BUNKER INVESTIGATION FALTERS, NATIONWIDE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 005020

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PGOV PINS KJUS IZ
SUBJECT: BUNKER INVESTIGATION FALTERS, NATIONWIDE
INSPECTIONS GATHER STEAM

REF: A. BAGHDAD 4745

B. BAGHDAD 4921

Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs
David C. Litt for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S/REL GBR AUS) The committee appointed by PM
Ja'afari to investigate abuse discovered by Coalition
Forces on November 13 at the Ministry of the Interior
"Bunker" site in Jadiriyah has made little progress.
On December 13, Deputy Prime Minister Rowsh Shaways
passed Post the committee's first report, a slender
two-page letter to the PM that reflects little
independent investigation, glosses over evidence of
abuse presented by the USG, and requests additional
time to complete its work.


2. (S/REL GBR AUS) Conversely, the joint ITG-USG
committee established separately to inspect and report
on Iraqi detention facilities nationwide has prepared
substantive reports on its December 8 inspection of
the MOI Special Police Commando facility at Site 4,
which discovered 625 detainees held in overcrowded,
filthy facilities, some suffering from serious
injuries. The committee will present their report to
the PM and MOI in the coming days; joint inspections
will resume directly following the election.

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"THE AMERICANS, THEY HAD NO PERMISSION TO ENTER..."
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3. (S/REL GBR AUS) On December 9, Rule of Law
Coordinator, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence and Pol-MilOff met DPM Shaways at his
home to discuss progress on investigations into human
rights abuses at the MOI Bunker. The DPM, recently
returned from the north, asked if the USG had noticed
any "irregularities" in the committee meetings held in
his absence, which were chaired by Minister of State
for National Security Affairs Safa al Din al Safi.


4. (S/REL GBR AUS) ROL Coordinator noted that little
effort had been made by the committee to move forward.
Shaways nodded. "I told you before," he said, "that
the composition of the committee may not be neutral.
The viewpoint of the PM himself will impact the
ability of the committee to operate freely. And with
the situation of the election - even if you put
something down that is correct, it can be made
political."


5. (S/REL GBR AUS) ROL Coordinator asked if DPM
Shaways was still considering, as he had previously
mentioned (see Reftel A),seeking the replacement of
committee members. The DPM shrugged and spread his
hands. "The committee was appointed by the PM by
name," he said. "What we can do - what we have tried
to do - is make the role of the Ministry of Human
Rights stronger."


6. (S/REL GBR AUS) The next day, ROL Coordinator, COS
C2, and Pol-MilOff attended the first committee
meeting held since the DPM's return. No MoHR personnel
were present. After a brief introduction by DPM
Shaways, MoS for TNA Affairs al Safi launched into a
verbal attack on MNF-I's legal authority to conduct
the November 13 search of the MOI Bunker which led to
the discovery of 168 detainees, of whom more than 100
showed signs of abuse.


7. (S/REL GBR AUS) "When US officials entered the
Bunker," al Safi said, "they were looking for a
specific person. When they found that person was not
there, it should have ended. Instead they took
inappropriate actions. They had no permission to
enter, to open everything up, to talk to detainees, to
take the evidence, to remove detainees without any
official order. This was illegal."


8. (S/REL GBR AUS) ROL Coordinator noted that
Coalition Forces had stepped into prevent ongoing
abuse in order to promote stability and security in
Iraq, in accordance with the legal authorities
provided by UNSCR 1546 and UNSCR 1637, as well as
principles of moral decency. Al-Safi jumped back in.
"We have investigated these detainees," he asserted,
"and they were all detained by the previous MOI. 90%
were associated with the former regime."

9. (S/REL GBR AUS) DPM Shaways broke back into the
conversation. "I am in charge of the committee," he
said, "and I want to hear what's been investigated. As
a committee, we need to focus on two points: did
torture happen in the Bunker, and were the detainees
held legally or not? Then we can decide whether people
can be punished for this under Iraqi law."


10. (S/REL GBR AUS) After a respectful pause, al Safi
resumed. "All of the evidence the US gave us has
discrepancies," he said. "This paper says that this
person died on this day. Where is the documentation?
In this paper, it says Ahmed died of starvation. There
is only one witness to this, a detainee. Who is Ahmed?
What are we supposed to think about this? This is
Iraq, there are lots of Ahmeds."


11. (S/REL GBR AUS) "There is evidence that detainees
in the Bunker were tortured," said DPM Shaways
wearily, "and there are pictures." "Who took the
pictures?" asked al-Safi, gesturing at the US
attendees. "There are witnesses that more than 100
were abused," said the DPM. "We have the names of
people working at the Bunker. We'll interview them,
investigate who was in charge, who they are linked
to."


12. (S/REL GBR AUS) Al Safi persisted: "MOI was
surprised when Coalition Forces entered like they
did, when they found the child they were looking for
was not there. Is the committee going to investigate
this as well? Was it legal for Coalition Forces to
enter the Bunker? Was it legal for them to remove the
detainees?" The meeting ended with al Safi insisting
that the USG had leaked falsified photos of abused
detainees to the Iraqi press.


13. (S/REL GBR AUS) Three days later, DPM Shaways
passed Post a copy of his committee's initial report.
Most of the report's scant two pages are taken up by a
list of meetings held; the remainder minimizes USG
reports of abuse, claiming that "after the preliminary
investigation, it was discovered that some of the
detainees had physical disabilities and organ-related
diseases which they pretended were the result of
torture."


14. (S/REL GBR AUS) "There are many objections on the
method through which the (Bunker) was raided, and the
way detainees and records were taken by MNF-I", the
report continues. As a way ahead, the committee notes
that it "needs more time". NOTE: the committee has had
more than a month to start substantive investigations.
END NOTE.

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"BAD BLANKET AND OTHER STUFF...VERY BAD PLACE"
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15. (S/REL GBR AUS) In contrast, Iraqi members of the
team assembled (with Post's and MNF-I's prodding) to
conduct nationwide detention facility inspections have
quickly produced high-quality initial reports on the
December 8 inspection of MOI's "Site 4" facility, even
in (or perhaps due to) the absence of a high-level
Iraqi lead following the resignation of PM military
aide MG Talib al Kinani.


16. (S/REL GBR AUS) Shortly after the inspection, the
Iraqi Inspectors General sub-committee forwarded Post
an English-language checklist completed on care and
custody at Site 4. The IGs assessed the site on a
pass/fail test on nearly seventy inspection criteria:
Site 4 passed two, "protection from elements (roof)"
and "adequate drinking water". It was given a failing
mark on all other criteria.

17. (S/REL GBR AUS) The IG sub-committee's report,
shared with Post on December 13, is consistent with
the report provided by Post in Reftel B, and contains
strong criticism of Site 4's conditions, overcrowding,
and management. The IGs also describe evidence of
serious physical abuse and possible torture, including
a detainee who "had been beaten with a water pipe, and
there were clear signs all over his body".


18. (S/REL GBR AUS) The Iraqi MoHR produced a ten-
page report listing extensive abuses discovered during
the same inspection. "Detainees (at Site 4) sleep on
the ground using cardboard and in a mad state of over-
crowdedness," says the MoHR, adding that "all the
detainees suffer from malnutrition." Lists of alleged
murders associated with the facility are attached.


19. (S/REL GBR AUS) The MoHR report also documents
extensive procedural violations at Site 4, noting that
the lack of documentation for detainees on-site is in
violation of Iraqi law, that detainees have been
denied access to counsel, that MOI law enforcement
personnel acting as guards have not been trained in
detention operations, and that Site 4, like all MOI
detention facilities aside from police station jails,
should be transferred to the control of the Ministry
of Justice.


20. (S/REL GBR AUS) Both reports, as well as an
independent (but similar) report prepared by MNF-I,
will be bundled and presented to Minister Jabr and PM
Ja'afari later this week. Iraqi committee members have
requested consultation with the Ministries of
Interior, Defense, Justice, Labor, Health, and Human
Rights on next steps, and have made a number of
specific suggestions for reform.


21. (S/REL GBR AUS) Iraqi members of the committee
continue to report intimidation from MOI officials.
Employees of Colonel Abbas have asked MOI personnel
for the addresses of two MOI IG officials working with
the committee; their homes are now apparently under
surveillance, and both are sleeping in their offices.
Rumor at MOI has it that both will be fired soon; ROL
Coordinator has protested to Minister Jabr.

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WAY AHEAD: PARALLEL INSPECTIONS
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22. (S/REL GBR AUS) New joint inspections of MOI and
MOD facilities are planned for the weeks of December
20 and 28; targeted sites include at least one
"secret" or unauthorized facility on which MNF-I C2
has developed intelligence. As noted before, we expect
to encounter systemic care and custody failures at
most Iraqi detention facilities inspected, and cases
of abuse and/or torture at many.


23. (S/REL GBR AUS) MNF-I also intends to conduct
rapid independent spot inspections of off-the-book
facilities identified by Iraqi (primarily Sunni)
interlocutors as locales at which illegal detention,
severe neglect, and physical abuse and/or torture are
practiced. The results of the USG inspections, which
we expect will start the week of December 19, will be
briefed to the responsible ministers and PM Ja'afari.

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COMMENT
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24. (S/REL GBR AUS) The ITG committee investigating
detainee abuse at the Jadiriyah Bunker has succumbed
to a combination of inexperience, ennui, and high-
level political incentives for inaction. DPM Shaways'
absence and temporary replacement by al Safi did not
help matters, and the committee's report indicates the
DPM may have little ability to re-direct the staff's
agenda from obfuscation to investigation.


25. (S/REL GBR AUS) Post will make it clear to the PM
that we are disappointed at the Bunker committee's
lack of progress, and will note that the absence of a
full and open investigation into the credible
allegations of abuse that emerged from the impromptu
Bunker inspection will have a significant negative
impact on the Iraqi public's trust in the ITG's
interest in due process and rule of law.


26. (S/REL GBR AUS) The reports of the joint ITG-USG
team investigating Iraqi detention facilities
nationwide should provide a stronger mechanism for
ensuring accountability for Iraqi officials implicated
abuses and promoting tangible change in Iraqi
detention operations. We anticipating an extended
Iraqi-led inspection regime including competent
medical triage, site evacuation, and legal review.


27. (S/REL GBR AUS) In the medium-term, ITG-USG
inspections - which by logistical necessity will
proceed at a slower, although steady, pace than USG-
only efforts - are key to the larger project of
building capacity for independent Iraqi monitoring
of human rights abuses and winning the trust of
the Iraqi public that the ITG and its successor
government have the capacity and will for honest
assessment and necessary reform.


28. (S/REL GBR AUS) Shorter-term, supplemental USG
inspections of locations believed by Iraqis to serve
as illegal and/or abusive detention sites are also
critical in re-assuring the Iraqi (and particularly
the Sunni) public that we hear their concerns, and
are prepared to act rapidly on credible intelligence
and information on human rights abuses shared by
Sunni contacts while we work with the ITG to establish
independent Iraqi inspection capacity.
KHALILZAD