AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES THE SOUTH WITH DEPUTY PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 004696

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR/B
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES THE SOUTH WITH DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER CHATURON

REF: A. BANGKOK 4596


B. BANGKOK 4653

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 15, Ambassador met with Deputy
Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng to discuss the situation in
southern Thailand. Chaturon spoke frankly, and often
critically, of the Thaksin Administration's handling of the
situation in the South. Chaturon, a member of the National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC),believes the Government's
failure to understand the nature of the situation in southern
Thailand is perpetuating a cycle of violence and further
alienating the local population. Chaturon, while not a
Thaksin confidant, is a popular and well regarded U.S.
educated politician who has managed to have a very successful
political career despite his days as a radical student
activist in the 1970s. END SUMMARY


2. (C) On July 15, Ambassador met with Deputy Prime
Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng. Chaturon has been a key player
in recent efforts to deal with the ongoing unrest in southern
Thailand. In April 2004, Chaturon submitted a "Seven Point
Plan" to the cabinet to resolve the violence. The proposal
followed an extended period of consultations with southern
community and religious leaders. Among other conciliatory
ideas, Chaturon's plan called for a lifting of martial law
and limited amnesty for some insurgents. The plan was not
received well by the security services and was largely
ignored.

IN THE WAKE OF YALA ATTACKS A NEW SECURITY LAW


3. (C) Chaturon came to the meeting directly from an
emergency cabinet meeting convened by Prime Minister Thaksin
to discuss the coordinated attacks in Yala province on July
14 (reftel A). He told the Ambassador that the cabinet had
approved an Emergency Decree to replace the selective martial
law already in place in parts of the South (reftel B).
Chaturon characterized the new law as an attempt to "soften"
the image of martial law and claimed that NRC Chairman Anand
Panyarachun had been consulted about the new law prior to the
cabinet's decision. (NOTE: Publicly, Anand has not been
supportive of the new emergency decree. The decree has also
been roundly condemned by the media and by NGOs who see the
law as an attempt to give authorities more leeway to go after
suspected insurgents while limiting press and other civil
freedoms in the region. END NOTE)

"THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE JUST DON'T GET IT"


4. (C) Chaturon told the Ambassador he wanted to speak
frankly and privately about the South. He expressed great
frustration that "high level people" (implying PM Thaksin and
his senior advisors) still do not understand what is really
happening in far southern Thailand. Chaturon complained that
Thaksin and other officials are still approaching the unrest
with a "policeman's mentality" -- looking at the violence as
criminal acts -- rather than understanding the complicated
cultural and religious problems in the South. Chaturon said
the military high command simply did not understand how to
solve a conflict between "citizens and the state." He
described the military establishment as falling into two
camps -- those who understand the cultural underpinnings of
the unrest, and those who want to treat the situation "like a
war." Chaturon claimed that the members of the Privy Council
also believe that Thaksin does not understand the problem and
are very concerned about the government's handling of the
crisis.

"TENS OF THOUSANDS" OF POTENTIAL MILITANTS


5. (C) Chaturon said he understood the deeply felt feeling
of "injustice" in the South and is worried that there are
potentially "tens of thousands" of Muslim youth in the region
who could turn against the government. Chaturon complained
that "the people in charge" are ignoring how widespread and
serious the problems are in the South. He said the
government's tactics and disregard for the rule of law has
further alienated the general populace in the region and that
Muslims feel like they do not have an outlet to the
government. Chaturon said his assessment is that the
violence is still localized in the far southern Muslim
majority provinces because most often it is often directly
related to local grievances or a cycle of revenge killings
between security forces and local Muslims. He indicated that
this cycle of violence is beginning to take on a life of its
own.

COMMENT


6. (C) Chaturon is a well regarded and outspoken
politician, especially on social issues. He has a carefully
cultivated public image of a humble, uncorrupt politician and
he is consistently rated as one of the most popular members
of the Thaksin administration. In person he is thoughtful
and soft-spoken and is obviously seriously concerned about
the deteriorating situation in the South. While Chaturon is
popular with many voters and has a prominent public position,
he is not considered to be part of the Prime Minister's inner
circle, and by all indications Thaksin does not seek his
counsel on how to handle the South. During the meeting, the
Ambassador related an earlier private conversation he had
with the Prime Minister. The Ambassador had asked Thaksin if
the creation of the NRC was an admission that Chaturon had
been right about the South back in April 2004. Thaksin,
gritting his teeth, said, "No! His proposals were wrong at
that time, but happen to be right now." Chaturon took some
obvious satisfaction from the anecdote, but indicated that
his calls for Thaksin and the government to understand the
complex cultural and religious elements in the South and deal
with the problem in a comprehensive fashion are being largely
ignored. END COMMENT

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:


7. (C) Chaturon was born on January 1, 1956 into a
prominent, politically active family. During his studies in
the Faculty of Medicine, Chiang Mai University, he became a
political activist and was president of the Chiang Mai
University Student Union in 1976. He played a significant
role during the October 1976 student uprising. Following the
government's crackdown, Chaturon left school and escaped into
the northern jungle to join the Communist Party of Thailand.
He returned home in 1980 and subsequently traveled to the
U.S. for further studies, receiving a BA in Economics from
the State University of New York at Buffalo and an MA in
Economics from American University. He worked toward, but
did not complete, a Ph.D. at American University.


8. (C) Chaturon first won a parliamentary seat in the 1986
election as a Democrat. However, he and his faction (the 10
January faction) later split from the DP and formed the
Prachachon (People's) Party. He later was briefly in Chart
Thai before joining the NAP in 1991, winning a seat in three
of the four succeeding elections (the exception was September
1992). During the mid-1990s, Chaturon served as NAP spokesman
and in April 1999, he became the party's secretary general
after a tough contest with Sanoh Thienthong. At least in
part due to the animosity generated by his snub in not
receiving the secretary generalship, Sanoh left the party for
Thai Rak Thai. Ironically, Chaturon quit the NAP and
followed Sanoh into Thai Rak Thai in June 2000, where he was
elected to the Lower House in the number 15 position on the
TRT party list in January 2001. Following the TRT's election
victory he was named Minister attached to the Prime
Minister's Office. During the March 2002 shuffle, Chaturon
became Minister of Justice, and in October 2002 he was moved
to his current position as Deputy Prime Minister, where he
focuses on social issues and education. Chaturon's past
positions include Secretary to the Deputy Finance Minister
(1986-87),Secretary to the Commerce Minister (1990-91),and
Deputy Finance Minister (1996). He is also widely remembered
for the leading role he played in the movement opposing the
Suchinda government in 1992. Chaturon is an avid soccer
player and fan.

END BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
BOYCE