THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 003436

SIPDIS

DOD FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015
TAGS: OVIP PGOV MARR MASS TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE RUMSFELD


Classified By: Charge Alexander A. Arvizu. Reason 1.4 (a and d)

SUMMARY


1. (C) Mr. Secretary, all of us in Bangkok look forward to
your visit as an opportunity to advance a number of key U.S.
foreign policy objectives. We have just finished our annual
Cobra Gold exercise -- the only multilateral training
exercise in the Asia-Pacific region. This year's exercise
underscored the fact that the quick ramping up of our
regional hub at Utapao Royal Thai Navy Air Base and our
military's ability to interact rapidly with Thai counterparts
during the recent tsunami crisis was a direct result of
decades of joint combined exercises, training and
cooperation. We have requested meetings for you with Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (Prime Minister TOCK-SIN) and
Defense Minister Gen. Thamarak Isarangura Na Ayutthaya
(Minister TA-MA-ROCK). In those meetings, you can point to
the critical U.S. military role in providing assistance to
Thailand and the other tsunami-hit nations in the region as
evidence that the United States remains engaged in Southeast
Asia and is committed to our treaty obligations here. Prime
Minister Thaksin is a key ally in the Global War on Terror
and would welcome your views on this subject as well as
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thaksin will likely
share his opinions on his largest domestic challenge --
unrest in the predominantly Muslim provinces of southernmost
Thailand. Three other key foreign policy objectives can be
advanced during your visit:

-- Iraq. CJCS Myers recently sent the Thai CHOD a letter
asking Thailand to send officers to the OIF Multinational
Headquarters. We await a response to that request. We have
also urged Thailand to make another deployment in support of
OIF, but have not received an official indication whether a
deployment is in the offing.

-- F-16 Purchase. The MOD has indicated it plans to procure
18 new fighter aircraft to replace its aging F-5's.
Competitors include the Saab Gripen, SU-30 and the F-16 Block

52. Both Saab and Sukhoi have a head start on Lockheed
Martin in the competition and rumors abound that back room
deals favoring Russian planes may be in the works. Thaksin
has suggested any deal must be financed through barter trade,
which Lockheed Martin is willing to do. We are pressing the
Thai to allow F-16 to compete fairly with the Russian and
Swedish planes. It would be extremely helpful to Lockheed
Martin's bid if you were to reinforce points made recently by
Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary Zoellick and others.

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-- PSI. The Thai Foreign Minister has suggested that his
Government is close to endorsing the Proliferation Security
Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles (PSI-SOP).
Nonetheless, the bureaucratic clearance process on
endorsement is moving slowly. Encouraging Thaksin to endorse
the SOP prior to the July Operational Experts Group meeting
in Copenhagen might prod the Thai Government to action on
this priority non-proliferation issue. End Summary

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP


2. (C) Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good.
The goodwill generated by America's quick and massive
response to the December 26 tsunami is palpable. American
businesses have over $20 billion in direct investment in
Thailand. The United States is Thailand's largest export
market and its second-largest foreign investor.


3. (C) Nonetheless, there are several points of friction.
Human rights remain a key concern. On October 25, 2004,
poorly trained Thai military and civilian security forces
forced nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be
transported to a military base nearly three hours away. 78
protesters died en route. The State Department's annual
human rights report (HRR),which in 2004 voiced concern over
the lack of accountability for approximately 1,300
extrajudicial killings in 2003 during a "war on drugs"
promoted by the Prime Minister, rankles the Thai Government.


4. (C) Thailand's policy of "constructive engagement" with
the military junta in Burma and provision of economic
assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing frustration
for us. The Thai government supports democracy in Burma but
maintains, not altogether convincingly, that engagement with
the SPDC is the only realistic approach it has to make
progress on the major cross-border flows of refugees, illegal
economic migrants, and methamphetamines it faces from Burma.
Recently PM Thaksin has voiced growing frustration with
Rangoon and his Ministers tell us that Thai policy may become
less favorable towards Burma.


5. (C) It surprises many visitors from Washington to learn
that the Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons
systems in its arsenal. While Thai military links with the
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai
links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media and the
military. Recent visitors have found PM Thaksin to be an
engaging interlocutor when discussing China -- he would
likely welcome a chance to discuss China's role in the
region.

PM THAKSIN


6. (SBU) In 2001, Thaksin became the first democratically
elected civilian Prime Minister to win an outright majority
in the Thai Parliament. His Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais)
political party dominates domestic politics and controls 377
of the 500 seats in Parliament. Thaksin won reelection in a
landslide victory on February 6th. Thaksin comes from a
prosperous Sino-Thai family in Thailand's second largest
city, Chiang Mai, and placed first in his class at the
National Police Academy. He spent several years studying in
the United States, earning a master's degree in Criminal
Justice from Eastern Kentucky University and a Doctorate in
Criminology from Sam Houston State University. After a few
years with the police, he left government service to run the
family business (Shinawatra Corporation, or Shin Corp),which
he turned into Thailand's largest telecom company, making
himself a multi-billionaire (in US dollars).


7. (C) Thaksin considers himself a personal friend of the
President, drawing on their common Texas connections. He
characterizes himself as a "CEO Prime Minister" and likes to
be known for being decisive. He is also impulsive. His
critics accuse him of authoritarian tendencies, of staffing
the major institutions of the country with his family members
or classmates, and of reinforcing the business interests of
family and political allies through government policies. Of
note, Chaisit Shinawatra, the Royal Thai Supreme Commander,
is Thaksin's cousin; Chaisit was previously leapfrogged by
the Prime Minister into the Army Commander position.

MILITARY COOPERATION


8. (C) We conduct a wide range of major exercises and
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra
Gold, our only joint/combined/multilateral exercise in the
Asia Pacific Region. 2005 marked the 24th year we've held
Cobra Gold. Over that time, the exercise has transformed
from a bilateral effort aimed at training to deter a
conventional attack from Vietnam, to a multilateral exercise
aimed at enhancing peacekeeping and other skills. Cobra Gold
2005 had a special focus on disaster relief and included
observers and participants from over 20 nations as well as
representatives from numerous international relief agencies
and civilian governmental organizations. For the past five
years, Singapore has been a participant in the staff exercise
portion of Cobra Gold. In 2005, Japan agreed to participate
in the STAFFEX for the first time and is prepared to send
participants to Cobra Gold 2006 -- illustrating the special
role Cobra Gold plays in promoting multilateral engagement in
Asia.


9. (C) Utapao, the Thai Naval Air Base used as the primary
staging area for U.S. tsunami disaster relief efforts in the
region, has long been a critical support hub for U.S.
aircraft transiting the region. Over 420 DoD aircraft use it
each year. From January 25 until February 4, we conducted
our largest air exercise with the Thai, Cope Tiger. This
year, F-18's from the USS Abraham Lincoln, which was
operating off of Aceh at the time, participated. Our largest
naval exercise is the Combined Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT) series which will take place again in June.

THE TSUNAMI AFTERMATH AND COBRA GOLD


10. (U) The massive rescue and recovery operation
undertaken by the U.S. military as a result of the December
26 tsunami was historic. Mercifully, U.S. casualties were
much lighter (about two dozen confirmed or presumed dead)
than those suffered by other countries. Thousands of Thai,
Europeans and other Asians were killed in the Phuket area --
a haven for vacationers during the holiday season. Total
fatalities will likely never be known; the official number is
about 5,400 but Thai officials privately say they expect the
final death toll to top 8,000.


11. (C) U.S. disaster relief efforts, led by the U.S.
military, had an immediate impact on affected areas in
Thailand. III MEF Commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, was
the commanding general of Combined Support Force 536 (CSF
536),which was based out of Utapao. CSF 536 worked closely
with the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI to ensure that requests for
assistance were promptly addressed and to assist coordination
of relief from civilian agencies, NGOs and corporate donors.
The Royal Thai Armed Forces granted the U.S. military blanket
overflight clearances for relief operations in the region,
including for aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln Battle
Group which operated off Sumatra. In addition to permitting
our use of Utapao, the Royal Thai Government integrated Thai
officers into the CSF staff where needed. During the height
of operations, over 1800 USG personnel operated out of
Utapao. We distributed over 660,000 pounds of supplies
within Thailand including medicine, food, dry ice and body
bags. USAF C-130s made regular delivery runs from Utapao and
Bangkok to affected areas for time sensitive supplies while
bulk shipments tended to go overland. USN P-3s positioned at
Utapao conducted search and rescue missions in the region.
Teams made up of medical specialists from the CDC, the Armed
Forces Research Institute of Medical Science and the Joint
POW/MIA Accounting Command in Hawaii were also deployed to
Thailand to assist with victim identification. U.S. Navy
SEALS and a representative from the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance worked closely with Thai military units
to search for the remains of American and other victims of
the disaster. From the beginning of the disaster, the
Defense Attache Office painted the intel picture for
commanders, forces, planners, and national decision makers.
Embassy Bangkok provided 24-hour American Citizens Services
for weeks after the crisis to assist Americans, claim Amcit
remains and coordinate USG relief efforts.

VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH


12. (C) Prime Minister Thaksin's biggest domestic challenge
is the unsettled security situation in the far southern part
of the country. Southern Thailand, in particular the
southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was
incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. However, 2004
witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of violence, with
over 500 people killed either by militants or by security
forces. Local Muslim separatist militants have attacked
symbols of Thai and Buddhist authority, and there continue to
be almost daily incidents of violence, notably even after the
tsunami disaster of December 26. Attacks most often involve

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isolated shootings of local officials, although increasingly
sophisticated bombing attacks have become more common. While
there is no credible evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or
al-Qaeda direction of the violence, there is concern that
they might attempt to exploit the local violence for their
own purposes.


13. (C) Thaksin has recently acknowledged that the problem
in Thailand's south is not simply the work of criminal gangs
as he once declared, and that recent RTG policies towards the
South have failed to halt the violence. Thaksin recently
appointed a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed
by highly respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun
to look for althernative solutions to the long-running
insurgency, and has indicated that he might replace martial
law with something less harsh. Until recently, this violence
was directed primarily at RTG institutions with no evidence
of attacks directed towards foreign interests. On April 3,
however, simultaneous bombs exploded outside a French-owned
Carrefour supermarket in Songkla's Hat Yai City and at the
Hat Yai airport, killing two persons. Since then there have
been no other attacks on foreign-owned targets. Thai
officials may ask you for U.S. equipment and technology such
as UAVs to support efforts to monitor militant movements in
the south. We recommend you be receptive but noncommittal,
and suggest that technical experts follow up. You may also
wish to point to our current efforts to improve human rights
training for Thai soldiers and officers who will rotate to
the south. We are working with U.S. experts to develop a
multi-faceted training program to educate enlisted soldiers,
mid-level officers and senior Thai leadership. Thaksin --
and most Thais -- are sensitive about any perception that the
U.S. wants to establish a security presence in the south.
Outrageous but widely circulated rumors that the U.S. has
fomented violence in the South also need to be considered
when discussing offers of possible U.S. assistance. In your
meetings, you may wish to:

-- Seek Thaksin's assessment of the situation in the south
and to ask what the Thai strategy is to bring the situation
under control;
-- Point out our desire that any Thai security response be
consistent with international human rights norms.

THAILAND AND IRAQ


14. (C) Thailand has played an important role in supporting
the Global War on Terror. In addition to capturing terrorist
mastermind Hambali -- the link between the Jemaah Islamiah
and al Qaeda -- Thailand sent troops to both Afghanistan and
Iraq. Thailand dispatched two deployments to Iraq as part of
OIF. In December 2003, two Thai soldiers were killed by a
car bomb while on duty in Karbala. Thailand's second
six-month deployment of 443 medics and engineers to Iraq
ended on September 20, 2004. While participation in OIF has
not caused the domestic furor in Thailand that it has in
other countries, Thaksin's critics have used Thailand's
deployments to Iraq against him. Several RTG officials have
told us that Thailand's deployments have been used by
militants to stir up dissent in the Muslim south. Recently,
CJCS General Myers sent a letter asking Thailand to consider
sending staff officers to man the OIF Multinational
Headquarters. Although in recent meetings with PACOM
Commander ADM Fallon and Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick
Thaksin had said that he would consider some "humanitarian"
presence in Iraq, at a private dinner on May 12 with the
Ambassador, Thaksin seemed extremely sensitive to the issue,
particularly the symbolism that a Thai presence in Iraq would
have among Muslims in southern Thailand. Thaksin stressed
that as an ally Thailand supported the U.S. on Iraq, but
asked us to be sensitive to his own efforts to manage the
situation in Thailand's south. During your meetings with
Thaksin and Thamarak, you may wish to:

-- Express appreciation for Thailand's previous deployments
to Afghanistan and Iraq;
-- Ask whether Thailand would agree to send staff officers
to man the OIF Multinational Headquarters;
-- Probe for details about what type of Thai follow-on
deployment might be possible;
-- Assure RTG leaders that U.S. military experts will help
them shape the deployment.

F-16 SALE


15. (C) Thailand recently announced its plans to purchase
18 fighter aircraft to replace aging F-5s in the Royal Thai
Air Force (RTAF) fleet. Although the RTAF presently has 59
F-16s in its inventory, reports indicate that the RTG is
leaning towards purchasing Saab Gripens or SU-30s because of
a belief (which we have worked to overcome) that Saab or
Sukhoi can offer a better business deal to Thailand. In his
meetings with ADM Fallon and Deputy Secretary Zoellick,
Thaksin indicated that a successful bid on the fighter
contract would have to include barter trade. Lockheed Martin
subsequently made clear that it was willing to offer the same
attractive barter deal that the Russians or Swedes offer.
Lockheed Martin met with Ministry of Commerce officials for
the first time to discuss barter trade on May 24 and plans to
follow up shortly with a meeting with the Commerce Minister
to assure him that Thailand is prepared to offer the same
sort of financing package as Saab or Sukhoi. RTAF officers
generally support the F-16 Block 52 in the competition
although rumors abound that the RTAF commander is leaning
heavily towards purchasing Russian planes. We have been
making a full court press on Thaksin asking him to ensure
that his Commerce and Defense Ministries give Lockheed
Martin's bid the same serious consideration they are giving
Saab and Sukhoi. This point has been made by Secretary Rice,
Deputy Secretary Zoellick and ADM Fallon. The Embassy
believes that pressure from senior U.S. officials like
yourself is essential for Lockheed Martin's prospects. It is
our belief that a transparent competition that takes into
consideration capability of the aircraft, interoperability
with U.S. forces, and cost would result in F-16 winning the
contract. It would be extremely helpful in this effort if
you would:

-- Stress our desire for Lockheed Martin to compete in an
fair competition with the Swedes and Russians.
-- Note Lockheed Martin's willingness to conduct barter
trade involving Thai agricultural products and other items.
-- Point out the interoperability and technology transfer
advantages F-16 has over SU-30 or Gripen and how it is the
best choice to defend Thailand.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

16 (C) After a year and a half of lobbying from the U.S.
and others, Thailand apparently has made the basic policy
decision to be more supportive of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and is moving through the final steps
towards endorsement of the PSI Statement of Interdiction
Principles (SOP). However, despite recent assurances by both
the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister that official
Thai endorsement of PSI awaits only final Cabinet approval,
the Royal Thai Government has failed to move forward with the
initiative. Prime Minister Thaksin's final scrutiny of the
decision will be key, and his endorsement cannot be taken for
granted given his mercurial decision making style. An action
driving event might be the upcoming PSI Operational Experts
Group (OEG) meeting in Copenhagen in July. If Thailand
endorses the SOP prior to that meeting, it will be allowed to
participate with other PSI endorsing countries. In your
meeting with PM Thaksin, you may wish to:

-- Welcome the Thai Foreign Minister's recent suggestion to
Secretary Rice that Thailand will soon endorse the PSI SOP.

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-- Note the importance of the upcoming OEG meeting in
Copenhagen in July and express our hope that Thailand
endorses the PSI principles prior to that meeting.


ARVIZU