Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK2749
2005-04-22 02:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF PACOM CDR ADM FALLON

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MASS TH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 002749 

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR ADM FALLON, FPA HUSO
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV
OSD/ISA FOR POWERS AND STERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 18APRIL2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF PACOM CDR ADM FALLON


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 002749

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR ADM FALLON, FPA HUSO
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV
OSD/ISA FOR POWERS AND STERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 18APRIL2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF PACOM CDR ADM FALLON


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)

SUMMARY


1. (C) Admiral Fallon, your visit to Bangkok to meet with
Thai leaders and Chiang Mai to open this year's Cobra Gold
exercise will allow you an opportunity to push forward a
number of key U.S. foreign policy objectives. We have
requested meetings for you with Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra (Prime Minister TOCK-SIN),Foreign Minister
Kantathi Suphamongkhon (Minister KAN-THA-TEE),Defense
Minister Gen. Thamarak Isarangura Na Ayutthaya (Minister
TA-MA-ROCK),Royal Thai Supreme Commander Gen. Chaisit
Shinawatra (General CHAI-SIT) and the Secretary General of
the National Security Council General Winai Phattiyakhul
(General WEE-NAI). In these meetings, you can point to the
critical U.S. military role in providing assistance to
Thailand and the other tsunami-hit nations in the region as
evidence that the United States remains engaged in Southeast
Asia and is committed to our treaty obligations here. Since
Cobra Gold this year will focus on lessons learned from our
recent experience mitigating the impact of the tsunami, it
will be appropriate for you to drive home a key lesson
learned: the quick ramping up of our regional hub at Utapao
Royal Thai Navy Air Base and our military's ability to
interact rapidly with Thai counterparts is a direct result of
decades of joint combined exercises, training and cooperation
between Thailand and the United States. The largest domestic
challenge facing the Royal Thai Government remains unrest in
the predominantly Muslim provinces of southernmost Thailand.
While emphasizing the U.S. assessment that the violence there
remains in internal matter for the Thais to resolve, you can
quietly underscore our willingness to help by improving the
human rights training of Thai soldiers rotating into the
south and offering other assistance to Thai troops.


2. (C) CJCS Myers recently sent General Chaisit a letter
urging Thailand to send officers to the OIF Multinational

Headquarters. It would be helpful for you to ask your
interlocutors how Thailand intends to answer General Myers'
request and to ask whether Thailand intends to commit another
deployment of troops to the Iraq region. Our bilateral
mil-mil dialogue with Thailand, Thai-Tac, should be enhanced.
Your visit can drive home points made by the PACOM J-5
recently by asking Thai military leaders to revitalize
Thai-Tac and make it more strategically focused on key issues
such as Regional Maritime Security, the growing role of China
and India in the region, defense modernization and other
issues. For the first time since the Asian financial crisis
of 1997, Thailand is considering a big-ticket military
hardware purchase. In the coming months, Thailand will
likely announce its intention to select from 18 Saab Gripens,
SU-30's or F-16's to replace aging F-5s in its fighter
aircraft inventory. It would be extremely helpful to
Lockheed Martin's bid for the fighter contract if you were to
note the clear advantage F-16 has over the competition from
an interoperability standpoint and mention our desire that
F-16 receives a fair assessment from the Thai Air Force. End
Summary

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP


3. (C) Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good.
The goodwill generated by America's quick and massive
response to the December 26 tsunami is palpable. Thailand is
a Treaty Ally and has been firmly supportive of the
International War on Terror and has participated in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
American businesses have over $20 billion in direct
investment in Thailand. The United States is Thailand's
largest export market and its second-largest foreign
investor.


4. (C) Nonetheless, there are several points of friction.
Human rights remain a key concern. On October 25, 2004,
poorly trained Thai military and civilian security forces
forced nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be
transported to a military base nearly three hours away. 78
protesters died en route. The State Department's annual
human rights report (HRR),which in 2004 voiced concern over
the lack of accountability for approximately 1,300
extrajudicial killings in the initial 2003 phase of a Thai
"war on drugs" promoted by the Prime Minister, rankles the
Thai Government.


5. (C) Thailand's policy of "constructive engagement" with
the military junta in Burma and provision of economic
assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing frustration
for us. The Thai government supports democracy in Burma but
maintains, not altogether convincingly, that engagement with
the SPDC is the only realistic approach it has to make
progress on the major cross-border flows of refugees, illegal
economic migrants, and methamphetamines it faces from Burma.


6. (C) It surprises many visitors from Washington to learn
that the Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons
systems in its arsenal. While Thai military links with the
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai
links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media and the
military.

PM THAKSIN


7. (SBU) In 2001, Thaksin became the first democratically
elected civilian Prime Minister to win an outright majority
in the Thai Parliament. His Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais)
political party dominates domestic politics and controls 377
of the 500 seats in Parliament. Thaksin won reelection in a
landslide victory on February 6th. Thaksin comes from a
prosperous Sino-Thai family in Thailand's second largest
city, Chiang Mai, and placed first in his class at the
National Police Academy. He spent several years studying in
the United States, earning a master's degree in Criminal
Justice from Eastern Kentucky University and a Doctorate in
Criminology from Sam Houston State University. After a few
years with the police, he left government service to run the
family business (Shinawatra Corporation, or Shin Corp),which
he turned into Thailand's largest telecom company, making
himself a multi-billionaire (in US dollars).


8. (C) Thaksin considers himself a personal friend of the
President, drawing on their common Texas connections. He
characterizes himself as a "CEO Prime Minister" and likes to
be known for being decisive. He is also impulsive. His
critics accuse him of authoritarian tendencies, of staffing
the major institutions of the country with his family members
or classmates, and of reinforcing the business interests of
family and political allies through government policies. Of
note, Chaisit Shinawatra, the Royal Thai Supreme Commander,
is Thaksin's cousin; Chaisit was previously leapfrogged by
the Prime Minister into the Army Commander position.

MILITARY COOPERATION


9. (C) We conduct a wide range of major exercises and
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra
Gold, the annual exercise which in 2004 involved
approximately 13,500 U.S. service members and 6,000 Thais.
Cobra Gold 2005 will be smaller than last year, primarily due
to U.S. commitments elsewhere and the large number of U.S.
forces sent to the region for tsunami relief. Utapao, the
Thai Navy Air Base used as the primary staging area for U.S.
disaster relief efforts in the region, has long been a
critical support hub for U.S. aircraft transiting the region.
Over 420 DoD aircraft use it each year. From January 25
until February 4, we conducted our largest air exercise with
the Thai, Cope Tiger. This year, F-18's from the USS Abraham
Lincoln participated. Our largest naval exercise is the
Combined Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series which
will take place again in June. Recently, a number of senior
U.S. military officials have visited Thailand -- then-Deputy
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz visited in January, Seventh

SIPDIS
Fleet Commander VADM Greenert came in February and March,
SOCPAC Commander BG Fridovich was in Thailand April 17-20,
13th AF Maj.Gen. Rice came to Bangkok April 20-22, and
JIATF-West Commander Admiral Rear Admiral Kelly visited April
20-24. USARPAC CG, LTG Brown, plans to visit the week after
your trip to Thailand.

A NOTE ON THAI MILITARY STRUCTURE


10. (C) The relative power and influence of the Royal Thai
Army (RTA) dwarfs the other services. As such, the Royal
Thai Army Commander traditionally wields more real power than
the Supreme Commander. General Chaisit was the head of the
RTA until the military reshuffle last October. His
"promotion" to head Supreme Command is viewed by many as the
result of Thaksin's displeasure with Chaisit's inability to
quickly control the unrest in the southern part of the
country. In October, Thaksin named Deputy Supreme Commander
Sirichai Thanyasiri (General SUR-A-CHAI) to take over
strategic planning for the south. Thailand's armed forces,
which had a history of interfering in the country's politics,
have not emerged from the barracks since 1992 and appear to
be fully reconciled to constitutional roles of defense and
security. Their exposure to US civil-military values through
their extensive participation in IMET training deserves some
credit for this transformation of their attitude towards
democracy.

THE TSUNAMI AFTERMATH AND COBRA GOLD


11. (U) The massive rescue and recovery operation
undertaken by the U.S. military as a result of the December
26 tsunami was historic. Mercifully, U.S. casualties were
much lighter (about two dozen confirmed or presumed dead)
than those suffered by other countries. Thousands of Thai,
Europeans and other Asians were killed in the Phuket area --
a haven for vacationers during the holiday season. Total
fatalities will likely never be known; the official number is
about 5,400 but Thai officials privately say they expect the
final death toll to top 8,000. One of the most devastated
areas in Thailand was the Phang Nga Naval Base. Phang Nga
represents the only strategic naval facility on Thailand's
Andaman Sea west coast. Pier facilities, the water treatment
plant, barracks and communications capabilities were badly
damaged by the tsunami.


12. (C) U.S. disaster relief efforts, led by the U.S.
military, had an immediate impact on affected areas in
Thailand. III MEF Commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, was
the commanding general of Combined Support Force 536 (CSF
536),which was based out of Utapao. CSF 536 worked closely
with the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI to ensure that requests for
assistance were promptly addressed and to assist coordination
of relief from civilian agencies, NGOs and corporate donors.
The Royal Thai Armed Forces granted the U.S. military blanket
overflight clearances for relief operations in the region,
including for aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln Battle
Group which operated off Sumatra. In addition to permitting
our use of Utapao, the Royal Thai Government integrated Thai
officers into the CSF staff where needed. During the height
of operations, over 1800 USG personnel operated out of
Utapao. We distributed over 660,000 pounds of supplies within
Thailand including medicine, food, dry ice and body bags.
USAF C-130s made regular delivery runs from Utapao and
Bangkok to affected areas for time sensitive supplies while
bulk shipments tended to go overland. USN P-3s positioned at
Utapao conducted search and rescue missions in the vicinity
of Thailand and in the region. Teams made up of medical
specialists from the CDC, the Armed Forces Research Institute
of Medical Science and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command
in Hawaii were also deployed to Thailand to assist with
victim identification. U.S. Navy SEALS and a representative
from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance worked closely
with Thai military units to search for the remains of
American and other victims of the disaster. From the
beginning of the disaster, the Defense Attache Office painted
the intel picture for commanders, forces, planners, and
national decision makers. Embassy Bangkok provided 24-hour
American Citizens Services for weeks after the crisis to
assist Americans, claim Amcit remains and coordinate USG
relief efforts.


13. (C) CSF 536's concept of operations set up Utapao as
the hub for U.S. relief efforts bound for Sri Lanka, and
Indonesia in addition to Thailand. In each of those
countries, Combined Support Groups (CSG) were established to
interact with the local government, the U.S. Embassies and
the NGO community. CSG-Thailand was based in Phuket and
redeployed on January 22. Since that time, ongoing
reconstruction efforts in Thailand are being managed by the
Embassy, JUSMAGTHAI, and USAID. A key part of those efforts
is to focus civil affairs projects carried out under our
military exercise authority in Thailand to assist Thais
rebuilding in the devastated areas around Phuket. At least
one COMREL project conducted as part of Cobra Gold 05 will
take place in the tsunami-devastated region.


14. (C) Cobra Gold 2005 will consist of a one week disaster
relief seminar for military, government civilians and NGOs,
aimed at capturing some lessons learned from the tsunami
mitigation effort followed by a one-week staff exercise in
Chiang Mai focused on a disaster relief scenario. In your
discussions with Thai officials, it will be appropriate for
you to underscore the fact that our successes in mitigating
the damage caused by the tsunami were due in no small part to
the decades of military cooperation between our two
countries, cooperation that is perhaps best symbolized by the
annual Cobra Gold exercise. By focusing Cobra Gold 05 on
disaster relief, we hope to capture the lessons learned by
U.S., Thai, Japanese and Singaporean units who participated
in Operation Unified Assistance and improve our ability to
respond to future disasters.
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH

15. (C) Besides dealing with the tsunami aftermath, Prime
Minister Thaksin's biggest domestic challenge is the
unsettled security situation in the far southern part of the
country. Southern Thailand, in particular the southernmost
Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat,
has experienced episodic violence since it was incorporated
into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. However, 2004 witnessed a
dramatic increase in the level of violence, with over 500
people killed either by militants or by security forces.
Local Muslim separatist militants have attacked symbols of
Thai and Buddhist authority, and there continue to be almost
daily incidents of violence, notably even after the tsunami
disaster of December 26. Attacks most often involve isolated
shootings of local officials, although increasingly
sophisticated bombing attacks have become more common. While
there is no credible evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or
al-Qaeda direction of the violence, there is concern that
they might attempt to exploit the local violence for their
own purposes.


16. (C) Thaksin has recently acknowledged that the problem
in Thailand's south is not simply the work of criminal gangs
as he once declared, and is an issue that potentially reaches
beyond Thailand's borders. Last December, Thaksin claimed
publicly during a radio address that Thai militants are
training in Malaysia and that Indonesian extremists are
instigating some of the violence. This rather clumsy public
assertion offended the two fellow ASEAN governments. Thaksin
is not likely to ask for direct U.S. assistance as the RTG
maintains -- as do we -- that the southern situation is
primarily a domestic issue. Until recently, this violence
was directed primarily at RTG institutions with no evidence
of attacks directed towards foreign interests. On April 3,
however, simultaneous bombs exploded outside a French-owned
Carrefour supermarket in Songkla's Hat Yai City and at the
Hat Yai airport, killing two persons. Thai officials may
ask you for U.S. equipment and technology such as UAVs to
support efforts to monitor militant movements in the south.
We recommend you be receptive but noncommittal, and suggest
that technical experts follow up. You may also wish to point
to our plans to improve human rights training for Thai
soldiers and officers who will rotate to the south. We are
working with U.S. experts to develop a multi-faceted training
program to educate enlisted soldiers, mid-level officers and
senior Thai leadership. It would be prudent to keep in mind
that Thaksin -- and most Thais -- are sensitive about any
perception that the U.S. wants to establish a security
presence in the south. Outrageous but widely circulated
rumors that the U.S. has fomented violence in the South also
need to be considered when discussing offers of possible U.S.
assistance. In your meetings, you may wish to:

--Seek your interlocutor's assessment of the situation in the
south and to ask what the Thai strategy is to bring the
situation under control;
--Point out our desire that any Thai security response be
conducted while respecting international human rights norms
and explain the negative consequences associated with
incidents like Tak Bai.

THAILAND AND IRAQ


17. (C) Thailand dispatched two deployments to Iraq as part
of OIF. In December 2003, two Thai soldiers were killed by a
car bomb while on duty in Karbala. Thailand's second
six-month deployment of 443 medics and engineers to Iraq
ended on September 20, 2004. While participation in OIF has
not caused the domestic furor in Thailand that it has in
other countries, Thaksin's critics have used Thailand's
deployments to Iraq against him. Several RTG officials have
told us that Thailand's deployments have been used by
militants to stir up dissent in the Muslim south. Recently,
CJCS General Myers sent a letter to General Chaisit asking
Thailand to consider sending staff officers to man the OIF
Multinational Headquarters. It would be appropriate for you
to ask your interlocutors how they intend to answer General
Myers' request. Similarly, during your meetings with senior
Thai officials, you may wish to:

--Express appreciation for Thailand's previous deployments to
Afghanistan and Iraq;
--Explain that the Administration hopes Thailand will
consider a follow-on deployment in support of OIF;
--Assure RTG leaders that U.S. military experts will help
them shape the deployment.
STRATEGIC TALKS

18. (C) PACOM J-5 led our delegation during the week of
October 18 in our annual mil-mil strategic talks with
Thailand, Thai-Tac. It became clear over the course of those
talks that they could be improved by focusing less on arcane
details or minor disagreements between staff officers and
more on strategic issues. Both sides agreed that Thai-Tac
2005, scheduled to be held in Honolulu this fall, should
focus more on strategic issues --leaving tactical issues for
staff officers to resolve. During you conversations at Royal
Thai Supreme Command, you may wish to:

--Express our hopes that Thai-Tac in the future focuses on
key strategic issues such as RMSI, the rise of China and
India, force modernization and other issues.

INTEL COOPERATION


19. (C) Your J2 valiantly tried to implement an
Intelligence Modernization Program with the Royal Thai Armed
Forces during the past year. However, the Thai military
intelligence community stiff-armed the offer, primarily on
the questionable grounds that the individual services do not
want or need to be part of the joint approach offered by
USPACOM. This helps illustrate a problem the Thai military
-- and the Thai Government -- has in dealing with the
southern insurgency, i.e., excessive stovepiping of
information and insufficient sharing within the Armed Forces
or with other agencies. While our bilateral intel
relationship is good, it can be improved, especially at the
military-to-military level. In discussing intelligence
matters with your interlocutors, it may be useful to remember
that Defense Minister Thamarak has a strong intelligence
background. In your meetings with the Supreme Commander and
the Minister of Defense you may wish to:

--Underscore lessons the U.S. Government has learned about
intelligence cooperation and the necessity to link
intelligence together from the military services, Joint
Commands, and other Agencies;
--Offer for your J2 to re-engage with the Thai J2 and service
intelligence chiefs to raise the mil-mil intel relationship
to a more mature level.


F-16 SALE


20. (C) Thailand recently announced its plans to purchase
18 fighter aircraft to replace aging F-5s in the RTAF fleet.
Although the RTAF presently has 59 F-16s in its inventory,
press reports indicate that the RTG is leaning towards
purchasing Saab Gripens or SU-30s because of a belief (which
we have worked to overcome) that Saab or Sukhoi can offer a
better business deal to Thailand. Recently, Lockheed Martin
executives have made it clear to Thai decision makers that
their company will put together a countertrade package equal
to up to 100 percent of the purchase price of any aircraft.
This promise has allowed RTAF officers -- who generally
support the F-16 Block 52 in the competition -- to start
putting together a package outlining options for the purchase
for the RTAF commander's approval. While rumors are rife
that some senior Thai Air Force officers may be receiving
compensation from one of the other two competitors to support
their bids, the Embassy believes that pressure from senior
U.S. officials like yourself can improve Lockheed Martin's
prospects. It is our belief that a transparent competition
that takes into consideration capability of the aircraft,
interoperability with U.S. forces and cost would result in
F-16 winning the contract. It would be extremely helpful in
this effort if you would:

--Point out the interoperability advantages F-16 has over
SU-30 or Gripen and how it is the best choice to defend
Thailand.

IN CLOSING


21. (SBU) Thank you for seeing me in Honolulu.
Congratulations again on assuming your new command, and I
look forward to welcoming you to Thailand.
BOYCE