Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK4028
2005-06-20 08:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI MFA OFFICIAL: NO CHANGE IN POLICY TOWARD SHAN

Tags:  PREL PREF PHUM PBTS TH BM BURMA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 004028 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, USPACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM PBTS TH BM BURMA
SUBJECT: THAI MFA OFFICIAL: NO CHANGE IN POLICY TOWARD SHAN
BUT RESPONDING TO BURMESE PRESSURE

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 156


B. CHIANG MAI 113

C. CHIANG MAI 109

D. RANGOON 697

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke, Reason: 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 004028

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, USPACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM PBTS TH BM BURMA
SUBJECT: THAI MFA OFFICIAL: NO CHANGE IN POLICY TOWARD SHAN
BUT RESPONDING TO BURMESE PRESSURE

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 156


B. CHIANG MAI 113

C. CHIANG MAI 109

D. RANGOON 697

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke, Reason: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary. The Burma desk officer at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that despite the Royal Thai
Government's (RTG) pushback of approximately 450 Shan
refugees to the Burmese side of the border last week, there
is "no change in Thai policy" in providing temporary
protection and humanitarian assistance to people of any
ethnic origin along the Thai-Burma border. The RTG has found
no evidence of reported chemical weapons use by the Burma
Army against ethnic Karenni fighters in February. The
current overall relationship between Thailand and Burma
remains strained. The MFA expects the Burmese government to
announce their decision about whether or not they will assume
the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006 at the ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting in Vientiane, Laos in late July. End Summary.


2. (C) In response to the reported relocation of some 450
Shan refugees the week of June 6 reported in Reftel A,
PolCouns and Poloffs met with Minister Counselor Damrong
Kraikruan, Burma desk officer at the Thai MFA. Damrong
confirmed that this group of Shan were pushed back and said
that the action was requested by the SPDC at a Thai-Burma
border committee meeting earlier this year. At that meeting,
Damrong reported, the SPDC had presented a list of 25 sites
on the Thai side of the border where the SPDC claimed
"insurgents" were being harbored. The RTG disagreed with the
Burmese characterization of most of these locations and
agreed to it only in connection with Doi Tai Laeng, which is
located in Mae Hong Son Province, approximately 110
kilometers from the town of Mae Hong Son. According to
Damrong, the complete list of "insurgent locations" provided
by the SPDC included refugee camps such as Mae La and Nu Pho
camps, located in Tak Province, and people who clearly did
not fit into a category of "insurgent." Damrong said that

the RTG rejected any relocation of established refugee camps
along the border, and agreed to relocate only part of this
one group of Shan and no others. In this case, Damrong said,
the RTG felt it had to respond to the SPDC request, ask the
Shan to relocate on the Burmese side, and inform the SPDC
that the "insurgents" were on Burmese soil. He said that the
RTG did not consider any of the Shan who had moved to be in
any danger. Damrong claimed that the school and temple at
the old site on the Thai side are still open and that all of
the children, including some orphans are still on the Thai
side. (Note: It is unknown by Post how many bona fide Shan
orphans are among this group. Some of the children claimed
as orphans could actually be children who have one or both
parents still living inside Shan state or elsewhere, as in
many Burmese refugee camps. End Note.)


3. (C) Damrong said that the RTG will permit the Shan (or any
others) to re-enter Thailand if fighting breaks out. Damrong
noted that when there was fighting between the Wa and Shan
during the Songkran water festival in April this year, PM
Thaksin had instructed the MFA to tell the SPDC that the RTG
would allow temporary refuge and humanitarian assistance to
anyone fleeing fighting. This policy is still in effect,
according to Damrong. (Note: At the June monthly meeting of
Burma border NGOs in Bangkok, an NGO representative noted
that 896 Shan who were reportedly fleeing fighting had
entered Fang District in Chiang Mai Province in May. End
Note.) According to Damrong, the MFA and the office of the
PM had decided not to respond publicly to criticism about the
pushback of the Shan. Only the Third Army Deputy Commander,
Manas Paorik was making public statements, as noted in Reftel

A. (Note: The regional office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) generally does not engage the RTG on
Shan refugees under the terms of UNHCR's 1999 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the Thai government. UNHR Regional
Representative Hasin Utkan told Refcoord on June 7 that he
had nevertheless expressed concern about the Shan pushback to
the MFA. End note.)

4.(C) Damrong opined that the Wa attacked the Shan based on
direct orders from the SPDC as a sort of loyalty test for the
Wa following the ouster of former SPDC Prime Minister Khin
Nyunt. (Note: This analysis appears to contradict both
Chiang Mai and Rangoon sources as noted in Reftels B, C and

D. End Note.) As for the future, Damrong stated that the
RTG does not/not believe more fighting will break out soon.
Damrong thinks that the annual rainy season lull in fighting
has started. He claimed that there are no indications of
troop or weapon deployments that would indicate more fighting.


5. (C) When asked about the reported use of chemical weapons
by the SPDC in February against the Karenni, Damrong said
that the RTG had investigated and found no evidence to
substantiate the claims (Septel).

6. (C) When asked about the overall relationship between
Thailand and Burma, Damrong replied that it was "not very
good." He then gave a rather detailed analysis of the
actions of General Maung Aye, currently Vice Chairman of the
SPDC, and the General's negative perceptions of Thailand.
Damrong recounted how in 1992 Maung Aye, as the Eastern
Regional Commander of the Burma Army, nearly started a
shooting war with the Thai Army, when troops under Maung
Aye's command occupied Thai territory in Chumporn province.
The Burmese Army at that time was mounting an offensive
against the Karen national Liberation Army, which spilled
over onto the contentious "Hill 491". Eventually, at an
emergency Thai Burma border committee meeting called in
Chiang Mai to resolve the dispute, Maung Aye was forced to
withdraw Burmese troops and suffered a perceived loss of
face.

7. (C) Damrong said that many subsequent meetings and visits
scheduled between RTG officials and Maung Aye were canceled
because the Burmese General would, at the last minute, refuse
to meet. Maung Aye did not, in fact, visit Thailand until 10
years later, in 2002. Shortly after that visit, Thai and
SPDC troops engaged in a brief border fight resulting in the
shelling of Thai and Burmese Army positions and loss of life,
and deepening Maung Aye's suspicions about Thailand. Lately,
there has been another border dispute concerning some 36
houses on the border at Three Pagodas pass in Sangklaburi
province. At a border committee meeting in March this year,
the SPDC gave an ultimatum to the Thai side to remove the
dwellings by the end of March or the SPDC would demolish them
(16 of the houses are owned by Thais, the rest by Burmese,
according to Damrong). Damrong said the negotiators spent
some 10 hours working on this issue but in the end nothing
happened and the villagers returned to their dwellings.
Apparently, this inaction to follow up on the Burmese
ultimatum had made Maung Aye furious.


8. (C) The Thai MFA expects the SPDC to announce their
decision about whether or not they will assume the ASEAN
chairmanship in 2006 at the ASEAN Ministerial meeting in Laos
in late July. It appeared the SPDC will decline the
chairmanship this round, and that a compromise plan for when
and how they would be allowed to assume the chair will be
worked out.


9. (C) Comment: The RTG pushback of the Shan in this one case
raises concerns. Despite Thai reassurances that those
relocated in Burma would be allowed to come back to Thailand
in case fighting breaks out, Post will continue to inquire
with MFA about the plight of the Shan, particularly the most
vulnerable, such as unaccompanied minors and the disabled.
While the push across the border has garnered international
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the Shan themselves have
been relatively quiet about protesting the move (Reftel A).
This incident may be a gesture by the RTG to appease the SPDC
on a sensitive border issue while maintaining Thai
humanitarian and intelligence relations with their close
neighbors, the Shan. It does not appear to be the case of the
Third Army taking matters into their own hands, as
demonstrated by Damrong's complete knowledge and admission of
the pushback. Damrong was well prepared to answer our
questions. His comments about the overall relationship with
Burma indicate that the MFA's recent high level of
frustration with the SPDC is not abating. On the matter of
the ASEAN chair, however, his assumption that the SPDC will
announce at the Vientiane ASEAN Ministerial its willingness
to forgo its rotation may only be wishful thinking. End
Comment.


10. (U) This message was cleared by Embassy Rangoon and
Consulate General Chiang Mai.
BOYCE