecture of transparency" and created a better
assessment of the real missile defense threats in Asia. Such
threat assessments are not simply functions of the numbers of
offensive missiles, but also of the political will of states
to use them.

HIGHLIGHTS FROM SESSION TWO
===========================


4. (SBU) During the afternoon session on 6 October,
Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines presented
more fulsome presentations on nonproliferation and missile
defense. The Australian delegation expanded on the themes in
their earlier statement. Indonesia agreed that missile
proliferation is of great concern, but made clear their
concern about the impact of any new technology controls on
developing economies, particularly when developing countries
are not involved in the negotiation of the controls. In
addition, the delegation from Jakarta highlighted its
preference for a multilateral effort under the UN to tackle
missile-related issues. The Philippines outlined the basics
of the HCOC in a powerpoint presentation. In particular, the
Philippines encouraged more ARF members to subscribe to the
HCOC.


5. (SBU) Japan, in the first of two presentations, gave a
succinct outline of the mechanics of their missile defense
program and a stark comparison of defense figures to
highlight the fact that missile defense was not the start of
any new military build-up. Japan explained that its missile
defense components were to be entirely self-contained, and
would be incapable of any offensive use. In their second
presentation, the Japanese delegation made a strong pitch for
continued cooperation in the MTCR and HCOC and called upon
other countries to support and participate in PSI.


6. (SBU) Three USG experts provided presentations. Mr. Philip
Jamison of the Office of Missile Defense Policy at the
Department of Defense gave an overview of U.S. Missile
Defense policies and programs. He stated that missile
defense is one of the tools the USG has to combat WMD
proliferation. The four goals of missile defense are to
assure allies and friends that the U.S. will not be coerced
by missile threats; dissuade potential adversaries from
investing in ballistic missiles; deter ballistic missile use
by denying benefits of any attack; and defend against
ballistic missiles should deterrence fail. Mr. John
Schoenewolf of the Missile Defense Agency then gave an
explanation of several of the current and planned elements of
the U.S. missile defense system, stating that "we now have a
thin line of defense in case of emergency." Dr. Kerry
Kartchner of the U.S. Department of State then gave a
presentation addressing several misconceptions about the
technical, cost, and diplomatic aspects of missile defense.
He stated that missile defense is not an alternative to
deterrence, as many had claimed, and that deterrence remains
our highest priority. He also noted that missile defense has
not led to the collapse of arms control or to a renewed
U.S.-Russian arms race, and that U.S. missile defense was not
aimed at either Russia or China. All three presentation
reaffirmed U.S. commitment to promoting transparency
regarding its missile defense programs.


7. (SBU) Pakistan opened up the round-table discussion with a
brief synopsis: all countries present agree that
proliferation is a concern, but representatives are divided
on the issue of missile defense. In particular, Pakistan
questioned the utility of missile defense in the face of
non-state actors and suggested that missile defense would
destroy the concept of deterrence, leading to a more
dangerous world. A/S Rademaker explained that although
deterrence was a familiar idea, it was not necessarily a good
one and was fraught with its own perils. Picking up on the
Pakistani charge (also echoed by the Chinese and Russians)
that missile defense development would drive the development
of offensive weapons, A/S Rademaker explained that missile
defense actually lowered the utility of a given offensive
deployment and was far preferable choice to a build up of
offensive weapons. In response to Russia and Indonesia's
concerns about "debris" from the intercept of a missile, A/S
Rademaker explained that in U.S. modeling, such debris tended
to follow the original trajectory of the incoming missile,
with a small cluster of debris being much less dangerous than
an actual missile.


8. (SBU) The ROK delegation asked how U.S. missile defense
efforts worked in conjunction with the MTCR HCOC and other
existing regimes. A/S Rademaker noted that most missile
defense systems were too small -- based on range and payload
-- and did not fall under these regimes.


9. (SBU) The Chinese delegation asked a number of direct
questions during the second session. They wanted to know why
the U.S. was limiting its cooperation on missile defense to
"only" 18 countries, suggesting those countries not included
were concerned about being excluded. The Chinese also
suggested that the U.S. programs were "weaponizing space" and
asked how we could do this consistent with our other
international obligations. They also expressed concern over
the ability of the U.S. to make the correct judgment as to if
a launch is peaceful or not, particularly at the boost phase
of missile launch. The U.S. delegation replied that the
states to which the U.S. might extend protection would be the
subject of further diplomacy and discussion and no definitive
answer could be provided. Furthermore, U.S. missile defense
remains an extremely transparent program, given its high
profile and the Congressional oversight to which it is
subject. Regarding the potential weaponization of space, the
U.S. remains committed to the Outer Space Treaty. Missile
defense plans do not include anti-satellite weapons and the
existing program would not lead to the weaponization of
space. The U.S. acknowledged that discriminating a hostile
missile launch from a peaceful space vehicle launch may be
difficult; however, the U.S. would take the political context
surrounding the launch into consideration. This would
include an assessment of validity of any claim that a launch
was indeed peaceful. It is therefore the responsibility of
the launching party to take steps to reassure its neighbors
that its intentions are in fact not hostile.

THAILAND URGED TO ENDORSE PSI AT ASTOP
======================================


10. (C) Prior to convening the plenary session of the ARF
Missile Defense Seminar, on October 5, A/S Rademaker held a
series of bilateral meetings with key countries to discuss
proliferation issues. Thai MFA Deputy Permanent Secretary
Taker Phanit assured Rademaker that Thailand will endorse PSI
soon but stressed the need not to exacerbate the Muslim
separatist situation in Southern Thailand. Thakur explained
that Thailand is waiting for a "Muslim neighbor" to sign the
PSI Statement of Principles before endorsing. Rademaker
told Thakur that he had heard similar concerns from other
ASEAN countries and reiterated a previous U.S.-Australian
suggestion of a joint endorsement of the PSI SOP by a number
of countries with similar concerns. Rademaker noted that
the upcoming Asian Senior Level Talks on Proliferation
(ASTOP) in Tokyo, scheduled for January or February 2006,
might be a ripe opportunity. While noncommittal, Thakur
seemed open to Rademaker's suggestion. Thakur noted that he
will meet with Ambassadors from PSI participant countries
October 14 to discuss this issue further. Of note, during
the plenary session of the seminar on October 6, Thai LTG
Naraset Israngkura, Deputy Director for Policy and Plans at
MOD, told the assembled delegates that Thailand "views PSI as
an important instrument to reinforce political will" and
pledged to "work closely with PSI countries."

VIETNAM NEEDS MORE TIME TO "STUDY" PSI
======================================


11. (C) A/S Rademaker and delegation met with Vietnamese
Ministry of Defense Sr. Colonels Nguyen Quoc Long and Hong
Viet Quong and MFA officer Vu Van Nien on 5 October to
discuss PSI. Following A/S Rademaker's general overview of
PSI's components and the growing global support for this
initiative, Nguyen responded that the SRV was still studying
this initiative internally, and that a decision would take
some time. According to Nguyen, Vietnam respects the goals
of nonproliferation and counterterrorism but had to consider
the regional context. Vu added that Vietnamese officials are
working to understand PSI's interplay with international and
domestic laws, as well as ongoing efforts such as the NPC.
The SRV is also interested in the logistical details of PSI,
such as compensation for detaining the wrong vessels; "this
could impact our bilateral relations with other countries."
A/S Rademaker explained that many countries had these same
concerns before joining in support of PSI, and that the SOP
are consistent with international law and respect domestic
ones as well. PSI activities are a cooperative effort that
involves multiple countries. Even if Vietnam does not join
in supporting PSI, other PSI countries will likely turn to
the SRV for assistance if proliferation activities involve
Vietnam, its ships and/or ports.


12. (C) Vu inquired whether the main purpose of PSI was the
coordination and sharing of intelligence information (Note,
the entire SRV team seemed very interested in this. End
Note). A/S Rademaker responded that the sharing of
information was an important part of PSI, and explained the
role of the Operational Experts Group and other PSI
activities in helping PSI members to work to build their
capacity to support the goals and activities of the PSI.
Nguyen pointed out that the SRV does not participate in
bilateral or multilateral military exercises, but admitted
that other elements such as the police or customs units could
possibly be involved. Nguyen closed by repeating the SRV's
need for more time to consider PSI, but suggested that
Vietnam may be able to so "some parts" of PSI if not others.
(NOTE: The Vietnamese delegation was not particularly
familiar with PSI concepts or ideas. It is possible that
their comments and questions do not reflect the latest
thinking in Hanoi. END NOTE)

MALAYSIA IS "ON THE SAME PAGE", BUT HAS SOME CONCERNS
============================================= ========


13. (C) A/S Rademaker met with four Malaysian officials:
Mr. Ilango Karuppannan (Principal Assistant Secretary, Policy
Planning Division, MFA and head of delegation); ASP Asuar
Rahmat (Director, National Security Division, Prime
Minister's Department); Mr. Hasnan Zahedi Ahmad Zakaria
(Principal Assistant Director, National Security Division,
Prime Minister's Department); and Colonel Othman Abdullah
(Chief of Staff, Operations, Air Division, Ministry of
Defense). A/S Rademaker began the session with a general
overview of the PSI and its objectives. Karuppannan
addressed A/S Rademaker's comments by stating that, in
general, the GOM is on the same page as the U.S. when it
comes to PSI. However, the GOM had two concerns. First,
they wanted assurance that the PSI and any actions taken from
signing the PSI were consistent with international laws.
Second, the GOM is concerned about the potential
repercussions should it be a willing participant in an
operation that does not go well. Karuppannan seemed pleased
to learn that other ASEAN countries were also giving serious
consideration to PSI. Karuppannan concluded by stating that
Malaysian officials are studying the issue very closely, but
in the interim want to assure us that they agree with the
objectives of PSI.

INDONESIA MISTRUSTFUL OF U.S. INTENTIONS ON PSI
============================================= ==


14. (C) In their bilateral meeting with A/S Rademaker on 5
October, the Indonesian delegation said they agreed on
non-proliferation goals, but have strong reservations about
PSI. Indonesia requires many more confidence building
measures and they believe that the UN should remain the focus
of this and similar efforts. They understand the necessity
for PSI as a counter-proliferation measure; however they are
still looking at the details. They are concerned PSI will
create "disharmony" within ASEAN and are still looking at the
details. Another concern is how PSI relates to the Law of
the Sea.


15. (C) Indonesia would prefer that this and similar
initiatives would come through the UN, rather than from a
group of individual countries. "PSI should have been created
in a multilateral forum; and the UN is the proper forum."
Part of this perspective comes from their view that PSI, and
other similar regimes that are set up outside of the UN,
diminish the authority of the UN.


16. (C) They also questioned who would have authority to
interdict ships on the high-seas, blaming the U.S. for past
mistakes, like the "misidentification" of the DPRK shipment
of missiles as a stateless vessel, noting that Indonesia has
huge sea areas "and that this agreement could have large
impact on our country." In a parting shot, the Indonesian
head of delegation said that they are suspicious of PSI, and
they believe that PSI will allow the U.S. to "push the
limits" of international law.


17. (C) A/S Rademaker responded by noting that 60 plus
nations have endorsed PSI. PSI activities are undertaken in
line with international law and domestic law. The entire
intention of PSI is increasing cooperation between countries.
The UN supports PSI, citing a public statement by UNSYG
Annan, and the flexibility of this grouping allows for swift
and effective action to counter the rising threat posed by
proliferation. A/S Rademaker also urged Indonesia to
intervene with APEC economies that have not yet met their
commitment to conclude an Additional Protocol so APEC's goal
of universal adherence by the end of 2005 is met.

SIGNING OF ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT URGED
=====================================


18. (C) During his bilateral meetings with Vietnam, Malaysia,
and Indonesia, A/S Rademaker also urged the signing of
Article 98 agreements with the United States. His
counterparts were unfamiliar with Article 98, and A/S
Rademaker gave a short tutorial on the need for Article 98
agreements, emphasizing the reciprocal nature of the
agreement. He handed out information packets on Article 98,
and his interlocutors promised to bring the matter to the
attention of appropriate officials in their capitals.

CONCLUDING SUMMARY
==================


19. Over a year in making, the ARF Missile Defense Seminar
advanced two U.S. objectives: greater acceptance in the
Asia-Pacific region of U.S. missile defense policies and
programs and strengthening the ARF (one of only two fora in
the region that includes the U.S.) by enhancing its viability
as a cooperative security forum. The event was well attended
by ARF participant countries, and U.S. experts fully utilized
this unique opportunity to debunk myths and address
misperceptions about missile defense. Skeptical views were
aired by the Chinese, Pakistani, Indonesian, and Malaysian
delegations, but U.S. experts effectively countered those
views and, at the same time, provided transparency on U.S.
missile defense programs and policies, favorably impressing
even the skeptics. Because they bring together the relevant
officials from 25 participant countries and organizations,
ARF sponsored functions have proven to be a cost-effective
way to advance U.S. interests. In addition to the missile
defense agenda, the U.S. delegation was able to conduct PSI
and Article 98 bilaterals on the margins.
BOYCE