Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BANGKOK1573
2005-03-03 10:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI MFA PERMSEC SUMMONS THE AMBASSADOR OVER 2004

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV TH HUMAN RIGHTS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001573 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, DRL. US PACOM FOR FPA HUSO.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TH HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: THAI MFA PERMSEC SUMMONS THE AMBASSADOR OVER 2004
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

REF: BANGKOK 1527

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001573

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, DRL. US PACOM FOR FPA HUSO.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TH HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: THAI MFA PERMSEC SUMMONS THE AMBASSADOR OVER 2004
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

REF: BANGKOK 1527

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Foreign Ministry (MFA) Permanent Secretary
Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn told the Ambassador March 2 that the
2004 Human Right Report (HRR) on Thailand presented
government actions (at Khru Se mosque and Tak Bai) in the
deep South in a misleading light by failing to place them in
the context of the separatist insurgency. He raised a few
other specific "inaccuracies" and complained about the
general methodology of the report. His main message, however,
was that the RTG regards the HRR as "interference" and that
it creates difficulties in the bilateral relationship. He
said the MFA would try to limit the damage caused. MFA has
by and large tried to play down the issue after calling in
the Ambassador. Krit said MFA has advised PM Thaksin not to
react publicly. End Summary.


2. (C) On March 2, the Ambassador was called in to the MFA by
Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn over the Thailand
chapter of the 2004 HRR. Krit said he wished to express the
Royal Thai Government's deep unhappiness over some of the
content of the HRR as well as the way release of the report
had been handled. The report had hurt bilateral relations,
he said, and he wanted to discuss with the Ambassador how to
limit further damage. Krit was accompanied by MFA Americas
Director General Nongnuth Petcharatana, Ministry spokesman
Sihasak Puangketkaew and other Americas Department officials.
Polcouns Clarke took notes for the Ambassador.

MFA ASSERTS HUMAN RIGHT REPORT IS FLAWED...


3. (C) Krit, referring to an article in the February 28
edition of the English-language newspaper The Nation which
purported to preview the HRR, complained about "prior
leakage." He assured the Ambassador that nobody at MFA was
responsible. (Note: The Nation has hinted to us that its
source was MFA which, while not in possession of an advance
copy, had been well-briefed for months about major events at
Khru Se mosque and Tak Bai that are condemned in the HRR.
End note.) He also said that "members of Thai civil society"

who had attended an Embassy meeting with NGO representatives
and RTG officials about the HRR on March 1, were "dual
capacity" and had provided quotes to the press. DG Nongnuth
interjected her familiar objection that the U.S. should not
be "PR'ing" its criticisms of human rights in Thailand.
(Note: NGO reps did in fact accurately quote from the
discussion, but primarily gave the press their reactions,
generally favorable, to the HRR. End Note.)


4. (C) Krit said that he was aware the U.S. had been open
over the past year to MFA explanations of human rights abuse
incidents. However, it was the view of the RTG that our
final 2004 Report had a "greatly reduced value" because of
"fundamental flaws." These, he said, fell into two areas: 1)
"misleading presentation," where an overall context of
positive human rights developments in Thailand had been
omitted or minimized; and 2) where the "unscientific nature"
of the collection methodology resulted in assertions that
were "off the mark."


5. (C) Krit offered several specific complaints. The
opening pages of the HRR contain a number of sweeping
generalizations, including about corruption. Many incidents
may be committed by individuals, he said, but the implication
is that the government was involved. Readers pick up unduly
negative impressions from sections when they don't understand
the background. Writing about the Khru Se mosque incident,
for example, cannot be balanced without discussion of the
violent insurgency that the RTG faces in the South. Peaceful
handling the South is on the top of the Thai national agenda,
Krit said. PM Thaksin had just established a National
Reconciliation Commission headed by Anand Panyarachun, so the
situation was not as static as portrayed in the HRR.


6. (C) Krit also raised a reference to the murder of a
Pattani Court judge which seemed to suggest that he was
killed by RTG authorities. He said that under common law
there is a presumption of innocence until proven guilty, and
this assertion with no attribution stepped over the line.
(Note: The judge almost certainly was killed by
anti-government gunmen. End note.) Further, Krit said that
under the "unlawful killings" section, the HRR had reported
on deaths of persons from land mines. "How could deaths by
landmines be classified as a human rights abuses and put in
this section," he asked. (Note: The category is actually
"Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life," and inclusion of
land mine death figures -- as arbitrary deaths -- is in the
HRR drafting instructions. End Note.)

...AND DAMAGES U.S.-THAI RELATIONS


7. (C) Krit said that there certainly could be genuine
differences of opinion about events, but the main thrust of
his message to the Ambassador was RTG concern over what was
seen as an unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs
of Thailand. Thais, including the prime minister, did not
understand why this was happening, especially in the period
of post-tsunami cooperation. The "sudden" publication of the
Human Rights Report had created difficulties for the
bilateral relationship, he said. Krit said that the RTG
wanted to avoid the "annual public spectacle" of release of
the HRR, and would try to dampen public reaction against the
U.S. in response to this year's report. The MFA would only
note to the press that it had been in contact with the
Ambassador about inaccuracies and asked for corrections.
However, he added, this should not be understood as lessening
the strength of the RTG concerns he had outlined.


8. (C) Spokesman Sihasak commented that the way that material
in the HRR was organized was a problem. He suggested that if
the U.S. had highlighted the government's efforts to promote
people's economic well-being and fight trafficking that would
have toned down the HRR. He shared his insight that the
press and politicians were using the HRR against the
government.


9. (C) The Ambassador said he would report RTG concerns
about the HRR to Washington and would check on the specifics
raised. He said that, while not wanting to sound at all
defensive about the report, he regretted any inaccuracies
that it might contain. He said that the HRR was mandated,
and he had experienced sensitivities over it in every country
where he had been posted. Every effort had been made, he
said, to ensure factual accuracy and avoid subjective
analysis. He pointed out, however, that even if Khru Se and
Tak Bai had not occurred, human rights are a concern in our
foreign policy and there would still have been a report.

HANDLING MEDIA COVERAGE


10. (C) The Ambassador told Krit that he sought the PermSec's
guidance on how best to try to keep this "a one day crisis
and not a five day crisis." He asked whether he would be
facing photographers when he exited the MFA. Krit and
Sihasak assured him that they did "not practice that kind of
diplomacy." As the Ambassador left MFA, the press was in
fact staked out to cover the departure. From March 3 news
articles, the follow-on briefing that Sihasak gave to
journalists apparently stuck largely to the theme that MFA
had conveyed its concerns and asked for corrections, although
Sihasak also provided some detail that Krit had not been
happy about substance on the South and methodology. The
Thai-language newspaper Matichon carried a front page picture
over the headline, "The MFA deems the southern information
one-sided, prods the Americans to improve it, and summons
their big ambassador for acknowledgment," but coverage of the
HRR was otherwise brief and buried in the inside pages of
most newspapers on March 3.

MFA ADVICE TO THAKSIN: BEST NOT TO COMMENT PUBLICLY


11. (C) Krit telephoned the Ambassador on March 3 to touch
base and apologize for the press presence, explaining they
had been there for another purpose. He was pleased that the
media had played the "summoning in" story in a generally
straight-forward manner. The Ambassador noted that Prime
Minister Thaksin remained quiet on the issue, and Krit
responded that MFA had sent him a memo immediately after the
March 2 meeting providing advice in that vein.


12. (C) Comment: Krit is fully aware that the HRR is a
mandated annual report. The inaccuracies he raised are
debatable, as is the issue of whether our coverage of Khru Se
and Tak Bai needs any more context than is already provided
in the report. While the specific Thai complaints in our
view do not warrant fixes, the strength of MFA's reaction
(and reportedly Thaksin's) should not be dismissed as simply
an annual ritual. MFA has been lobbying diligently for
months to try to soften the HRR Thailand chapter, and its
annual release will continue to create serious bilateral
tensions. It remains to be seen whether Thaksin's silence on
the HRR will survive the week and his opportunity this
Saturday to comment on it during his weekly national radio
broadcast. End Comment.
BOYCE