THAI INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OBSERVERS DISCUSS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002541

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER TH
SUBJECT: THAI INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OBSERVERS DISCUSS
NATURE OF SOUTHERN TROUBLES

REF: (A) BANGKOK 2401 (B) BANGKOK 2322 (C) BANGKOK
1008 (D) 04 BANGKOK 8377 (E) 04 BANGKOK
7171 (F) KUALA LUMPUR 4806

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Clarke. Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (S) Summary: In recent Embassy meetings with several
Thai government and academic experts on Thailand's southern
separatist troubles, several themes emerged: 1) the Royal
Thai Government (RTG) sparked deep resentment and lost
credibility among Muslims in the South after detainees taken
at Tak Bai died while being transported for further
interrogation; 2) the degree to which assistance from outside
Thailand to local separatists remains unknown; and, 3) there
is real concern about the possibility that international
extremist groups could be tempted into active involvement in
the South. End Summary.

ATTACKS ON APRIL 3 SUGGEST NO LETUP IN VIOLENCE DESPITE
CONCILIATORY LANGUAGE FROM THAKSIN


2. (C) On April 5, Poloffs interviewed Dr. Surasit
Vajirakachorn, Associate Dean at the National Institute of
Development Administration and a lecturer on southern Thai
developments, about the South. Surasit characterized the
April 3 bombings at Hat Yai Airport and in Songkhla (Ref. A)
as "demonstrations" by militant separatists that their
campaign against the government and the economies of the
southern provinces would not let up, even as Prime Minister
Thaksin directs a major shift to a more conciliatory southern
policy. Surasit estimated that the separatist movement in
the south has grown to about 10,000 members of which about
half are armed fighters. (Note: This estimate was offered by
the professor, but it is by far the highest we have heard.
3000 is the more common total heard. End note). Surasit
told poloffs that before the Southern Border Provinces
Administrative Center (SBPAC) and the
Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43 were dismantled by PM
Thaksin in Spring 2002, there were no more than 1000 active
separatists. He dated the separatist growth spurt from the
shutting down of these two organizations, with the numbers
boosted further after the Krue Se Mosque incident, the Tak
Bai incident and the arrests of religious teachers from the
Thamma Witthaya religious schools.


3. (C) Poloffs and a Washington visitor also spoke March 16
with General Surapong Suwana-adth of the Royal Thai Army
Headquarters Directorate of Intelligence (who is slated
shortly to become Chief of Intelligence at Supreme Command)
and Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, political science professor at
Chulalongkorn University and prominent expert on defense and
security issues about the South. They also attributed the
recent up-tick in violence in the South to the killings of
Thai Muslims by RTG security personnel last year. Surapong
and Panitan said that the majority of the victims (over half)
were civilians (they did not include the Krue Se-related
attacks or Tak Bai casualties in their statistics, which
would have pushed their estimated percentage of civilian
deaths considerably higher). They added that it appears that
the attackers are employing tactics that vary by district -
in some districts, drive by shooting or machete attacks are
most common; in others bombings and in others arson. There
is no discernible pattern. Surasit opined that use of cell
phone detonated improvised explosive devices could indicate
expertise learned from abroad, but wouldn't hazard a guess
about from specifically where.


4. (C) Surapong said that in the struggle for "hearts and
minds," Tak Bai dealt a severe blow to the RTG,s image and
was a setback to the government's efforts to calm the
situation in the Muslim border provinces. As a result, the
security forces are looking again at their (lack of) training
in riot control, Surapong said. In his view, security forces
might be able to improve the volume and quality of
information from civilian informants in order to be more
"surgical" in apprehending separatists. He said there would
be better use of information, noting that a new
"development-based" Army unit, the 15th Division, is slated
for deployment to the south and should buttress efforts to
win hearts and minds. (Note: After Thaksin's comments (Ref.
B) during last week's parliamentary debate on the south that
troops would less visible in some areas in the region, it is
not clear whether the 15th Division will actually be
deployed. End Note.)


5. (SBU) In Poloffs' meetings, Surapong, Panitan and
Surasit all noted that there have been no separatist-related
incidents in another Muslim-majority border province, Satun.
They each speculated that separatists, anxious not to draw
attention by security forces to smuggling activities that may
be funding their activities, avoid attacks on government and
civilian targets in that province.

DEFACTO SEPARATION IN THAI BUDDHIST RURAL FLIGHT?


6. (C) Many Thai Buddhists living in the southern provinces
are relocating to safer, more urban locales in the region,
according to Dr. Panitan. He said that the flight could
either be from perceptions of a deliberate campaign by
separatists to create a defacto separate Muslim area in the
deep South, or simply a derivative of the general violence.
Panitan claimed that roughly 100,000 Buddhist residents of
Narathiwat, and 300,000 from Yala and Pattani, have moved,
most leaving rural businesses or residences overnight (or for
longer periods) to stay in Songkhla or Hat Yai, where
security is deemed to be better. Government figures for
those who have moved out of fear of the violence is lower --
about 20,000. (Note: Panitan's figures and anecdotal
comments about non-Muslims fleeing troubled areas in the
south match those of other observers. Reftels C, D,and E.
End Note.) Panitan added that suspicion between the Thai
Muslim and Buddhist communities is growing. Buddhist
businessmen carry guns when traveling in the afflicted
provinces and in their places of businesses. Some are taking
target practice and hiring security guards.

ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS AT RISK?


7. (S) Panitan claimed that Thai officials are concerned
about recent unspecified threats originating in the south to
the Royal Family members. Panitan declined to give
additional information, but said that there is genuine
concern that some separatists may intend to target a member
of the royal family during a royal visit to the affected
provinces.

OUTSIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE BUT DEGREE UNKNOWN


8. (C) Panitan said that there is ample visible evidence
that unaccounted funding is coming in to the deep South from
outside. As an example, he cited the case of local Islamic
teachers, many of whom had attended religious schools in the
Middle East and returned to Thailand, having relatively
prosperous looking homes, "complete with a big satellite dish
to pick up al-Jazeera" but with no evidence of income to
support their house and other possessions. Surasit said that
there is, in his opinion, assistance from "across the
border," (i.e. Malaysia),particularly in providing refuge
for separatists skipping across the border to evade Thai
authorities. Colonel Surapong said that the outside funding
question is very worrying and one that Thai authorities are
trying to get a handle on, particularly the activities of the
International Islamic Relief Organization.

MOVEMENT OF DUAL NATIONAL DIFFICULT TO TRACK


9. (C) Panitan said that the RTG does not have firm and
effective control over movement of Thai or dual national
Muslims across the border. Surapong claimed that some
separatist suspects the authorities are seeking are hiding in
rural areas, some just across the border in Malaysia.
Panitan characterized relations between Thai and Malaysian
law enforcement and border police as good; strains between
the two neighbors' security services exist at higher ranks.
(Note: Embassies Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have heard similar
comments from both Thai and Malaysian border officials.
Reftels D and F. End note.)

FEAR THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS COULD BE TEMPTED TO BECOME
INVOLVED


10. (C) On the question of whether the separatists would
welcome Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) assistance, Surapong opined
that some would value JI expertise but not the international
attention this would draw to them. He said that JI had used
Thailand as a sanctuary in the past but, citing the example
of Hambali, noted that the JI leader had kept himself
isolated from mainstream Thai Muslims. In an aside, Panitan
and Surapong both agreed there was a general separation
between Wahabi/Sufi influenced Muslims and the majority of
southern Thai Muslims, who rejected global jihadism. Surasit
said that the possibility of an international terrorist group
insinuating itself into the conflict is his greatest worry.


11. (C) Comment: These conversations with three
"authoritative" Thai observers demonstrate again that Thai
experts really are unable to put a name on or identity the
persons or organizations responsible for bomb attacks such as
those occurring in Songkhla province on April 3. Another
thread running through the discussions with Panitan, Surapong
and Surasit was the frequent assertion that dismantling the
joint civilian/military bodies several years ago, and
adoption of overly hard-line tactics against the separatists,
cost the RTG a significant degree of support among Muslims in
the southern border provinces and tipped the balance, leading
to the current woes. Of concern are the continued reports
that non-Muslim Thais in the south, out of fear and
intimidation, are relocating away from the troubled areas.

ARVIZU