DEMARCHE: BRINGING BURMA BEFORE THE UNSC - THAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 006511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TH UNSC UNGA BURMA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: BRINGING BURMA BEFORE THE UNSC - THAI
INVOKE ASEAN SOLIDARITY

REF: SECSTATE 185479

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b),(d)

1.(C) Summary: Thailand is not prepared to support the
proposal to bring Burma before the UN Security Council. The
Thai MFA believes that other ASEAN members also will not
support the proposal, although none are willing to leap to
Burma's defense with the vigor that Burma has requested.
End summary.


2. (C) Polcouns met with director of the MFA East Asian
Affairs Department, Damrong Kraikruan, on October 13 to
deliver reftel points. Damrong said that Thailand could not
support the proposal to bring Burma before the Security
Council. ASEAN members were uncomfortable with the
situation, but would have to support Burma's request that
they oppose this proposal. Damrong said that Burma had
pressed the ASEAN members to assist it in a high-level
lobbying effort at the UN, including having their Permanent
Representatives make presentations on Burma's behalf, and
writing letters saying that the substance of the critical
reports was untrue. The other ASEAN countries were not
prepared to go along with this proposal. They would provide
"low-key" support to Burma, however. Damrong believed that
the ASEAN members would, in the end, stick together on this
issue.


3. (C) Damrong said that that Burmese Deputy FM OO Kyaw Thu
had just met with the Thai MFA Permsec, and the UN issue had
been discussed. According to Damrong, the Burmese side said
that it would succeed in blocking the UNSC proposal; it
claimed it already had the support of China, Japan, Brazil
and Philippines. Burma expected the US to win the support of
only perhaps 7 SC members. Damrong claimed that the Thai side
had urged Burma to do more to address international concerns,
and warned them that "this issue will not just go away."


4. (C) Damrong recounted the familiar reasons why Thailand
cannot take a more aggressive stand against Burma, repeating
that Thailand had to have cooperation with Burma on border
security and counternarcotics efforts. Public criticism by
Thailand would lead to a vindictive Burmese response,
including perhaps "incidents" at the border. Damrong pointed
out that, although the Thai government did not publicly
criticize Burma, it did not prevent others in Thailand from
doing so. The Thai press was free to publish criticisms of
its neighbor, and a number of anti-SPDC NGOs operated from
Thai soil. Those who were critical of Thailand's position
should bear this in mind.


5. (C) Thailand and Burma were also discussing the upcoming
exchange of visits. Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to visit
in January/February, and the Burmese PM would probably pay a
visit in Bangkok early in the year as well. Damrong said
that the Thai side was waiting to see the results of an SPDC
reshuffle that they expected shortly.

6 (C) Comment: We believe that the Thai are leaning on the
Burmese privately, as they tell us, since they recognize the
price that ASEAN is paying on Burma's behalf. The MFA is
clearly uncomfortable and tired of being seen as Burma's
defender, but the RTG does not appear to be ready yet to
openly disrupt ASEAN solidarity. end comment.
BOYCE