THAILAND: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001169

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV. HQ USPACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON TH TRT US FTA POL MIL
SUBJECT: THAILAND: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PM
THAKSIN, FEBRUARY 14, 2005

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) The Ambassador met with Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra at Government House on February 14, 2005.
Although this meeting was billed as an official "courtesy
call," the Ambassador had met with Thaksin several times
since his arrival January 2 with the many high-level visits
for the tsunami relief effort and other events. PM Thaksin
was warm and friendly from the onset of the meeting,
welcoming the Ambassador back to Thailand, and recalling how
they had talked about the country's future during the
Ambassador's previous assignment to the Embassy. The
Ambassador congratulated Thaksin on his election landslide;
Thaksin expressed his appreciation for the President's
congratulatory telephone call. The PM said he looked forward
to hosting former Presidents Bush and Clinton in Phuket on
February 19. During discussion of the regional humanitarian
aid effort staged out of Utapao, Thaksin stressed his strong
support for bilateral cooperation and strengthening the
special relationship that the United States and Thailand
enjoy.


2. (C) The Ambassador asked Thaksin about next steps and
policy initiatives now that Thai Rak Thai (TRT) is solely in
control of the Lower House of Parliament. Thaksin said that
the House will reconvene on March 4 and, after selecting a
new Speaker, will officially choose a prime minister. The
new cabinet will be in place by March 18. He said that in
his second term, the economic emphasis will be more on
"supply and efficiency," and refined market-oriented
policies.


3. (C) On the FTA, Thaksin said that, with the election
campaign now behind us, the talks could proceed. He reminded
the Ambassador twice that it was he, Thaksin, who had
proposed the FTA in the first place. Thaksin said he had
promised the President that the FTA would be comprehensive.
The Ambassador spoke about the need to educate the Thai
public on the benefits that would derive from an FTA.
Thaksin said that he preferred the use of the word
"discussion" to "negotiation" because it carried more of an
image of equals working together. (Note: Finance Minister
Somkid Jatusripitak introduced this concept in the
Ambassador's meeting with him two weeks ago. End Note.)
Pansak Vinyaratn, one of the PM's close advisors, interjected
that, while official Thai negotiators had been named, it was
time now to "empower" discussions with Somkid and his team.
(Note: Somkid may not retain the Finance portfolio, but
seems headed for an economic management and policy oversight
role. End Note.) Pansak implied that the Somkid discussions
would be a parallel track with the actual primary negotiating
team. Thaksin expressed interest in the shift of USTR
Zoellick to State, asking whether Zoellick would retain
interest in the FTA talks as Deputy Secretary if confirmed.


4. (C) Thaksin began assessed the violence in the South in
familiar terms. He complained about the spread of bad
Islamic theology through some pondoks (Islamic schools). He
said more arrests would be made to break up the network of
false teachers. He asserted an Indonesia connection, noting
that some separatists traveled to Medan. At one point,
Thaksin characterized the situation as "all political," in
which even some members of Parliament were involved in
fomenting problems. Even some candidates from his own TRT
party who lost in the election, bent on revenge, could
complicate matters, he said. Thaksin acknowledged that some
change in his southern strategy was needed, but described it
only as more of a focus on "peacekeeping." (Note: The
Thaksin administration is continuing plans to beef up the
number of military troops in the deep South, claiming that
their primary responsibilities will be civic affairs. End
Note.)


5. (C) The Ambassador raised the Ford case and Thaksin said
it had some legal ramifications. Pansak interjected that the
Thai government was trying to make accommodations and come to
an agreement. He said that the emphasis was on forging a
settlement and not prosecuting Ford. However, since Ford had
acted on bad legal and tax advice and done something wrong, a
solution that takes into account those actions was necessary.
However, a lower fine would be possible, he said.


6. (C) The Ambassador also brought up the Thai fighter
aircraft purchase, called for transparency in the decision,
and spoke about the capabilities of the F-16, which is
already in Thailand's inventory. Thaksin said the priority
is not so much on the aircraft itself as a policy to
"expedite exports." This led to a brief discussion of
chickens and countertrade. The Ambassador argued that
interoperability, military capabilities, and long-term costs
should be primary considerations, but Thaksin stayed with his
emphasis on the importance of export implications.


7. (C) On another advocacy issue the Ambassador raised, the
Engine Alliance (Pratt & Whitney and GE) interest in
supplying engines for the new Thai Airbus purchase, Thaksin
seemed confused on the facts of the bid. He assumed that
Pratt & Whitney was somehow out of the picture, and spoke of
a possible teaming up of GE and Rolls Royce (the key rival).


8. (C) The Ambassador raised the matter of a follow-on Thai
military contingent in Iraq, noting that we looked forward to
a positive decision on that issue. Thaksin indicated only
that it was still under consideration.
BOYCE