EMERGENCY DECREE CONTROVERSIAL AMONG SENIOR THAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 005455

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA (POWERS)
NSC FOR MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS TH
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DECREE CONTROVERSIAL AMONG SENIOR THAI
LEADERS

REF: A. BANGKOK 4653 NOTAL

B. BANGKOK 4697 NOTAL

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) MFA PermSec Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn (please protect)
confidentially told the Ambassador on August 24 that he had

SIPDIS
severe misgivings about the recently released Emergency
Decree. Saying that he was speaking privately and with a
need to "unburden himself," Krit said that, while he thought
the motivation to replace martial law with something else was
"pure and good," certain unnamed members of the security
forces had seized upon the general sense of alarm caused by a
coordinated series of attacks in Yala on July 14 to force
through a poorly conceived edict providing them greater
power.

DECREE A "LEMON"


2. (C) Krit described the Emergency Decree itself as a
"lemon," and far more draconian than what was needed to
respond to the violence in the south. Particularly worrisome
are: Section 11 (6),which gives the PM power during times of
emergency to issue an order barring any act deemed to be a
threat to public order, and Section 17, which protects any
state actor operating under the Emergency Decree from civil,
criminal or disciplinary liabilities for his actions so long
as they were made in "good faith."


3. (C) Krit suggested that the Decree was rushed through
the Cabinet while everyone was anxious to do something to
respond to the Yala attacks. He said that the draft Decree
was presented to an assembly of about 70 Cabinet or Deputy
Cabinet level officials in an atmosphere of crisis and passed
before many of those gathered even had an opportunity to read
the text. In the subsequent days, a number of senior Thai
leaders became alarmed at what they had endorsed and agreed
that the decree needed modification. However, it is unlikely
that the edict can be changed any time soon because the Prime
Minister cannot be seen to be vacillating in his response to
the violence in the south.

VOICES OF REASON MAY MITIGATE THE DAMAGE


4. (C) Fortunately, Krit explained, the top two officials
tasked with addressing the situation in the south, Justice
Minister Chidchai Vanasatidya and Education Minister Chaturon
Chaisaeng are honorable men -- and unlikely to act in rash
ways. In addition, National Reconciliation Commission Head
Anand Panyarachun serves as the "conscience of the Prime
Minister" and can serve as a brake on Thaksin's worst
instincts.

COMMENT


5. (C) The Ambassador had gone to MFA to discuss the
upcoming meeting between Thaksin and the President and the
Strategic Dialogue. It was, therefore, a surprise when Krit
asked that the room be cleared so that he could share this
candid assessment. Like many Thai diplomats, Krit is much
more comfortable with protocol and diplomatic dinners than
with security matters. Nonetheless, he knows the Thai
bureaucracy and is progressive. He was visibly uncomfortable
when he had to explain the Emergency Decree to the diplomatic
community on July 18 and, as more and more thoughtful Thai
have expressed public misgivings about the order, he probably
felt it best to explain to Washington that the Emergency
Decree is not endorsed wholeheartedly among senior officials,
who may work behind-the-scenes to mitigate some of its more
hard-line aspects.
BOYCE