DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR EAP FOCUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGKOK 006524

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015
TAGS: KDEM PREL TH
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR EAP FOCUS
COUNTRIES - THAILAND

REF: A) SECSTATE 169892 B) BANGKOK 006094

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L.BOYCE, reasons 1.5 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary and introduction: Thailand is the most
democratic country in the neighborhood, with a lively press
and fiercely competed elections. Thailand's remarkable
political development, after a long period of military rule,
progressed in tandem with its impressive economic
development, which gave its citizens greater access to
education and mass media, reinforcing the transition to
democracy. In 1997, Thailand adopted a new constitution,
meant to consolidate yet further the country's democratic
progress.


2. (C) Things have not gone quite as expected. The 1997
Asian financial crisis discredited the Democrat Party in
power during the initial recovery stages, and left the
population uncertain and eager for a strong leader. Thaksin
Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party took advantage
of the opening, winning a commanding majority in the 2001
elections and an even larger one in 2005. Thaksin is the
strongest Prime Minister in Thai history -- the only one, in
fact, to serve out his full term and be re-elected. One of
the goals of the 1997 Constitution was to build a more stable
parliamentary system and stronger political parties by making
it more difficult for MPs to jockey for political advantage
by changing party affiliation. Thaksin has cleverly used
these provisions to increase the cohesion and clout of TRT
and expand his personal power. Thaksin also built his
personal stature with populist programs, like cheap credit
and cheap medical care, that won the enthusiastic support of
the poorer voters, especially in the rural areas. Thailand's
opposition parties and NGOs have never come up against
anything quite like Thaksin, and they are playing political
catch-up. Thailand remains a democracy, but one in which the
balance among the political and social forces is unhealthy.


3. (C) Post works on many levels to promote greater
democracy in Thailand. We are not optimistic that major
changes can occur here in the 6-8 month timeframe requested
in ref A, but we believe that post's interventions and
programs are already having effect here and will continue to
do so. The information below responds to the questions in ref

A. Specific suggestions for additional resources or other
Washington action are contained in paras 7,11,14,15,17 and

19. End summary and introduction.


4.(C) IDENTIFY THE KEY AREAS OF DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

-- Media Freedom. Thailand still has some of the most
lively and vibrant media in the region, but it is being
constricted. The government's use of libel suits and the
purchase of media outlets by 'Friends of Thaksin' have
limited the public's access to independent news. The
government is attempting to shut down many community radio
stations on weak, technical pretexts. Journalists have
questionable ethics and sensationalize stories to sell papers.

-- Muslim unrest. In the South, the government lacks a smart
policy to combat anti-government violence, insurgency and
separatism. Society lacks mechanisms to promote
reconciliation and ethnic harmony. The security problem in
the South is a threat to democracy around the country, as the
government uses terrorism as an excuse for "emergency"
regulations that could limit individual freedoms, especially
press freedom. Security forces are implicated in human
rights abuses.

-- Rule of law/law enforcement/transparency. Weak corporate
governance and transparency regulations foster money politics
and corrupt the political system. The poor performance by
police, due both to lack of training and lack of motivation,
contributes to human rights abuses. The security forces are
hampered by poor coordination and interagency distrust. In
the South, the lack of access to justice is one of the key
elements feeding anti-government feeling.

-- Voter education/election monitoring. Given the lack of
opposition access to broadcast media, voters may have limited
information about their choices, or about criticisms of the
conduct of the elections. Vote buying and, in some areas,
voter intimidation, still occur.

-- Weak institutions. The 1997 Constitution calls for a
range of independent institutions, starting with a
non-partisan Senate and including agencies to combat
corruption, oversee media, etc. These new institutions are
still too weak to accomplish their goals. In some cases, the
Senate has moved too slowly to establish these agencies; in
other cases, the government has effectively blocked the work
of agencies that might limit its power, or co-opted them.
The Senators are not the independent "wise men" foreseen in
the constitution; most are partisan, with the TRT faction
dominant.


5. (C) IDENTIFY THE 3-5 MOST IMPORTANT DESIRED OUTCOMES OVER
THE NEXT 6-8 MONTHS

-- Media. Desired outcome: Journalists/civil society better
able to resist efforts by government and political interests
in limiting press freedom. Longer term goals: fewer threats
to independent media.

-- Justice/South. Desired outcome: International interest
and raised RTG awareness lead to a decrease in security force
abuses in the South; government officials recognize that
overreaction only fuels insurgent, anti-government feeling.
Improved access to justice for Southern Muslims. Longer
term goals: improved administration of justice, improvements
in police and peaceful resolution of the conflict in the
South. Greater public confidence in the probity of government
institutions.

-- Rule of Law/Law enforcement. Desired outcome: we cannot
expect to have any measurable impact in 6-8 months. In the
longer term, current embassy programs should contribute to
improved professional ethics by judges and lawyers. The most
important, and hardest, outcome to achieve is improved
performance by police and other security forces, both in
terms of competence and in terms of respect for human rights.
Making progress in this area would require a significant
increase in USG resources addressed towards the basic police
training academies and refresher training for working
officers.

-- Elections. Desired outcome: effective engagement by civil
society on voter education and election monitoring, leading
to a free and fair election for the Senate in April/May 2006.



SIX MONTH DIPLOMATIC AND PROGRAMMATIC STRATEGY
-------------- -

MEDIA
--------------


6. (SBU) Post has a range of programs already in place to
support free and objective media

-- We are about to begin a $500,000 project to expand and
improve objective media coverage of social and political
development throughout Thailand, with particular attention to
broader, accurate coverage of minority concerns, regional
developments and social conflict.

-- Post regularly sends journalists on IV programs and
includes them in other PAO outreach activities.


7. (SBU) Post has several pending requests that would
contribute to strengthening independent media:

-- Post has requested funding to support English-language
education for journalists. This is the fastest way to get
journalists access to a variety of viewpoints on political
issues.

-- For journalism support particularly relevant to the
problems in the South, please see paras 10 and 12 below.


8. (C) Other measures to achieve desired outcomes:

-- Post has highlighted the encroachments on press freedom in
our human rights report, and in conversations with Thai
officials.

-- The Senate finally named the new National Broadcasting
Commission (NBC) just last week. PAO and POL intend to work
together to encourage the new NBC to act fairly and
objectively as it makes decisions on spectrum allocation. In
particular, we will emphasize the importance of a workable
system to permit community radio, one of the most promising
avenues to getting independent, relevant news to the voters.

MUSLIM UNREST/THE SOUTH
--------------


9. (C) The situation in the South is one of post's top
priorities. Security concerns make travel and programming in
the South difficult, but post has so far been able to
maintain a regular travel program. Post frequently raises
the problem of the South with Thai officials and civil
society at all levels. Widespread distrust of the US by
southern Muslims is one of the biggest obstacles post faces
in its outreach efforts.

-- Post sends officers to the South regularly to meet with a
wide range of residents -- officials, religious leaders, NGOs
and others from both Muslim and Buddhist communities.

-- Post is monitoring the trial of police implicated in the
disappearance of a prominent Muslim lawyer. Post is
cooperating with a range of NGOs to follow the trial
proceedings and to underscore international concerns
regarding the case of this well-known Muslim leader and the
alleged role of police in his disappearance and presumed
death.

-- Post maintains close contact with the National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC),the organization set up by
the government to prepare recommendations to end violence and
resolve the problems in the region. The NRC enjoys
considerable respect and credibility, and post underscores in
discussions at all levels the importance of taking the NRC
recommendations into account in setting government policy to
respond to the unrest in the area.


10. (C) Post has a vigorous outreach program in the South,
including three American corners at universities in the
region which have hosted DVCs and speaker programs. Through
the "Shared Futures" initiative, PAO has partnered with a
local Muslim organization to distribute "branded" backpack
kits to schoolchildren, and will work with a local vocational
institution to distribute 1,200 sewing machines to Muslim
villagers; this is aimed at empowering Muslim women
heads-of-household through micro-enterprise development.
Post involves members of the Muslim minority in the full
range of PAO programs, including IVs, and programs to promote
English-language study.

-- Post also distributes information in the local Malay
dialect as well as Thai language, and has worked with the
broadcast media on programming, most recently supporting a TV
COOP project for a series of broadcasts on the American
Muslim community which will be airing over the next several
months. PAO is also using TV COOP programming from
Indonesia, which is has dubbed into local languages and is
currently being broadcast.


11. (SBU) We believe that several small steps could improve
Post's ability to reach out to this key community. First, we
could use publications geared to less-educated readers. Even
when translated, many Department publications are geared at
too high a level for these readers. Second, the local TV
stations in the Muslim area are hungry for additional
programming and we could place far more Department provided
broadcast programming if we had the English-language scripts
to facilitate translation.


12. (SBU) USAID is administering a $500,000 program for the
South implemented through Asia Foundation to help build
citizen engagement in and commitment to moderate democratic
values and institutions. The program, which is just getting
underway, focuses on efforts in three key areas --local
government, universities and Islamic schools. This
represents a major increase in USG resources directed toward
the problems in the South.


13. (C) Post has provided Department with a list of priority
projects for funding from the FY05 Supplemental Peacekeeping
Operations Allocations to Support the Global War on Terrorism
(ref B). One of post's top priorities for this funding is a
project to provide non-lethal weapons and civil disturbance
training for Thai military units deploying to the South. The
Thai military specifically requested this assistance, a sign
that its leaders are aware of the high cost of military
mistakes in responding to civil disturbances. Since late
2004, post has been cooperating with the Defense Institute of
International Legal Studies (DIILS) so that training through
the Joint Combined Exchanges and Training (JCET),Counterdrug
(Baker) and IMET programs include more comprehensive human
rights training for military forces before they deploy to the
South.

14. (C) If more resources were available: Post has also
requested support for conflict resolution and Muslim outreach
programs from the FY05 Supplemental PKO Allocations to
support the GWOT. We do not anticipate that all of these
projects can be funded with the available resources, but
believe that they all merit USG support (further details on
programs in ref B). These projects include:

-- a program to study populist anti-terrorism movements and
to share other countries' approaches with Southern leaders
(cost: $29k)

-- a program to promote journalistic responsibility and
investigative journalism in the South, in partnership with
the Association of Yala Journalists (cost: $25k)

-- a program to support training for community radio
operators, in partnership with the Campaign for Popular Media
Reform (cost: $25k)

-- a grant to a nascent NGO, "Friends of Thai Muslim Women,"
to help it establish itself and work to with Muslim women to
counter political extremism through development (cost: $7k)


15. (C) In addition, there are many Thai organizations
working to improve the administration of justice in the
South. Post would welcome the opportunity, for example, to
support the work of the legal aid alliance formed by the NRC,
the National Human Rights Commission and the Law Society,
which have set up legal aid centers in the South to provide
residents there with access to legal representation. There
would be many opportunities to work on projects like this
with good partners if additional funding were available.

RULE OF LAW/LAW ENFORCEMENT/TRANSPARENCY
--------------


16. (SBU) INL through the Narcotics Assistance Section (NAS)
takes the lead in these areas.

-- NAS funds a ABA/CEELI program on judicial ethics; over
the next 8 months, this American Bar Association-conducted
program will hold seminars and training on Legal Ethics,
Judicial Ethics, and Prosecutor Ethics as well as a seminar
for the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC). It
will provide expertise for professional ethics curriculum
development, and support other public awareness/outreach
activities.

-- INL supports a resident legal advisor from the Department
of Justice, who works on issues of legal and procedural
reform and anti-corruption measures.

-- In designing upcoming police training through the
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA),NAS will
strengthen the human rights and professional responsibility
elements in its courses.

-- For law enforcement training specifically oriented to the
situation in the South, please see para 13, above.


17. (C) If additional resources were available: Post
believes that increased resources for police training,
correctly used, could have an impact over the medium-to-long
term. INL currently restricts the training of provincial
police, in response to a series of extra-judicial killings
connected to an anti-drug campaign conducted in 2003.
Historically, the provincial police have had a poor record,
with cases of corruption, human rights abuses and ineffective
policing too common. Other elements of the security forces,
including National Police, have a somewhat better record,
although the lack of accountability is a pervasive problem
affecting all the security forces. There are officials
within the National Police who understand the need to
professionalize the force and who would work seriously with
us toward that goal. As an interim measure, post will review
the range of USG-sponsored training for security forces and
counter-terrorism, and look for ways to use existing programs
to also promote more responsible and accountable policing.
Following this review, post may advocate for a
carefully-considered expansion of USG police training,
perhaps along the model of ICITAP's Indonesia program.


VOTER EDUCATION/ELECTION MONITORING
--------------


18. (SBU) Post will monitor upcoming by-elections and the
Senate elections early next year.
-- Post has regular contact with representatives of all the
main political parties and closely follows allegations of
unfair practices by the government to restrict their
activities, raising issues with RTG officials as appropriate.

-- Post meets regularly with the main voter education and
monitoring organization, Pollwatch.


19. (C) If additional resources were available: Pollwatch
is underfunded and would benefit from additional support
through grants or collaboration with an appropriate US NGO,
such as NDI or IFES. Post will encourage Pollwatch to apply
for PAO-sponsored grants through the Democracy
Commission/small grants program, if funding for these is
available this year.

INSTITUTION BUILDING
--------------


20. (C) Post cannot expect to make much impact over the next
6-8 months on the building of stronger institutions. Many of
the agencies established in the 1997 Constitution to
safeguard civil liberties are appointed by the Senate, whose
term will end in March. Incumbents cannot run for
re-election, so all 200 seats will be open when the
elections are held in April or May 2006. Once we see the
composition of the new Senate, post will evaluate the
efficacy of possible programs, such as IV or speakers, that
might assist reformers. Given budget constraints, we will
probably be unable to do much programming with the new Senate
before the new fiscal year, but can begin outreach to the new
members immediately after the elections.

MAJOR NEEDS/MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS
--------------


21. (C) Thailand is still significantly ahead of its
neighbors in its democratic development, and therefore it is
appropriate that the lion's share of democracy-building
resources are used elsewhere. Nonetheless, our strategy
outlined above shows that some additional resources could be
well-used to promote our democracy goals here.

SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCES
--------------


22. (C) The most significant influences contributing to
democratization here is Thailand's own civil society.
Thailand has a wealth of NGOs and advocacy groups, with
relatively few limits on their activities. Public awareness
of civil/human rights issues has grown with increased access
to media and education. Human rights NGOs maintain contacts
with international partners. Political parties campaign
vigorously. The push for more progress on democracy can and
must come from the Thai people. The US can provide support
by targeted diplomatic interventions and programs of the kind
outlined above.

CONSEQUENCES
--------------


23. (C) The US and Thailand enjoy an excellent relationship.
We have long and close ties to most sectors in Thai society,
from the political leaders of all parties, through the
military and up to the royal family. Thais and Americans are
connected by family ties, alumni associations, business
interests: we do not believe that there will be long-term
negative consequences to our efforts to support democracy
here. In the short term, we must recognize that the current
Prime Minister is famously sensitive to criticism and quick
to use nationalist and populist messages to build support for
his positions. Even though his soaring popularity has
sagged somewhat recently, he remains genuinely popular and
effective at using his office to rally support. Efforts
based on confrontation and direct public criticism of the PM
and his policies are unlikely, in our view, to be as
effective as those that build on the genuine progress
Thailand's other institutions have steadily built in recent
years.










BOYCE