Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK2259
2005-03-30 11:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

JAPANESE DFM TANAKA BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV BM TH ASEAN BURMA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002259 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV BM TH ASEAN BURMA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DFM TANAKA BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA

REF: STATE 50205

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002259

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV BM TH ASEAN BURMA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DFM TANAKA BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA

REF: STATE 50205

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 25 Ambassador met with visiting
Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Tanaka to discuss Tanaka's
recent official visit to Burma. Tanaka said he delivered "a
strong message" to the SPDC on democracy and the release of
ASSK. Tanaka reported that Prime Minister Soe Win did not
show any flexibility, blaming the NLD and outsiders for the
lack of progress. Tanaka said that Japan was increasingly
concerned with the situation in Burma, especially in light of
China's growing regional influence. Tanaka urged continued
close U.S.-Japanese cooperation, along with engagement with
ASEAN. END SUMMARY

JAPAN'S MESSAGE TO BURMA: "PROGRESS NEEDED ON DEMOCRACY"


2. (C) On March 25, visiting Japanese Deputy Foreign
Minister Tanaka briefed the Ambassador about his
just-completed trip to Burma. Tanaka met with Prime Minister
Soe Win and Foreign Minister Nyan Win. (NOTE: Tanaka said he
would also brief Thai MFA Permanent Secretary Krit
Ganjana-Goonchorn about his mission to Burma before heading
back to Tokyo. END NOTE) Tanaka said his instructions were
to deliver a clear message to the SPDC that progress was
needed on national reconciliation and democracy. Tanaka
indicated he had been selected to deliver the message because
he is a "friend of Burma". He highlighted some of his past
experience with the country, noting that he first traveled to
Rangoon in 1976, and has met with both Aung San Suu Kyi
(ASSK) and Khin Nyunt (before Khin Nyunt was removed from
office).


3. (C) Tanaka claimed that he told the SPDC in blunt terms
that the GOJ has serious concerns about Burma's internal
situation. He said he "demanded" that the SPDC release ASSK
and other political detainees and lift restrictions on the
NLD as part of the democratization process, and said these
reforms needed to take place before Burma's chairmanship of
ASEAN in 2006/7.


4. (C) Soe Win and Nyan Win responded to Tanaka's demarche
by repeating "often heard excuses," according to Tanaka. The
Burmese said they are deeply mistrustful of "the West"
because of Burma's colonial legacy. Soe Win reportedly said
the regime also did not trust UN Special Envoy Razali, saying
he was duplicitous and only interested in self-promotion.
Lastly, Soe Win said they had no faith in ASSK and the NLD,
blaming her for "working against the territorial integrity of
the country." Soe Win reportedly claimed that the SPDC was
strongly committed to national reconciliation as part of the
"road map," but blamed the NLD's boycott with delaying the
process.


5. (C) Tanaka said he pressed Soe Win and Nyan Win but they
were not flexible in their positions, and refused to directly
answer Tanaka's repeated questions about progress on
democratization. Tanaka "warned" Soe Win that Japan would
continue to press the regime on these issues over the next
year.

STRATEGIES FOR BURMA: THE UN AND ASEAN


6. (C) Tanaka told the Ambassador that he believes that
increased UN involvement is a crucial component for progress
on Burma. Tanaka privately expressed frustration about UN
Special Envoy Razali and his lack of access to the regime.
Tanaka said that, as a "pragmatic issue," Razali's status
needed to be discussed, suggesting that a replacement is in
order.


7. (C) Tanaka said the GOJ would continue to push its
democracy message for Burma through diplomatic channels, but
acknowledged the importance of close coordination with the
U.S.: "We must see eye to eye." Most important, Tanaka
said, is ASEAN engagement. Tanaka said the integrity of
ASEAN is at stake and that Singapore and Malaysia have to
play a larger role in the issue.

ROLE OF CHINA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA


8. (C) Behind much of Tanaka's comments was an obvious
concern over the influence of China in Burma. Tanaka
repeatedly stressed the importance that Japan places on the
situation in Burma vis--vis China's growing regional role.
Tanaka said the GOJ has noted with concern how Chinese
interests and influence have rapidly increased in Burma. He
also noted how active China has been in the region, and that
the Chinese role would continue to grow with time. Tanaka
suggested that both the U.S. and Japan needed to engage China
more on Burma.


9. (C) Tanaka opined that the Six-Party Talks in Northeast
Asia might provide a useful model for future dealings on
Burma and other issues in Southeast Asia -- with the U.S.,
Japan, China, and India at the core. Tanaka said that Japan
was looking ten years ahead, when China will be the biggest
player in Southeast Asia. He said Japan believed that this
rise could benefit everyone, but only if the U.S. remained
engaged.
BOYCE