Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD5081
2005-12-21 14:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IECI SCRUTINIZES COMPLAINT PROCESS AMIDST

Tags:  PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005081 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: IECI SCRUTINIZES COMPLAINT PROCESS AMIDST
HEIGHTENED SUNNI ARAB CLAIMS OF ELECTION FRAUD


Classified By: Robert Political Counselor S. Ford
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005081

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: IECI SCRUTINIZES COMPLAINT PROCESS AMIDST
HEIGHTENED SUNNI ARAB CLAIMS OF ELECTION FRAUD


Classified By: Robert Political Counselor S. Ford
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (U) See paragraph 12 for recommended press
guidance.


2. (C) Summary: On December 21 there were more
denunciations of election fraud while the election
commission investigated specific charges and complete
the vote count. UN election team leader Jenness told
us December 21 that the number of complaints had
reached 1,100 but only two dozen appeared serious.
None of those was likely to change the results of even
a single seat in the 275 member future parliament, he
said. He added he would work with the Iraqi election
commissioners to try to get ahead of the media
coverage of fraud allegations. Poloffs talked with a
series of Sunni Arab political leaders, urging that
they drop their call for a rerun of the Baghdad
election and that they tone down their rhetoric in the
media while the election commission does its work. We
can expect even more Sunni Arab unhappiness when they
see how the parliamentary seat numbers are shaping up
that will give the Shia 555 list a wide margin over
the Sunni Arabs. Over the longer term, we have to
focus Sunni Arab attention on how to join the
government and protect their interests from inside the
cabinet. End Summary.

--------------
IECI AND UNAMI ADDRESS SUNNI ARAB CONCERNS
--------------


3. (C) Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI)
UN Commissioner Craig Jenness told PolCouns on
December 21 that the IECI complaint review process is
moving forward amidst public dissatisfaction from
Sunni Arab political parties. Jenness stated that
earlier in the day SRSG Ashraf Qazi met with Tariq al-
Hashimi from the Iraqi Consensus Front (Tawafuq List
618) where al-Hashimi called the electoral process
into question, disputed the preliminary results for
Baghdad, and demanded a rerun of the election in
Baghdad. Qazi countered these claims and told al-
Hashimi that the IECI took all election-related
allegations seriously. According to Jenness, Qazi
urged al-Hashimi to tone down the rhetoric and not
over-politicize the process while the IECI continued
with its administrative investigations.


--------------
A Technician's View: Still a Clean Election
--------------


4. (C) Jenness emphasized to PolCouns that the IECI
was acting on all complaints that were sent to the
IECI, which currently number over 1,100. (The number
is still growing, but more slowly, as the voting
materials are processed at the Tally Center.) Jenness
pointed out that given nearly 32,000 polling stations,
the over 350,000 registered observers and monitors for
these elections, and the wide-reaching public outreach
campaign on the complaint process, the actual number
of complaints is not surprising and represents an
average of one complaint for every thirty polling
stations. Jenness doubted that the 25 "red"
complaints to date would do more than change some
ballot boxes or at most a few polling stations
nationwide. He admitted, however, that the IECI
lacked a credible public relations campaign regarding
their response to the complaints, and promised to beef
up their PR programs starting with the press
conference scheduled for later in the day.


5. (C) Jenness pointed out that pre-election complaint
investigations resulted in fines of 5 million Iraqi
Dinar (about USD $3500) levied against nine political
parties. While that amount is not very large, it
still demonstrated the IECI's resolved to see
administrative investigations through to their proper
completion. Post-election investigations, he pointed
out, could result in sanctions that include voiding
ballots for a specific ballot box, polling station, or
even a polling center, depending on the severity and
extent of the violation. This type of sanction
represents a potential loss of thousands of votes.

--------------
The Sunni Arabs Make their Case
--------------


6. (C) In separate telephone conversations with Poloff
on December 21 Tawafuq Front leaders Adnan al-Duleimi
and Tariq al-Hashimi both stood by their protest of
the election results. Duleimi demanded a re-vote in
Baghdad. Poloff warned him to let the electoral
commission have a chance to study complaints and play
its role. Taking this dispute to the media right away
would only make the issue harder to solve, not easier,
Poloff said. There are many intermediate steps that
can be taken to address complaints short of a full-out
re-vote. Most seriously, Sunni leaders like Salah al-
Mutlak were using the complaints to threaten violence,
a step that could undo the progress made on December

15. Duleimi denounced Mutlak out of hand, insisting
that he does not represent the Sunni Arab community
and would not have won any seats in the election at
all without "outside" support. He insisted that he
opposed violence in any form and wanted a peaceful
resolution of the issue.


7. (C) Tareq al-Hashimi said he had held a positive
meeting on the subject with UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi that
morning and then reviewed the details of his
complaint. Hashemi said that there was no way to
properly evaluate the number of votes lost because of
fraud throughout Iraq. He said ballots had been
invalidated in Diyala, monitors turned away in Kirkuk,
and Basra Sunni Arabs had been mysteriously
disenfranchised. Some 63,000 people voted for his
list in Basra even though the Sunni Arabs there
represent some 25 percent of the population or some
200,000 voters. (Others put the Sunni Arab population
in Basra at about 5 percent, making the results about
as expected).


8. (C) Most seriously, Hashemi said, his observers had
found a major discrepancy in Baghdad between their
vote count observations and those ultimately announced
by the IECI. The Tawafuq observers counted 1,120,000
votes for the UIA and 660,000 for Tawafuq. The
ultimate announcement was off by several hundred
thousand, he said, bringing it to 1.4 million for UIA
and 440,000 for Tawafuq. He insisted that the Sunni
Arab community would not remain silent if its concerns
were not addressed. However, he stopped short of
calling for a re-vote. He also changed the subject
when Poloff asked for a copy of his internal tally
documents supporting his count.


9. (C) Abid Mutlak al-Jaburi, who headed the Sunni
Arab Tawaffuq List 618 in Kirkuk province, warned
PolCouns December 21 that the Baghdad numbers
announcement had changed the mood of the Sunni Arab
community dramatically. Now the Sunni Arabs felt the
Shia had cheated and the Sunni Arabs again were in a
corner. He said people had started asking him why
they should trust the Americans who appeared to be "in
league with Iran" against the Sunni Arabs. He urged
that there be new elections in Baghdad, as well as
Kirkuk and Basrah.


10. (C) PolCouns cautioned that a new election in
Baghdad was hard to imagine. He urged al-Jaburi to
remember the most important goal for the Sunni Arabs
was to share in the government and to maximize gains by
looking at alliances with the Kurds and the Allawi
list. PolCouns urged Jaburi to (a) keep Sunni threats
out of the media as compromises likely will be
necessary later; (b) weigh in with the Ulema Council -
with whom Jaburi speaks - to stay out of the media and
(c) let the election commission do its work. Jaburi
did not argue but complained that the Sunni Arabs had
to receive a gesture or the political momentum from
the election would be lost. (He thought reducing the
Shia 555 list down to 100 seats would be face-saving
enough. PolCouns reminded him that counting votes is
one thing and making political deals is another.)


11. (SBU) Separately, members of the Allawi List 731
hosted a meeting with the Tawaffuq List 618 and Sunni
Arab hard-liner Salih Mutlak's 667 list during which
they denounced alleged massive election fraud and
promised to pursue redress. The three lists, joined
by several smaller lists, announced they would form a
follow-up committee and, notably, a media and
communications committee as well. PolFSN at the
meeting reported that Abdel Nasser al-Janabi from the
Tawaffuq list bitterly criticized the U.S. for not
ensuring a clean election process. However, there was
no threat to stir up violence or boycott the next
assembly.

--------------
Comment
--------------

12. (C) So far, the announcement of the Baghdad
results seems to have caused the greatest heartburn to
the Sunni Arab community. Much of what we are hearing
is Sunni Arab angst at seeing that Baghdad may well
have a Shia Arab majority; this is an emotional as
well as political shock to many. We can anticipate
even more complaints when the Sunni Arab leaders
realize how many parliamentary seats the Shia
Islamists will capture compared to their own seats
(septel). We will be working in the days ahead to
keep the Sunni Arab politicos from taking such a hard-
line stand in the media about the election results
that they cannot retreat later. On one side we will
work with the UN and the IECI to try to make the
investigation process as serious as possible without
giving anyone the sense that the investigations will
dramatically change the results (they won't). On the
other side, we will also seek to focus Sunni Arabs on
setting themselves up with the Kurds and the Allawi
list to negotiate entry into the government from a
position of relative strength.


--------------
Press Guidance
--------------


13. (SBU) Post recommends following press guidance:

-- The IECI estimates voter turnout at about 70
percent, with over 10.8 million votes cast. This
represents an increase of about 2.5 million voters
from the January 2005 elections.

-- It is important that the Iraqi election be deemed
credible by the Iraqi public, and the IECI should
investigate allegations of fraud thoroughly.

-- The 1,100 complaints filed with the IECI to date
demonstrates the extent of observer coverage as well
as Iraqis' freedom to address potential cases of
fraud.

-- There were over 30,000 polling stations, and it is
important to keep the number of complaints in context.

-- The IECI has complaints from all political parties
and must treat all complaints fairly.

KHALILZAD