ALLAWI AND SUNNI ARAB PARTIES CONSIDER BROADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005155

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: ALLAWI AND SUNNI ARAB PARTIES CONSIDER BROADER
COALITION

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sunni Arab political party leaders reported
to PolOffs December 29 that they are headed towards a
government coalition alliance with both Ayad Allawi's
National Iraqi List and the Kurdish Alliance and eventually
later with the Shia Islamists. However, our Sunni Arab
contacts also stress that they need a serious investigation
and "more balanced" results of the December 15 election.
Allawi aides told us they await talks with the Kurds about
joining a coalition government, and one top aide mused to
us December 29 about being in a loyal opposition. We think
Allawi is still interested in joining a coalition. END
SUMARY.

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Iraqi Islamic Party Moving on Two Tracks Now
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2. (C) Ayad Samarai, number two in the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP),told PolOff December 29 that the his party needs a
serious response to its call for an international
investigation of the December 15 election results. Without
such a response, he feared, the Sunni Arab public would not
understand subsequent Islamic Party cooperation with or in
the next government. He added that the IIP had agreed with
President Talabani to move forward simultaneously on two
paths: one, to investigate claims of electoral fraud while
also moving on a path towards discussing the formation of a
new government.


3. (C) Samarai confirmed they had planned to attend
meetings this week for negotiations with Allawi in
Sulaymaniyah and the Kurds in Irbil, but they did not
attend due to logistical problems. Samarai said they plan
to meet soon with Allawi and the Kurds.

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Sunni Arabs and International Monitors
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4. (C) Samarai also relayed that Tawafuq leaders will meet
Saturday with UN experts reviewing IECI's vote-counting
process. He said there was a productive three hour meeting
December 28 with the United Nations Special Representative
of the Secretary General Ashraf Qazi and other major
political coalitions - National Dialogue and Tawafuq - to
pressure Qazi for more international elections review
experts.


5. (C) Samarai welcomed the news from PolOff that the
Ambassador had yesterday personally asked SRSG Qazi and the
election commission to bring more international observers
to Iraq to review the process. Samarai said this would
have a very helpful psychological effect among Iraq's Sunni
Arab community to get them to accept the election results.
He said it will show that Tawafuq - the most influential of
the Sunni Arab blocs - can influence the IECI. The goal of
the Tawafuq, Samarai emphasized, is a national unity
government. (Comment: Tariq al-Hashemi, the head of the
IIP, separately told PolCouns December 29 that the news
that the International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE)
were sending more people was very positive. We are trying
to get Hashemi to issue a press statement late December 29
to this effect. End Comment.)

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Negotiating a Government
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6. (C) Mahmoud Mashadani, a member of the Iraqi Council of
National Dialogue (ICND),told PolOff December 29 they want
to form a broader coalition with Allawi and the Kurds, but
their goal is to ensure that Allawi doesn't get his choice
for the new ministers of Interior and Defense. Mashadani
said they might announce such a coalition soon. He added
that National Dialog Council members were meeting today to
list their own candidates for the two ministerial
positions.


7. (C) Sheik Abdul Nasir al-Janabi, a harder line member of
the ICND, told PolOff December 29 that Sunnis are 40
percent of Iraq's population, and 50 percent of Baghdad's
population. Thus, he wanted the seat allocation in the
Council of Representatives to reflect this. Despite
PolOff's reply that the Sunni Arab percentage of Iraq is
much smaller, al-Janabi persisted. (Note: Abdel Nasser
reflects what we hear from many Sunni contacts that are
having trouble accepting that Baghdad, built by Jafar al-
Mansur, a Sunni Arab general 1,300 years ago, is now a
majority Shia city. End Comment.)


8. (C) Dr. Hassan al-Bazazz, a Tawafuq member and
University of Baghdad Political Science professor, told
PolOff December 29 that the mood within the Tawafuq
until yesterday had been optimistic about forming an
alliance with Allawi and the Kurds. But after statements
by Masoud Barzani and Abdulaziz al-Hakim yesterday implying
the Kurds and Shia are less enthusiastic about this
alliance, the Tawafuq members felt as if they are "back to
square one." (Comment: al-Hakim told the Kurdish
parliament on December 28 that the next government should
be a national unity government but that ministerial
distribution within the government should be based on
election results. Sunni Arabs want to have more than
roughly 1/5 of the key government posts. End Comment.)
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MARAM TO MEET DECEMBER 31 - URGED TO ISSUE STATEMENT
WELCOMING OBSERVERS AND PROMISING TO COOPERATE
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9. (C) Ibrahim al-Janabi, Chief of Staff to Dr. Ayad
Allawi, told PolOff December 29 that the MARAM group -
which is comprised of the National Iraqi List, Tawafuq, the
National Dialogue, and over 40 smaller political entities -
will meet again December 31. The group has not met since
December 26. PolOff urged al-Janabi to have MARAM issue a
statement that welcomes the international monitors from the
International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE) and
promises to cooperate with them. Al-Janabi agreed that
political parties must accept the conclusions of any report
issued by the monitors. Al-Janabi also said the National
Iraqi List is prepared to meet with the international
monitors. (Comment: Allawi told the Ambassador December
29 that he would issue a statement welcoming the stepped up
international role in reviewing the election process. End
Comment.)


10. (C) Al-Janabi said that Dr. Allawi still has not been
invited to Sulaymaniyah to meet with President Talabani.
He added that is the democratic right of the largest
parties (the Shia and Kurdish Alliances) to negotiate with
each other, but he sees two possible outcomes: (1) these
two parties form a government, but they must allow those
excluded to be a real opposition (mentioning the idea of a
shadow government); and (2) these two parties invite the
others to join a national unity government, but it must be
based on the idea of equal shares for the government
formation/ministry distribution, regardless of their
success at the ballot box. (Note: It is still not clear if
Al-Janabi believes the National Iraqi List would be one of
these entities, or whether these would be limited in
practice to the Shia Alliance, the Sunni Arab bloc, and the
Kurdish Alliance. End Note.)


11. (C) Comment: We have been urging the Sunni Arab
Tawaffuq, the Allawi camp and the Kurds all to link up
before negotiating with the Shia. We sense progress in
that area although it is slow. There is more progress
between the Allawi camp and the Sunni Arabs, but that
results in part from their all being in Baghdad, and the
Kurdish leadership being up north. Despite posturing by
lower-level Sunni Arabs leaked into western press, the
political party leaders reiterated today their desire to
form a national unity government with fair representation.
Their main concern at the moment, however, is to show their
constituencies that they are pressuring the IECI to produce
transparent, accurate election results. Their response to
increased international observer participation through UN
efforts is encouraging. This stepped-up role could give
credibility to the elections results within the potentially
volatile Sunni Arab community.

KHALILZAD