UTAPAO NAVAL AIR STATION - OPPORTUNITIES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002280

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/RSP
DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISA/AP
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014
TAGS: PREL POL MIL
SUBJECT: UTAPAO NAVAL AIR STATION - OPPORTUNITIES FOR
IMPROVED FACILITIES

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) The Royal Thai Naval Air Station at Utapao represents
the most strategically significant location in Thailand, and
one of considerable importance regionally. In the past
several years Utapao has been used to support OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and various smaller
contingencies. Most recently, while serving as the regional
hub for the U.S. led OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (OUA),the
value of our nearly unfettered access to the facility was
once again clearly demonstrated.


2. (C) In addition to supporting contingency operations,
approximately 30 U.S. military aircraft routinely transit
Utapao monthly, and the base is central in supporting an
average of 40 joint and combined exercises conducted between
United States and Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) annually.
There are also commercial pressures on Utapao that will
likely grow in the future, including booming business in the
nearby Eastern-Seaboard industrial zone, international
charter flights, the base's use as a commercial aircraft
diversion airfield, and civilian competition for control of
airfield operations.


3. (C) Although successive Thai governments have been
responsive to U.S. requests to use Utapao, we cannot take for
granted the access we have enjoyed to date. Despite the high
tempo of U.S. activity in Utapao, we have offered very little
in the way of lasting facility improvements or maintenance
that would provide mutual benefits and be supportive of our
strategic objectives regarding expanded access and influence.


4. (C) The aftermath of OUA and increased interest in further
development of Utapao as a Cooperative Security Location
(CSL) requires careful consideration of how to best advance
our own interests while fully acknowledging legitimate
partner nation sovereignty and commercialization issues. In
this effort, it is critical that all U.S. military
initiatives that would in any way alter the current status
quo first receive thorough review, vetting and approval of
Commander, USPACOM, and that they be considered in the
context of any other "competing" or complementary programs.
Those programs approved by Commander, USPACOM should then be
reviewed by the U.S. Country Team in Thailand to provide a
perspective on what is achievable given existing political
realities and conditions, thereby resulting in a
cooperatively developed product which will have examined all
equities. The Joint United States Military Advisory Group
Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) will serve as the in-country focal
point for all U.S. military initiatives potentially affecting
Utapao, to include construction projects, renovations,
facility expansion and all interaction with applicable RTARF
representatives.


5. (C) Although the Royal Thai Government (RTG) is aware of
the general U.S. interest in the CSL concept globally, it is
important to note that there are no formal agreements with
any level of the RTG regarding the establishment of CSLs in
Thailand. The access that we currently enjoy is solely the
result of our traditional alliance and military-to-military
partnership that has been sustained over many years. The
past practice of disparate offices from various organizations
surveying Utapao based on stove-piped coordination and
objectives inadvertently jeopardizes our current level of
access through potential Thai misperception of USG intent.
It is important now, and will become increasingly important
in the years ahead, that we concentrate efforts to develop a
single plan, endorsed by USPACOM and the U.S. Country Team,
that promotes Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and
Mission Performance Plan (MPP) objectives, but is tempered by
a realistic analysis of RTG concerns and sensitivities.


6. (C) The U.S. Country Team's preferred approach would be a
plan that is implemented in phases addressing near-, mid- and
long-term objectives, and that contains elements directly
benefiting both U.S. and RTG goals. This approach would seek
to front-load improvements that would be perceived as most
beneficial from the Thai perspective in order to both serve
as tangible evidence of our appreciation for the access we
have been granted over many years, as well as offset the
potential impression that follow-on improvements might be
seen to have greater benefit to the U.S. Specifically:

A. Near Term: Provide equipment and services addressing
immediate needs in improving airport safety and upgrading air
traffic control capability. These are areas that have long
been neglected and represent fundamental, required airport
capabilities supporting U.S. military, Thai military, and
commercial aircraft. Examples of improvements in the near
term would include:
1) Area Surveillance Radar (ASR-10);
2) VOR/DME capability;
3) UHF/VHF integrated communications package;
4) Improved fire-fighting and crash and rescue capability;
5) Airfield Grounding System


B. Mid Term: Develop the largely unused portion of Utapao
east of the main runway for use as a U.S. lodgment point
supporting small deployments of U.S. personnel and equipment,
such as might be expected during an exercise. The
significant advantages associated with moving U.S. operations
to the east side include:
1) Reduced visibility of U.S. forces;
2) Reduced interference between military and commercial
traffic;
3) A self-contained capability to receive and process U.S.
military personnel, cargo and equipment separate from primary
flightline Thai military and foreign commercial operations
and facilities


C. Long Term: Expand development of the east side, to
include exploring the possibility of leasing existing
warehouse structures in order to support larger contingency
deployments of U.S. TDY personnel, and to formalize U.S.
presence on a long-term basis. Consideration should be given
to the placement of mobile equipment to support greater
logistics capacity, to include:
1) Fuel trucks;
2) MHE (10K forklift, 10K rough terrain forklift, 25K Loader
(NGSL),ground power unit (GPU),air start unit (ASU),
aircraft maintenance stands, runway sweeper)


7. (SBU) Each of these phases offers the partner nation
significant benefits and contributes to infrastructure
improvement necessary to better support routine and
contingency U.S. deployments. The option to develop the east
side creates an ability to expand or contract the U.S.
footprint, using temporary structures and mobile equipment
tailored to mission requirements, while avoiding unwanted
conflicts with ongoing airport operations, particularly on
the commercial side. This option does not envision the
construction of large, permanent structures that would
advertise the U.S. presence. It would, however, address
anticipated RTG/RTARF concerns.

ARVIZU