THAILAND: VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH: VISIT TO SONGKHLA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003633

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH: VISIT TO SONGKHLA
AND SATUN

REF: A. BANGKOK 1008

B. BANGKOK 3203

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke. Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Poloff visited the far southern province
of Songkhla and the Muslim majority province of Satun May
23-24. Satun province has avoided the violence plaguing the
three other Muslim majority Thai provinces despite a similar
population and geographical location. A separate historical
identity and more widespread use of the Thai language may
explain to some degree why Satun has thus far managed to
avoid the increasing levels of violence experienced by its
neighbors. Local observers believe that the overall level of
violence in the South will continue to rise due to a widely
alienated populace -- potentially spreading to Songkhla or
further north -- but cautioned against overstating the role
of separatist groups. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) On May 23-24 Poloff visited the far southern
provinces of Songkhla and Satun, including border crossing
areas with Malaysia. In Songkhla Poloff met with Dr.
Suttiwong Phongphaibun, Advisor to the Thaksin Institute for
Southern Thai Studies and Somphong Jutansuan, Chairman of the
Law Society of Thailand in southern Thailand. In Satun, he
met with Ibrahim Adam, Chairman of the Satun Islamic
Committee; Thanwakom Kamasiri, Satun Vice Governor for
Security; Gen. Tanacharoen Suvanno, Satun Provincial Police
Commander; and Wongwut Chumthong, Chairman of the Satun
Journalists Association.

BACKGROUND: SATUN - A DIFFERENT HISTORICAL LEGACY


3. (U) Satun is a majority Muslim, ethnically Malay
province, which along with Songkhla, Narathiwat, Yala and
Pattani makes up the Thai border area with Malaysia. Many of
the ethnically Malay population of Satun speak Yawi, not
Thai, as a primary language. Satun, like Narathiwat and
Songkhla provinces, shares commercially valuable border
crossing points into Malaysia. Despite these similarities,
Satun has somehow avoided much of the episodic violence which
has afflicted the other far southern provinces of Thailand
over the past one hundred years, and has been notably quiet
since the accelerated pace of violence seen since January

2004.


4. (U) Satun -- like the neighboring provinces of
Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani -- shares historical ties with
the northern Malaysian states. However, unlike those other
provinces which were part of the Sultanate of Pattani prior
to absorption into the Thai Kingdom; Satun was the
northernmost region of the Sultanate of Kedah. While the
rest of Kedah was eventually ceded to the British, and
eventually became part of Malaysia, Satun was split off, and
became a Thai province.


5. (SBU) The environment in Satun is very different from
its neighboring provinces. There are no heavily armed police
or military patrols or roadblocks -- all too common sights in
Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala -- and no obvious military
presence. The land and sea border points are quiet, with
minimal traffic, and no additional security is visible on
either the Thai or Malaysian side of the border. In Satun
city the streets remain full at night, in stark contrast to
Narathiwat where shopkeepers close early in order to be home
before dark.

SATUN - WHY NO VIOLENCE?


6. (U) There have been varying explanations as to why Satun
has avoided the violence that has plagued the rest of the
South. Satun has a relatively smaller Muslim population
compared to Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani and a slightly
higher percentage of non-Muslims among its total population.
Satun's historical separation from the Kingdom of Pattani,
around which most of the separatist propaganda revolves,
appears to also be an important factor (NOTE: Separatists
usually include Satun in calls for a Pattani State despite
these historical differences. END NOTE)


7. (C) Language appears to be a crucial factor. Ibrahim
Adam from the Satun Islamic Committee said that while many
ethnically Malay Muslims speak Yawi, Thai is more widely
used, even at the village level. Satun Police Commander
Tanacharoen Suvanno and Vice Governor Thanwakom agreed that
the widespread use of Thai played a key role in the
militant's lack of influence in the province. Both noted
that militants rely on Yawi speaking communities to establish
networks, and thus found it more difficult to operate in
Satun and in other more northern regions of Thailand.

8. (C) The mutual mistrust between the Muslim community and
Thai security forces which is readily apparent in much of the
South is not visible in Satun. Ibrahim Adam said his Islamic
Committee -- and the local village Imams -- maintained good
relationships with local security officials and that a high
level of trust had been established between the Islamic
Committee and the provincial government.

OVERALL SITUATION IN THE SOUTH - DOWNWARD TRAJECTORY?


9. (C) In our conversations, we heard concern that the
overall situation in southern Thailand is continuing to
deteriorate, and worries that the violence could soon spread
to other provinces, like Satun, which have thus far been able
to avoid bloodshed. Dr. Suttiwong Phongphaibun, former
advisor to the now disbanded Southern Border Provinces
Administrative Center (SBPAC) and Somphong Jutansuan,
Chairman of the Law Society of Thailand in southern Thailand
-- both lifetime residents of the South -- said the overall
violence in the South is the worst seen in their lifetime.
Suttiwong and Somphong specifically cited the deteriorating
relationship between the Buddhist and Muslim communities as a
cause for concern. Suttiwong claimed that some local Muslim
leaders have in recent months been highlighting religious
differences between the Buddhist and Muslim communities.


10. (C) NOTE: Post has reported on anecdotal evidence that
significant numbers of the non-Muslim population of southern
Thailand is abandoning the region out of fear, and that
Muslim militants appear to be deliberately intimidating the
non-Muslim populace through various means. Some reports
(reftel A) suggest that as many as 100,000 non-Muslims have
fled the southernmost three provinces over the past year. A
recent census, conducted in Yala City, seems to give some
credence to these reports. The census shows the city's
population has dropped by 12,000 from March of 2004 to March
of 2005. END NOTE

NO NEW EVIDENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS INVOLVEMENT


11. (C) None of our interlocutors reported any new evidence
of the involvement of transnational groups in the violence in
the South. Vice Governor Thanwakom said Thai militants are
copying the techniques used by transnational terrorists --
especially bombings -- but that the practice in itself is not
an indication of the presence of foreign terrorists since the
knowledge is readily available. (NOTE: A report produced by
the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPC)
in May said 65 bombs attacks have occurred in the far South
over the past six months. END NOTE)

ROLE OF THE SEPARATIST GROUPS - EXAGGERATED?


12. (C) During discussions regarding the major factors
behind the recent upsurge in the violence, several of our
interlocutors downplayed the role of the southern separatist
groups. Dr. Suttiwong and Somphong Jutansuan argued that
southern separatist groups were more influential in southern
Thailand 20 years ago, and did not enjoy current widespread
support. Several of our interlocutors described the
separatist groups as having little "street credibility" among
the populace; and said that most Muslims did not believe that
complete autonomy would solve their problems. Vice Governor
Thanwakom said the core numbers of hard-core separatist
remained small. He believes that the separatists themselves
rarely conduct attacks, and instead rely on hired gunmen --
usually disaffected youths -- to conduct drive-by shootings
and arson. Dr. Suttiwong is worried that the government is
exaggerating the role of the separatists in a similar fashion
to security forces in the 1970s which labeled people as
"Communists" for voicing any grievances against the
government.


13. (C) As in past visits, many of our interlocutors
complained that the media greatly exaggerated the level of
separatist related violence by lumping all incidents in the
South under "separatist related." Somphong said that while
the strength of the formal separatist movement is
exaggerated, the animosity felt by the population in the
South toward the central government should not be
underestimated. Somphong cautioned that the deeply felt
anger towards and suspicion of the central authorities by
much of the Muslim population in the South created the
environment in which the small group of separatists could
operate freely.

COMMENT: WILL THE VIOLENCE SPREAD TO SATUN?

14. (C) While the bloodshed has not yet spread to Satun;
many observers we spoke with were concerned that Satun might
not be able to escape the violence that plagues its
neighboring provinces. Vice Governor Thanwakom spoke
optimistically about an RTG strategy to use Satun and
Songkhla as "a wall" to keep the violence contained to the
far South. But it was obvious during the meeting with
Thanwakom and others that they are deeply concerned that it
is only a matter of time before the violence spreads.


15. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The connection of "separatism"
in the South to the many reported incidents of violence in
the region is often exaggerated, especially by the Bangkok
press. Yet the analysis in some official Thai circles seems
to be hardening around the assessment that the separatist
groups are the core factor behind the violence. Our view is
that we should be cautious about overstating the importance
of separatist or Islamist groups on the ground -- although it
continues to be difficult to identify who is responsible for
the mounting violence. It is worth noting that when local
people in the South discuss the ongoing violence, separatism
is not often cited as a reason for the attacks, and locals
are often dismissive of the capabilities of the known
separatist groups. Southern Thais are much more likely to
blame the violence on infighting between security forces,
turf battles between smugglers, or the U.S. Government
(reftel B) rather than connect the violence to the separatist
movement. However, what clearly cannot be overstated is the
grassroots dissatisfaction or genuine anger and resentment
among many southerners towards the central government. If
the RTG cannot address the basic sense of "injustice" in the
South the violence could spread to Satun and other parts of
Thailand. END COMMENT
BOYCE