Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD5131
2005-12-27 12:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ELECTION UPDATE: OCV DOES NOT CHANGE RESULTS,

Tags:  PNAT PGOV PTER KDEM IZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005131 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015
TAGS: PNAT PGOV PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ELECTION UPDATE: OCV DOES NOT CHANGE RESULTS,
DEBAATH COMMISSION WINS, AND FEMALE REPRESENTATION
PROJECTED LOWER

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 05087

B. B. BAGHDAD 05052

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Michael Oreste for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005131

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015
TAGS: PNAT PGOV PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ELECTION UPDATE: OCV DOES NOT CHANGE RESULTS,
DEBAATH COMMISSION WINS, AND FEMALE REPRESENTATION
PROJECTED LOWER

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 05087

B. B. BAGHDAD 05052

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Michael Oreste for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).



1. (C) Summary: Preliminary counts from the over 300,000 out-
of-country and 200,000 special voting ballots show the
largest
number of votes going to the Shia Coalition (36.6%) followed
by
the Kurdish Coalition(30%) and National Iraqi List (11%).
When
added into the preliminary totals, these votes do not alter
the
Council of Representative seat distribution projected by Post
(ref A). These numbers are still preliminary and subject to
change, especially depending on the results of the IECI's
complaint investigation (1,600 complaints overall with 35
"red"
or serious complaints).


2. (C) (Summary cont.) If Post's analysis holds, this CoR
may
hold a slightly lower number of female parliamentarians than
the
previous TNA. Candidate lists also will be affected by the
Transitional Electoral Panel's (TEP) decision to uphold the
DeBa'athification Commission's exclusive authority to decide
whether candidates are subject to de-ba'athification and,
therefore, should be disqualified. Meanwhile, UNAMI is
seeking
greater involvement by the International Mission for Iraq
Elections (IMIE) in response to demands from various parties
for
an outside international committee that would be able to
verify
results and address the allegations of fraud. End Summary.


3. (C) The IECI announced in its press conference December 26
that it had counted 90 percent of the OCV and Special Voting
votes, which only represents about five percent of the total
vote. After incorporating OCV and special voting data
provided
by the IECI, Post still calculated the same previously
calculated Council of Representatives seat distribution ?
with
the Shia Alliance obtaining 131 seats, the Kurdish Alliance
obtaining 53 seats, and Tawaffuq winning 41 seats. This
count
continues to put the Shia Alliance in a very strong lead; it
would need only 53 more votes to reach a two-thirds voting
majority necessary to elect the Presidency Council. Results

from
the Turkey OCV has not yet been included in the final numbers
due to concerns about fraud.


4. (C) In a surprise decision, the Transitional Electoral
Panel
(TEP),decided on December 24 to uphold the National
Deba'athification Commission's (NDC) appeal of the IECI's
initial decision not to disqualify any candidates on de-
ba'athification grounds (reftel B). Given this decision, the
IECI has decided that it must disqualify all of the now 90
candidates the NDC asserts are covered by the
Deba'athification
Law. On December 26, International IECI Commissioner Craig
Jenness told Poloffs that the IECI would give parties time to
propose alternate candidates from its lists, and would wait
until December 28 before beginning to disqualify candidates.
Post projects that only three candidates would be directly
affected by this decision: Adnan Al-Janabi, Rasim Husain A-
Awadi, and Abd Al-Lateef Al Badri, all List 731 National
Iraqi
List members. (Comment: Given the Sunni reaction to the
preliminary election results, post is concerned about the
additional negative reaction the TEP decision will engender
in
Sunni groups. Under relevant CPA Memorandum No. 7 and CPA
Order
No. 100, the Prime Minister maintains the authority to
reverse
De-ba'athification decisions of the NDC if it is "in the
interests of the Iraqi people" or if the NDC decision would
be
"fundamentally unfair." Both post and the UK intend to
engage
the PM on this option, though he likely will be quite
reluctant
to make such a decision. End comment.)


5. (C) Post estimates that, given the current data, the
number
of women who win seats in parliament would reach 66, slightly
lower than the 25 percent quota called for by the
constitution
and significantly lower than the 84 female TNA members. On
December 26, Craig Jenness told Poloff that the UN advisors
may
consider suggesting that compensatory seat candidate lists be
submitted with a female candidate every 2, 5, 8 and place, to
ensure a slightly higher representation of female
representation
in the CoR.


6. (C) Complaints now have risen above 1700, with 38
considered
to be the "red" complaints. Of these complaints, the most
serious one is an allegation that in Baghdad 45 ballot boxes
were taken and stuffed with fraudulent ballots. If true, this
allegation may result in over 22,000 false votes, which could
alter the Baghdad results by one seat.


7. (C) The Allawi's coalition and the Sunni Arabs still
express
deep concerns over the results of the elections and question
the
credibility of the process. IMIE Representative Nora
Kankashian
told PolOff on December 26 that based on an invitation from
SRSG
Qazi, IMIE has drafted a plan to quickly increase their
presence
in Iraq to cover the remainder of the electoral process,
especially the complaints review. Since the draft plan still
has not been approved by IMIE headquarters in Canada,
Kankashian
stated she could not provide any details. However, she
expressed confidence that the plan would be approved and that
personnel could be dispatched, most likely from Amman.


8. (C) Despite overall positive preliminary reports by IMIE
as
well as the Iraqi Elections Information Network (EIN),
Kankashian still expressed concerns over how the complaints
process was being handled, and opined to PolOff that the
process
was going too slowly and yielded few tangible results. She
was
particularly concerned over the recent IECI audit conducted
on
the Baghdad votes, an event that the IECI invited
international
observers and domestic monitors to attend. She described the
audit as confusing and ineffective, with the IECI staff
seemingly unable to adequately explain the process or the
intent. According to Kankashian, several political party
agents
hastily departed the audit, demonstrating their
dissatisfaction
with the conduct of that exercise. In addition to concerns
over
the domestic elections, she stated that IMIE remained
concerned
over the OCV vote in Istanbul, and expects the IECI to
conduct a
prompt and thorough investigation of those problems.


9. (C) Comment: As per the UN's previously stated election
timeline, the IECI will most likely not finish hammering out
election certification until early January. While there are
some "bumps" in the process ? characterized by the backlash
the
announcement of partial results has engendered, it does not
seem
likely that the results will change significantly - even
after
all the complaints are certified. The biggest challenge for
the
IECI continues to be a public image issue, which with the aid
of
IMIE it will hopefully begin to address.
KHALILZAD