Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK5791
2005-09-09 04:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

PM THAKSIN'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR OVIP TH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 005791 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR MORROW
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA (POWERS)
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR OVIP TH
SUBJECT: PM THAKSIN'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON


Classified By: Classified By: Alex Arvizu, Charge d,Affaires, a.i. Rea
son 1.4 (a and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 005791

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR MORROW
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA (POWERS)
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR OVIP TH
SUBJECT: PM THAKSIN'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON


Classified By: Classified By: Alex Arvizu, Charge d,Affaires, a.i. Rea
son 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) Summary: PM Thaksin Shinawatra's September 19 meeting
with the President presents an opportunity to underscore our
deep and warm relations with Thailand and to build upon that
relationship to strengthen our links to the rest of
Southeast Asia. Thaksin is the strongest Prime Minister in
Thai history and retains a firm grip on power. That being
said, Thaksin,s political opponents have seized on recent
vulnerabilities, including government missteps in dealing
with separatist violence in Thailand,s restive southern
provinces, as well as a distinct economic downturn. Thaksin
has promised the Thai public that he will deliver an "Action
Plan" with the United States designed to enhance bilateral
relations and Thailand,s stature in the region. As for what
we want to achieve, the Prime Minister's personal involvement
is vital to push forward a number of key bilateral issues,
including an Open Skies agreement, Thai endorsement of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, and a bilateral Free Trade
Agreement. We also encourage the President to speak candidly
about our concerns regarding the situation in southern
Thailand and the deplorable lack of political progress in
Burma. End Summary.

THE STRONGEST PRIME MINISTER IN THAI HISTORY


2. (C) Prime Minister Thaksin dominates politics in a way
never before seen in Thailand. His Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love
Thais) political party holds 377 of the 500 elected seats in
Parliament. His Cabinet Ministers are beholden to him for
their positions and tend not to make major decisions -- or
often even minor ones -- without Thaksin's express approval.
A successful businessman, Thaksin turned his family's
company, Shinawatra Corporation, into the largest
telecommunications concern in Southeast Asia, making himself
a billionaire in the process. His grasp of modern public
relations was evident in both of his national election
campaigns where he presented a polished, telegenic image to

the electorate and ran on a platform that promised a
twenty-first century economy coupled with a social welfare
program that included virtually free health care and
development grants to the nation's villages. (The majority
of the Thai population still resides in rural areas.)
Thaksin,s power base, as a result, includes the captains of
Thai industry, many business owners, and poor rural voters.
Opposition Democratic Party leaders are in disarray, working
to rebuild from their crushing defeat at the polls in
February their support areas are now pretty much relegated to
the party's traditional strongholds in the south and among
the intelligentsia in the capital. Thaksin displayed an iron
hand in imposing discipline within his party in June when he
beat back an attempt by the Democrats to censure the former
Transport Minister for corruption and, in so doing, made
clear that he would crush any Thai Rak Thai member or faction
that supported the censure motion.

THAKSIN,S AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES


3. (C) With justification, critics accuse Thaksin of having
little tolerance for dissenting views. Critics also point
out that Thaksin has curbed press freedom and filled key
government positions (including in the military) with family
members, Armed Forces Academy Prep School classmates and
other confidants, often seemingly regardless of
qualifications. Supremely self-confident, he frequently
makes snap decisions and rarely second-guesses himself. In
July, he pushed through the Cabinet an Emergency Decree in
response to the ongoing violence in southern Thailand. The
sweeping measure has been roundly criticized by activists and
scholars as giving security forces a virtual "license to
kill" in the Muslim south (although the edict seems to be
popular with the Thai public outside of the south and has yet
to be enforced, in any case).

THAKSIN'S VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT, AND
HIMSELF


4. (C) A graduate of the Thai National Police Academy,
Thaksin also holds a master's degree in Criminal Justice from
Eastern Kentucky University and a Ph.D. in Criminology from
Sam Houston State. With American visitors, he jokingly
refers to himself as an "honorary Texan." Speaking
colloquial if heavily accented English, he is comfortable in
the presence of Americans. The Prime Minister is grateful
for American assistance after the December 26 tsunami; it's
worth recalling that he rapidly approved our request to use a
Thai naval air base as the hub for U.S.-led international
relief efforts to Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Thaksin quickly
grasped the opportunities created by U.S.-Thai cooperation in
the tsunami aftermath and endorses our working together to
enhance security links with other countries in the region.


5. (C) Thaksin also views himself as the man most qualified
to lead ASEAN in the coming years. He believes he has become
a more important player on the global stage and, like other
national leaders, responds favorably to suggestions or
proposals pitched personally by prominent leaders such as
Vladimir Putin or Hu Jintao. Drawing on his business
experience, in recent months Thaksin has kicked off a number
of "Action Plans" with other countries designed to strengthen
bilateral relations with China and others. In practice,
these plans seem to be virtually anything the two countries
want them to be. After meeting with Secretary Rice in Phuket
in July, Thaksin unveiled in a subsequent weekly radio
address his Action Plan with the United States; our upcoming
Strategic Dialogue with Thailand (see para. 7) should be
viewed as part of that plan. He has been preparing for his
meeting with the President for weeks and will probably
respond favorably to any suggestions the President offers to
strengthen the U.S.-Thai relationship that he can later pitch
to the Thai public as fulfilling his launch of an "Action
Plan with America."

THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE


6. (C) Nothing better illustrates the strength of our
security relationship than our bilateral cooperation in
response to the December 26 tsunami. Thanks to years of
working with the Thai military, the United States was able to
quickly deploy over one thousand American soldiers, marines,
sailors and airmen to Utapao Naval Air Base and set up a hub
to provide relief to tsunami victims in Thailand, Indonesia
and Sri Lanka. Thaksin and his senior military staff
recognize that the good will emanating from the tsunami
response affords both countries an opportunity to enhance the
military relationship and to work jointly with other
militaries in the region. For years, Thailand has hosted the
Cobra Gold annual exercise, our largest multilateral exercise
in Asia. Over time, that exercise has transformed from a
bilateral event designed to thwart a Vietnamese invasion of
Thailand to a multilateral exercise to train for peace
keeping and disaster relief operations. Recent exercises
have allowed American and Thai troops to train with
militaries from Singapore, Japan, the Philippines and others.
We are now planning for Cobra Gold 2006 which will include
participation by Indonesia in addition to Singapore and
Japan. We are convinced that we and the Thai can work with
other militaries to support key U.S. objectives in Asia such
as improving responses to terrorism, enhancing peace keeping,
promoting interoperability with U.S. forces, and improving
maritime security -- while continuing to provide us a vital
platform in the region from which to respond to future
contingencies.


7. (C) To enhance more strategic thinking among Thai military
and civilian leaders, and as a way to shape Thaksin's Action
Plan concept, we have agreed to send key officials from the
Departments of State and Defense, the National Security
Council, and the U.S. Pacific Command to hold a Strategic
Dialogue in Bangkok in November. This mechanism will also
allow us to explore other tangible means to demonstrate
America's commitment to the region. We suggest the following
points be made in the President's meeting:

-- Our combined response to the December 26 tsunami
illustrates the importance of our strategic relationship. It
also demonstrates opportunities to reach out jointly to
other countries in the region through exercises like Cobra
Gold.

-- We see the upcoming Strategic Dialogue as an integral part
of a U.S.-Thai Action Plan to explore ways to further enhance
our relationship.

THE SOUTH AND TERRORISM


8. (C) Thaksin's preeminent policy concern is how to respond
to the unrest in southern Thailand. The current violence is
caused by separatist activity mixed with unfocused violence
by disaffected Muslims and criminal activity. All of this,
together with an often heavy-handed response by security
forces, has led to approximately 800 deaths since early 2004.
The ongoing violence has historic roots going back a century
and is aimed at driving Thai Buddhists out of the region.
While we are not aware of direct evidence of links between
Thai separatists and outside terrorist groups, we are
concerned that trans-national terrorist groups might attempt
to take advantage of the situation. Thaksin's policy
missteps over time clearly have exacerbated the violence.
Although his recent Emergency Decree is controversial, there
are some positive signs. Earlier this year, Thaksin
appointed a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) led by
respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to make
policy recommendations. The NCR's work to date has received
generally good marks from most objective Thai observers.
Partially in response to NRC recommendations, Thaksin has
committed to implementing much needed education and economic
reforms to benefit southerners. No one in Thailand,
including Thaksin, seeks a U.S. military presence in the
south, and we must constantly deal with nefarious rumors that
the U.S. is somehow behind the violence. Nonetheless, there
are areas where we can help. We have stepped up human rights
training of Thai troops rotating into the south to improve
their ability to control crowds and conduct other operations
in ways consistent with international norms. We are also
working with the Thais to improve their intelligence sharing
and gathering capabilities.


9. (C) The Prime Minister told the Ambassador that he is
eager to discuss his southern policy with the President and
address concerns that his policies are counterproductive. We
suggest the President consider making the following points:

-- We recognize the situation in the south is an internal
Thai affair. We stand prepared to help to the extent we can
by sharing intelligence, improving human rights training and
assisting with educational reform, if Thailand so desires.

-- We appreciate Thailand's assurances that the Emergency
Decree will not be used to justify human rights abuses in the
south.

-- We are encouraged by the work of the National
Reconciliation Commission. This distinguished group seems to
have come up with some good recommendations. We hope that
your government will be able to work with them on
implementation.

BURMA


10. (C) Under Thaksin, Thailand has maintained a strategy of
engagement with Burma. Pointing to the 1,400 mile long
border the two countries share, Thaksin tells Americans that
he has little choice but to engage the regime in Rangoon in
order to address narcotics trafficking, refugees, and
trafficking in Persons. He maintains that Thailand does
press Burma behind-the-scenes. Thaksin often likens
Thailand's problem with illegal Burmese immigrants to
America's concern with illegal workers from Mexico.
Recently, we have detected some positive movement from
Thaksin on Burma. He told Secretary Rice in July that if the
regime did not take some positive steps soon, he would be
willing to call more openly for political progress. We
suggest that the President call him on this pledge:

-- We both recognize that the regime in Rangoon is abhorrent.
You indicated to Secretary Rice in July that you would
consider calling more openly for reform in Burma.

-- We suggest that now is the time for you to join us in
publicly calling on Rangoon to release all political
prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and to engage in a
meaningful dialogue with the democratic opposition.

OPEN SKIES


11. (C) The United States and Thailand have been discussing a
passenger Open Skies arrangement since 2003. Until recently,
impediments laid by the Thai Ministry of Transport in support
of Thai Airlines, which has long feared that an agreement
would hurt its business, effectively blocked any chance for a
deal. But Thaksin personally endorsed an Open Skies
agreement following Secretary Mineta,s visit earlier this
year. Thaksin dispatched an experienced government
delegation to Washington for negotiations September 7-8 with
an eye toward concluding an agreement. If agreement is
reached prior to the September 19 White House meeting, we
suggest the President make the following point:

-- Thank you for your personal attention to achieving an Open
Skies agreement. Successful implementation can help make
Thailand a regional aviation hub and help boost tourism.

If a deal is not reached, we suggest the President make the
following point:

-- Your personal attention is important in order for our
sides to conclude a successful Open Skies agreement.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)


12. (C) Under Thaksin, Thailand has been supportive of our
efforts to combat proliferation. Despite our efforts since
2003, however, Thaksin has not yet formally endorsed PSI. He
recently told Ambassador Boyce of his concern that endorsing
PSI now risks aggravating Muslim separatist sentiment in the
south. Singapore is the only ASEAN nation that has endorsed
PSI to date; Thaksin has told us private that if another
ASEAN country were to endorse PSI (the Philippines is one
possibility),that would give him sufficient political cover
to bring Thailand on board. We suggest the President make
the following point:

-- We appreciate Thailand's commitment to combat the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
precursors. PSI is a meaningful way for the international
community to show unity in combating this threat.

-- Thailand can demonstrate regional leadership by offering
your endorsement of the PSI Statement of Principles.

-- We will keep you appraised of our efforts to enlist
support for PSI from within ASEAN and elsewhere.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA)


13. (C) Our FTA talks with Thailand languish in part because
few senior leaders in Thailand other than Thaksin himself
fully endorse an agreement. Recently, Thailand concluded an
FTA with Japan only after Thaksin himself intervened at a key
moment. It will probably take the same personal touch from
Thaksin to make progress in our talks. Thaksin will likely
tell the President that he fully endorses an FTA and that he
does not envision any serious problems in eventually reaching
a deal. We suggest that the following points be made:

-- An FTA is one of the most tangible ways to show the world
how seriously we both are about enhancing our relationship.

-- Your leadership is vital. You are the greatest proponent
of an FTA within your government. We hope that you will
instruct your key ministers that we need to begin making
concrete progress soon.

-- Ours must be a comprehensive agreement, covering all
economic sectors, although we are willing to discuss phase-in
periods.

--Time is of the essence, if we are going to conclude an FTA,
we have to reach agreement in the next few months.

F-16


14. (C) Thailand has been considering a purchase of 18
fighter aircraft to replace aging F-5s in its fleet. Up
until several months ago, it appeared that Russian SU-30s or
Swedish Saab Gripens would win the contract. Since that
time, we have worked closely with Lockheed Martin to ensure
that F-16 receives serious consideration. The Thai Air Force
already has 59 F-16s and, by purchasing new F-16s, or
upgrading its existing aircraft, Thailand would maintain
interoperability with the U.S. military and enhance the
likelihood that the Thai Air Force could buy the Joint Strike
Fighter in the future. Secretary Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld
have both raised this issue with Thaksin. Thaksin recently
indicated to Ambassador Boyce that he may be willing to spend
400 million dollars on Lockheed Martin upgrades to existing
F-16s, but in part due to the personal intervention of
President Putin, he might be compelled to also buy new
Russian SU-30s. Thaksin seemed open to the idea, however, of
forgoing buying any new aircraft and instead using his budget
to upgrade existing F-16s. This alternative would also
benefit our security relationship and Lockheed Martin. We
suggest the President make the following points:

-- If Thailand decides to purchase new fighter aircraft, F-16
is the best option available. It will be cheaper to
maintain, more capable and interoperable with the United
States -- your treaty ally.

-- However, a less expensive way to improve your fleet would
be mid-life upgrades of your fleet of F-16s -- thereby making
them airworthy for years to come.

CHINA


15. (C) Thaksin maintains excellent relations with China. He
went to Beijing in July and will meet PRC Vice Premier Wu Yi
in September upon his return from Washington. Thai
government and economic leaders subscribe to the maxim that
"a rich China will lead to a prosperous Asia" and encourage
further expansion of trade links between the two countries
building on a limited FTA covering some agricultural goods.
Thaksin is dismissive of suggestions that Taiwan and the
Mainland might someday come to blows, citing the PRC's
paramount desire not to disturb economic growth. PRC
state-run media and cultural centers saturate the Thai
market, reaching not only the 15 percent of Thai who are
ethnic Chinese, but a growing number of the population in
general. Although the Thai military tends to have far more
links with Americans than with Chinese, PLA ties with the
Thai military are on the upswing through bargain-priced arms
sales, officer exchange programs, and offers to hold joint
exercises. Some Thai analysts are concerned that their
leaders are too nonchalant about possible friction points
Bangkok might have with Beijing in the future and call for
greater discussions about China between Thai and U.S.
representatives. In the White House meeting, we suggest the
President make the following point:

-- We share a desire to see China become an engaged, mature
member of the international community. China's growing
influence would be a good topic for discussion during our
upcoming Strategic Dialogue.

IN CLOSING AND HURRICANE KATRINA


16. (C) Thaksin is eager to make a good impression in
Washington and wants to show his constituencies that he is
close to the President. He has been personally involved in
Thailand,s offers of assistance to those affected by
Hurricane Katrina. Thaksin,s personal involvement is
essential to advance a number of key U.S. objectives and
address our concerns, including terrorism, the violence in
southern Thailand, Burma, PSI, an FTA, an Open Skies
Agreement, and F-16s.
ARVIZU