U.S.-THAI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 BANGKOK 007030

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
PACOM FOR FPA FALLON AND J-5
OSD/ISA FOR POWERS AND STERN
JCS FOR GARLAND
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV MARR MASS PTER PREL KPAO TH
SUBJECT: U.S.-THAI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 7 and 8, following up on the
President's and Prime Minister Thaksin's commitment, senior
U.S. officials met with Thai counterparts to inaugurate a
bilateral dialogue on strategic and security issues. The
U.S. side was lead by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Eric John and included representatives from OSD, JCS and
PACOM. The Thai delegation was led by MFA Permanent
Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, and included

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representatives from Royal Thai Supreme Command, MOD, the
National Intelligence Agency and the military services.
Participants discussed a range of bilateral and regional
issues including China and India's roles in the region,
regional groupings, promoting democracy in Burma, the Korean
peninsula, Indonesia, Avian Influenza, trafficking in
persons, maritime security, educational exchanges, mil-mil
cooperation and exercises, the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI),and the continuing unrest in Thailand's far
South. The two sides agreed to:


1. Work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US
Embassy on a draft Plan of Action;

2. Explore improving International Law Enforcement Agency
(ILEA) efforts to combat trafficking in persons;

3. Work to strengthen the Fulbright Program and other
educational exchanges;

4. Collaborate on best approaches to upgrade facilities at
Utapao Naval Air Base;

5. Improve maritime observation/intelligence capabilities in
the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand;

6. Assist Thailand answer concerns about the Defense
Resource Management Studies (DRMS) and an MOA on procurement;

7. Proceed together on Global Peacekeeping Operation
Initiative (GPOI);

8. Establish regularized exchanges of views on Burma, led by
the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

END SUMMARY.

PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION
--------------


2. (C) Krit noted that the Strategic Dialogue had been
endorsed by the President and Prime Minister Thaksin during
their September 19 meeting in Washington and reflected the
strength and depth of U.S.-Thai relations. He expected the
Dialogue to build on other recent events which have served to
strengthen the relationship including Thailand's designation
as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2003 and the close cooperation
following the December 2004 Asian tsunami. He proposed that
the two sides use the Dialogue to begin work on a joint Plan
of Action that would outline broad goals toward strengthening
the relationship and improving people-to-people ties between
our two countries, as the PM and the President had agreed in
their joint statement following their September 19 meeting.
The Thais presented a draft "Plan of Action" for U.S.
consideration and suggested that both sides work through
diplomatic channels to conclude a joint document by February

2006. DAS John said the U.S. side would need more time to
look at the Plan of Action in detail and suggested that a
less structured format be considered. Both sides agreed that
Embassy Bangkok and the MFA would continue to consider the
document.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION
--------------


3. (C) Krit noted that Southeast Asia was experiencing a
period of dynamic change in part to the rising influence of
China and India in the region. While emphasizing the "vital"
role of the U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to
intensify U.S. engagement -- he indicated that Thailand would
also focus on developing stronger relations with both China
and India. Bangkok viewed both countries as sources of
"unlimited consumer demand" and noted they hoped to conclude
FTAs with both China and India. Krit hinted that Thailand
could play a "bridging role" between the U.S. and China and
India.


4. (C) Echoing comments prevalent among Thai academics,
Krit said that overall China's rise should benefit the
region, however, there remained several areas of concern,
including the Taiwan Straits and relations with Japan. He
emphasized the Thai view that China's rise is "inevitable,"
which required that they had no choice but to engage Beijing.
Thailand would "seize the opportunity" of the 30th
anniversary of bilateral Sino-Thai relations to enter into a
"strategic partnership" with China. Beijing and Bangkok were
meeting with increasing frequency through such fora as the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),ASEAN Plus Three, and shortly the
East Asia Summit (EAS). BGen John Allen of OSD/ISA provided
a briefing on Secretary Rumsfeld's recent visit to Beijing,
emphasizing the need for greater transparency within the PLA.
DAS John noted that the rise of China was not a zero sum
game and could benefit both the U.S. and Thailand. John
suggested the U.S. and Thailand explore concrete steps to
engage China, including joint peacekeeping training,
counternarcotics work and counterterrorism cooperation.


5. (C) Turning to India, Krit emphasized the growing
influence of India in Southeast Asia and New Delhi's
increasing engagement with countries in the region.
Describing India's deepening relations with ASEAN countries
as a policy of "looking west," he said New Delhi was building
stronger bilateral and security ties through regional fora,
most notably the ARF. Royal Thai Naval officials and General
Kemarat Kanchanawat, Director General of Joint Operations at
the Royal Thai Supreme Command, outlined a number of mil-mil
operations between India and Thailand in the Andaman Sea and
the Bay of Bengal. DAS John suggested that the U.S. and
Thailand work closely together to engage India, particularly
in the Andaman Sea.

REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE -- THE EAS AND ACD
--------------


6. (C) Krit suggested that the East Asia Summit (EAS) was
moving away from its original concept, which envisioned it as
an "East Asia Community," turning more into a forum to
exchange views on major issues. Many details needed to be
worked out before the EAS would be able to address
substantive issues and not "just be a talk shop." Krit noted
that the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD),which PM Thaksin
has called "the missing link" in Asia's regional
architecture, was continuing to expand into a true
"pan-Asian" forum. The ACD currently has 28 members,
including most recently Saudi Arabia and Russia. Bangkok
hoped the ACD would evolve into an informal setting for
discussions following the APEC model.

INDONESIA
--------------


7. (C) Both sides agreed on the many positive recent
developments in Indonesia, including progress on democracy
and Aceh. DAS John emphasized that the U.S. would continue
to support progress on democracy and economic development
while expanding military and counterterrorism cooperation.
Krit said that Thailand was looking for Indonesia to resume
its leadership role within ASEAN and noted that cooperation
between Thai and Indonesian intelligence on CT issues had
been especially good. The image of the U.S. in Indonesia had
improved dramatically following the tsunami, which was one of
the most significant -- and positive -- recent developments
in the region. Both sides agreed to continue close
consultations through Embassy Bangkok on further support for
Indonesia policy.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND BURMA
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador Boyce expressed the USG's concern about
the worsening situation in Burma. It was important to
recognize that the situation in Burma continued to
deteriorate. Aung San Suu Kyi and other key democratic
leaders remain in detention, the sham of the National
Convention continues, and the dire human rights situation
continues to support the flow of refugees, AIDS, and
narcotics. The sudden and "inexplicable move" of the capital
250 miles north to Pyinmana had baffled the diplomatic corps.
The Ambassador expressed his concern that Thailand was often
perceived as an apologist for Rangoon. He further noted that
in conversations with the President, Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense, Thai officials had promised to take a

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more publicly critical stance if Burma made no progress
towards meaningful reform. As Burma continued to show no
sign that they are willing to engage with the opposition or
make any other concessions, the Ambassador said that the time
had come for Thailand to take a stronger stance.


9. (C) Krit stated that he had "no quibbles" with the
Ambassador's assessment. It was "very true" that the U.S.
and Thailand shared common concerns about the situation in
Burma, and the joint statement between President Bush and PM
Thaksin was a testament to the "unanimity of views" between
the two countries. Krit admitted that Rangoon was becoming
more difficult to talk to, that the economic situation was
worsening and that there were increasingly visible strains
between the government and minority ethnic groups. However,
he explained, Thailand continued to believe in a policy of
constructive engagement. General Kemarat noted that the RTG
was well aware of the danger of the collapse of the Burmese
regime, and had plans in place in case it happened. Both
delegations agreed that, in response to the joint statement
issued by the President and PM Thaksin, we would have more
regularized exchanges of views on Burma.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA
--------------


10. (C) Both sides discussed recent developments on the
Korean Peninsula. DAS John provided a brief readout on the
current status of Six Party Talks and the challenges ahead as
the U.S. and other participants pursue the goal of a nuclear
free Korean Peninsula. Krit said that Thailand remained
particularly interested in the Six Party Talks, noting
Foreign Minister Kantathi's recent visit to Pyongyang. The
Thais -- as they have in past meetings with senior USG
officials -- suggested that Thailand could play a mediating
role between the DPRK and the U.S.

AVIAN INFLUENZA
--------------


11. (SBU) Noting they were a "front line country," the
Thais emphasized the seriousness with which they were
approaching Avian Influenza (AI). Krit described plans to
monitor possible outbreaks of the diseases within Thailand
and RTG efforts to work closely with other ASEAN members and
the WHO on AI. Thai Ministry of Public Health officials
noted that on November 3 the Prime Ministers of Cambodia,
Burma, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand met in Bangkok to develop
a common approach to combating AI and related diseases.
(NOTE: The leaders met under the auspices of the
"Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy
(ACMECS). END NOTE) Krit said that Thailand hoped to become
an anti-viral production center in the future, and asked for
U.S. technical assistance on stockpiling anti-viral drugs.


12. (SBU) DAS John emphasized the seriousness with which
the U.S. government was approaching AI, noting that it is a
global challenge. John commended Thai efforts thus far and
requested that the RTG expand its cooperation on monitoring
with neighboring counties, particular Burma. John said the
U.S. would seek collaboration with Thailand for future
vaccine trials.

TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
--------------


13. (SBU) Both sides briefly discussed Trafficking in
Persons (TIP). DAS John commended Thailand for progress on
TIP issues, but suggested that even stronger legislation was
required to provide greater legal protection for victims
related to labor trafficking. The two sides agreed to
explore ways to improve ILEA's anti-TIP programs.

EDUCATION EXCHANGES
--------------


14. (U) The Thais emphasized the importance they placed on
the long-standing educational exchanges between the U.S. and
Thailand, and their hope that these exchanges be expanded.
Thai Ministry of Education officials said they would
particularly like to expand the Fulbright Program and the
Peace Corps presence, improve English language instruction,
develop greater links between universities, and expand
teacher education in science and technology. Additionally,
the Thai military hopes for greater military training
opportunities and would like to increase the number of Thai
cadets at U.S. military academies. DAS John said that
Embassy Bangkok would continue to look for ways to expand and
support educational cooperation. He strongly advocated that
the RTG correct the funding disparity of the Thai Fulbright
Program -- currently funded almost entirely by the U.S. -- by
matching the U.S. contribution.

UTAPAO UPGRADES
--------------


15. (C) General Allen noted that the quick decision by the
RTG to allow the U.S. to use Utapao as a regional hub for
tsunami relief operations was a prime example of how

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increased military access could benefit the region --
furthering our joint interests. The USG remained sensitive
to the fact that the RTG would prefer the extent of U.S.
access to Utapao remain relatively quiet. Focusing on the
continued strategic importance of Utapao, Allen explained
that the USG wished to maintain access to the base and was
ready to work with Thailand to upgrade existing facilities.
Rear Admiral Narongpol Na Bangchang of the Royal Thai Navy
noted that land at Utapao is limited and any plans to upgrade
base facilities should be done with Cobra Gold operations in
mind. He further noted that a full upgrade of Utapao would
cost approximately 17 million dollars. The Thai side also
explained that it hoped to build a UN Emergency Logistics
Response Facility near Utapao to improve capabilities to
respond to future emergencies, and sought U.S. support for
this designation. Allen explained that PACOM components had
examined Utapao with an eye towards potential improvement.
These findings were being consolidated now and PACOM would
share them with the Thai in the near future.

MARITIME SECURITY
--------------


16. (C) Both sides acknowledged that maritime security was
an issue of enormous importance. Royal Thai Navy
representatives noted that the RTG cooperated with many
countries in the region to monitor maritime traffic in the
Andaman Sea and the South China Sea, including joint maritime
patrols with Vietnam and Malaysia. General Kemarat described
shortcomings in the "Eyes in the Sky" (EITS) program.
Implemented in September, EITS seeks to mobilize the combined
resources of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to maintain
maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. Kemarat
explained that, in practice, EITS is of limited utility
because it only involves token patrol flights by one plane
each from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Kemarat was
much more hopeful of an Indonesian proposal to set up ship
patrols coupled with reporting stations in the region to be
part of a "Combined Maritime Patrol" architecture. This
architecture would be multi-national and interagency --
running in parallel with EITS -- and would divide the Strait
into five reporting zones, with reporting stations in Phuket
(Thailand),Lumut and Sabang (Indonesia),Dumai (Malaysia)
and Changi (Singapore). Although, there would be no single
command and control center, each country would receive a full
activity report from all sectors. Kemarat explained that
this project was currently in the "working-group" stage and
the Thai side did not know when it would be fully
implemented. Kemarat suggested, however, that the Phuket
node of such an architecture could provide tactical feed from
all of the stations into a Thai-U.S Maritime Operations
Intelligence Fusion capability, now in the planning stages.
The two sides agreed to work more closely to improve our
joint ability to monitor ship traffic in the Andaman Sea and
the Gulf of Thailand. Kemarat indicated his willingness to
work with JUSMAGTHAI to endorse a statement of intent with
JIATF-West to set up a Maritime Fusion capability.

DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STUDIES
--------------


17. (SBU) Noting that in previous weeks the USG had briefed
the Thai on Defense Resource Management Studies (DRMS),
General Allen asked whether Thailand was ready to begin
implementation of the program. PermSec Krit and LTG Naraset
Israngkura, Deputy Director General of MOD's Office of Policy
and Planning, asked for more time to study the proposal.
Privately, Naraset seemed frustrated at MFA's unwillingness
to commit to the initial assessment phase of the DRMS.
General Allen suggested that the Thais visit the Philippines
to view the results of a particularly successful DRMS
program. Dennis Lawrence of the Institute for Defense
Analysis reiterated that DRMS came with no strings attached,
emphasizing that once the assessment was completed the Thai
could decide whether they wished to proceed with the program.
Failing to win a commitment to endorse DRMS, the U.S. side
promised to work to answer any remaining concerns in the
hopes that Thailand will be able to participate in DRMS in

2006.

NATIONAL TRAINING FACILITY AND GPOI
--------------


18. (C) General Kemarat gave a detailed briefing outlining
Thai plans to build a National Training Facility (NTF)
capacity at Lop Buri, Prachuap Kirikhan, and Kanchanaburi.
He said that the facility at Lop Buri would include a
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility, a joint
live fire training range and a PKO/counter-insurgency
training area. Kemarat explained that the NTF would be used
by the three services and Thai police to improve skills and
that the facility at Lop Buri would be an integral part of
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) under which
concerned countries would work to train 15,000 peace keepers
in the Asia-Pacific region. General Allen noted that
Thailand was a global leader in United Nations peacekeeping
operations (UNPKO) and that the United States welcomed the
establishment of the NTF, which was consistent with the aims
of GPOI. Allen did, however, caution that the Thai side
should seek to centralize as much as possible the final NTF
site. Both Krit and Kemarat confirmed that Thailand fully
endorses GPOI and stands ready to work with the United States
to make it a success.

COBRA GOLD AND COPE TIGER
--------------


19. (C) Air Vice Marshal Ittahaporn Subhawong, Director of
Operations for the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF),noted with
concern that there were plans to combine the annual Cobra
Gold exercise with Cope Tiger. The RTAF views Cope Tiger as
instrumental in improving Thai air capabilities and that it
was important to maintain Cope Tiger as a separate entity not
focused on PKO like Cobra Gold. General Allen cautioned no
final decision about consolidating the two exercises had been
made and promised to relay the RTAF concerns to the
appropriate authorities. Brig. Gen. David Snyder, PACOM
Deputy J-5, explained that U.S. strategic lift remained a
serious concern and that the United States was looking for
ways to better use this valuable commodity.


20. (C) The Thai delegation endorsed the U.S. proposal to
make Cobra Gold 2007 a GPOI Capstone event. General Kemarat
also promised that Thailand would send a platoon to Khaan
Quest 2006 in Mongolia, also a GPOI Capstone event, to study
ways to make Cobra Gold 2007 and GPOI in Thailand a success.
General Allen asked Thailand to continue to think of creative
ways to use Cobra Gold and our bilateral exercise program as
a way to enhance regional cooperation with key countries such
as Japan, Indonesia and Australia. On the margins of the
meeting, several Thai officials indicated a willingness to
work with the Chinese PLA in future GPOI or peacekeeping
events.

PSI AND NON-PROLIFERATION
--------------


21. (C) DAS John opened the non-proliferation discussion by
noting that over sixty countries had endorsed the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),signaling their
commitment to halting the spread of WMD. In particular, he
noted Philippine President Arroyo's public statement at UNGA
this year in support of PSI. Krit responded by noting
Thailand's support for U.S. efforts to interdict illegal
transfers of WMD, but explained that the RTG was looking for
the right time to subscribe to PSI. Thailand would like to
announce its support for PSI with another ASEAN country,
preferably an Islamic one. In the meantime, RTG officials
would appreciate some clarification on issues of Thai concern
regarding the initiative. MFA's Kriangsak Kittichaisaree,
who will be the DG for International Organizations in 2006,
asked for U.S. assistance in answering a series of technical
and legal questions about PSI.


22. (C) DAS John responded that, on implementation,
regardless of whether Thai law allows specific actions or
not, PSI does not obligate participating states to do
anything. On potential political concerns, PSI interdiction
activities are not publicized and thus pose little potential
public downsides. Moreover, the benefits of forward action
in halting the spread of WMD should outweigh any potential
negative political concerns. DAS John thanked the Thai for
their support of the IAEA additional protocol and inquiring
whether the RTG had considered supporting the Hague Code of
Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).

COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND
--------------


23. (C) Krit noted that Thailand has ratified five of the
twelve UN anti-terrorism conventions, and hopes to complete
the remaining seven. Although Thai officials had reached out
to UN experts to help them draft new laws to ratify the
conventions, these drafts had been rejected by different
parts of the RTG, slowing the process. On the broader war on
terror, Krit emphasized Thailand's willingness to continue
cooperation, citing current efforts such as PISCES and CSI.
In the region, terrorism must be viewed in the broader
political context of rising Islamic extremism, and the
increasing influence of conservative political Islam in
Indonesian and Malaysia.


24. (C) Turning to the situation in Southern Thailand, Krit
reaffirmed that the RTG remains concerned about the potential
for external actors such as Al Q'aida and Jemaah Islamiya
(JI) to become involved, but as of yet had not seen such
activity. The flare-up of violence in the last couple of
years was due to domestic factors and driven by three groups:
separatists, narco-traffickers, and local politicians, who
are using the violence for their own ends. The RTG is
worried that casting the violence in Islamic terms only
serves to increase the militancy of youth in the South.


25. (C) Given these concerns, the RTG has embarked on a
comprehensive, long-term effort to attack the root causes of
the violence. Krit claimed the government has been
successful in preventing the situation from being portrayed
as a Buddhist-Muslim conflict, and to ensure that it is not
internationalized. The recent war of words with Malaysia
over the 131 Thai who fled their homes to Malaysia was an
unfortunate affair, but the two sides are moving beyond this
spat to improve their cooperation. Krit expressed some
frustration, however, with the role of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) which sent a delegation to the
South. In their statement of concern over the treatment of
Thai Muslims who have been arrested, OIC representatives
missed the point that the nearly 1,000 people who have died
in the violence are victims too.


26. (C) Ambassador Boyce responded by reiterating that this
was an internal Thai matter, and one that demands a Thai
response. That said, the USG remains concerned about the
potential for external terrorist involvement in the South.
The formulation of the National Reconciliation Commission
(NRC) to examine the causes and potential solutions to
violence in the South was to be applauded, and the U.S. looks
forward to its final report. The Ambassador noted that
improving Thai-Malaysian cooperation is also a welcome step
and that geography dictates the necessity of this
collaboration. For the RTG this is indeed their southern
problem, but for the Malaysians it is their northern problem.
Finally, the Ambassador repeated his offer for appropriate
types of assistance to the Thai effort, a sentiment echoed by
General Allen.


27. (C) General Kemarat presented a brief powerpoint
presentation outlining the RTA's plan of action in the South,
which emphasizes the use of military, police, and civilian
resources to secure peace and order, improve the economy,
strengthen local governance, and combat the ideology of
extremism. The RTG has considered construction of an
electronic fence along the 647 kilometer Thai-Malaysian
border, but each kilometer cost nearly 2 million U.S.
dollars, leading the RTA to focus on the use of ground
sensors to secure the border instead. Thai forces were also
making use of an Israeli-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) in the South (Note: for what purpose remained unclear.
End Note.),but needed more UAVs. Finally, the RTA is
focused on improving its C4I infrastructure in the South, but
this would take time.


28. (C) General Allen stated that the U.S. offer of
assistance could be focused by a DRMS and potential
opportunities that may become available through
transformation initiatives from the Joint Forces Command. He
invited those RTA to travel with him to the U.S. Joint Forces
Command in Norfolk to see how inter-force cooperation worked.
Identifying the specific needs of the Thai forces in the
South is the key to determining appropriate U.S. assistance.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


29. (C) In closing, the two sides agreed to the following
next steps in the dialogue (which should be considered C/Rel
Thai).


1. Work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US
Embassy on a draft Plan of Action;

2. Explore improving International Law Enforcement Agency
(ILEA) efforts to combat trafficking in persons;

3. Work to strengthen the Fulbright Program and other
educational exchanges;

4. Collaborate on best approaches to upgrade facilities at
Utapao Naval Air Base;

5. Improve maritime observation/intelligence capabilities in
the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand;

6. Assist Thailand answer concerns about the Defense
Resource Management Studies (DRMS) and an MOA on procurement;

7. Proceed together on Global Peacekeeping Operation
Initiative (GPOI);

8. Establish regularized exchanges of views on Burma between
Embassy Bangkok and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

COMMENT
--------------


30. (C) After an almost ten year hiatus, this was the first
time we have brought Thai civilian and military officials
together with U.S. counterparts to discuss strategic issues.
Thai problems with interagency "stovepiping," the MFA's lack
of a grasp of military issues, and the corresponding lack of
understanding by the Thai military of regional fora and the
complexities of Burma policy were obvious. Several officials
told us privately that this was the first time they had
worked with counterparts from other agencies on these sorts
of issues. Despite the often tedious pace of the talks, we
believe the enhanced interaction among the Thai and the
endorsements we received for GPOI, Utapao upgrades, improved
maritime surveillance and talks on Burma were worth the
effort. END COMMENT.

DELEGATION LIST
--------------

U.S. SIDE:


1. Eric John, Delegation Head, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Department of State

2. Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, Bangkok

3. BGen. John Allen, Office of the Secretary of Defense

4. Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Remington, Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff

5. Brig. Gen. David "Tanker" Snyder, Deputy J-5, PACOM

6. Alexander A. Arvizu, DCM Bangkok

7. Col. Steven McKeag, Defense Attach, Bangkok

8. COL Kevin Clark, Chief, JUSMAGTHAI

9. Mark B. Lambert, Political/Military Affairs,
Bangkok

10. Jessica Powers, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Department of Defense

11. Melanie Higgins, Thailand Desk Officer, Department
of State

12. Lt. Col. Kyle Garland, Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Department of Defense

13. Lt. Col. Seshagiri Munipalli, FPA, PACOM

14. LTC Timothy Dunne, J-7, PACOM

15. Jane Bocklage, PM/Regional Security and Arms
Transfers, Department of State

16. Dennis L. Lawrence, Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA)

RTG SIDE:


1. H.E. Dr. Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, Permanent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs

2. Mrs. Nongnuth Petcharatana, Director General,
Department of American and South Pacific Affairs

3. General Kemarat Kanchanawat, Director General, Joint
Operations Supreme Command

4. Lt. General Noraset Israngkura, Deputy Director
General, Office of Policy and Planning, Office of
the Permanent Secretary of Defense

5. Major General Surapan Wongthai, Director General of
Operations, Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army

6. Major General Padejkarn Jantsawek, Director General,
Office of Policy and Planning, Joint Operation, Supreme
Command

7. RADM Bongsak Singnarong, Director General, Joint and
Combined Exercises Planning Office, Supreme Command

8. AVM Ittahaporn Subhawong, Director of Operations,
Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters

9. Colonel Surasit Thanadtang, Director for Policy and
Strategy, Joint Operations, Supreme Command

10. Colonel Jirawat Punsawat, Directorate of Operations,
Royal Thai Army

11. Colonel Thikarmporn Chulilung, Director, Office of
Policy and Planning, Office of the Permanent Secretary
of Defense

12. Group Captain Songtam Chokkanapitag, Directorate of
Operations, Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters

13. Mr. Choombhon Lertrattakarn, Senior Specialist in
International Relations, National Security Council

14. Ms. Ratchanee Sornsiri, Office of Foreign Affairs,
Narcotics Control Board

15. Ms. Rarinthip Sirorat, Director of Policy and
Strategic Planning, Ministry of Social Development
and Human Security


31. (U) DAS John has cleared this message.
BOYCE