CAMPAIGN TONE GETS SHARPER, MORE INTENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005002

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN TONE GETS SHARPER, MORE INTENSE

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 4960

B. B. BAGHDAD 4924

C. C. BAGHDAD 4906

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) With just one day before the elections,
campaigning for the December 15 elections has been intense,
incredibly more personal, organized and criminal than the
campaign in January. This has included inter-sectarian
conflicts: the destruction of Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU)
offices by forces allegedly aligned with the large Kurdish
parties and United Islamic Alliance (555) verbal assaults
on their secular and liberal Shias. Press reports and
conversations reveal targeted attacks on parties, using
sophisticated, pre-meditated methods that include threats,
kidnappings, and assassinations. In January, the fear was
related more to the insurgency and its ability to disrupt
the election of a transitional government. This time, with
the Sunnis guaranteed to participate in significantly more
numbers, the fear has turned to what will happen when one
or a few parties gain power, particularly since these
elections are for a 4-year permanent government. In all, in
comparison to the January 2005 contest, the stakes are
higher, the incidents of violence nastier and the rhetoric
has been ratcheted up to match. Iraqis know they have real
choices on December 15, and they can make their votes
count. It will be important for the parties and observers
who allege voting fraud to document their allegations
carefully and for the election commission to address them
seriously. The commission's disqualification of several
hundred thousand fraudulent votes in Irbil in January 2005
is an example of the kind of resolve the commission may
well need again. End Summary

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Allawi and Sunni Parties Come Out Swinging
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2. (U) Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's campaign has
stepped up its criticisms on the record of Prime Minister
Jafari's government, criticizing the current Shia Islamist
government for its failure to develop the economy and
restore security, and his latest poster does the same. He
also has underlines in his public remarks the risk of Iraq
falling into civil war if sectarian politics continue as
they are. Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs are accusing the
transitional government of helping the occupation; a
Tawafuq (618) TV ad bitterly condemns the "occupation" for
marginalizing people and then attacks the transitional
government for helping. List 618 campaign events also
condemn the government for violating human rights and
running secret prisons, playing off the news of the
Jadriyah investigation. National Dialogue Front slate
(List 667) leader Saleh Mutlak has TV ads stressing the
alleged sectarian tone of the Jafari government. Bordering
on the hysterical, Allawist Saad al-Janabi is using his own
al-Rasheed radio station to repeat the allegations
frequently heard from Sunni politicians that vigorously
accuse the Jafari government of arranging for one million
Iranians with fake identification and registration to vote
in the elections. On December 13, al-Rasheed radio issued
news reports about the discovery of a 6,000 man secret
prison operated by Iranian intelligence officers.

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Shia Islamists Firing Back
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3. (U) The Jafari government defended its record
releasing a 50-page document full of ITG achievements.
Meanwhile, United Islamic Alliance leader Abdel Aziz al-
Hakim lashed broadsides of his own not so subtly aimed at
Allawi and the Sunni Arabs. Al Furat TV, controlled by
SCIRI, reported that SCIRI head Abdul Aziz al Hakim offered
200,000 Badr Corps members to help ISF and IP provide
election security. In the same press conference, Badr
Corps head Hadi al-Amari said, "We used weapons against
Saddam, and are not afraid to use them if Baathists are
part of the government again." (A veiled threat to Allawi,
whom they consider as Baathist.) Prominent Da'wa political
leader Jwad Maliki, meanwhile, was on Al Furat December 13
evening warning viewers of the return of a "new Baath"
party through the election.

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Assassinations on the Rise
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4. (U) On December 7, election monitoring NGO IFES
(International Federation of Election Systems) released a
statement confirming that since November 10, there have
been 17 assassinations of political party members, sitting
officials, and religious figures with links to political
parties. Base on preliminary data, IFES suggested that
this number is expected to rise. (Prominent Sunni Arab
political figure and TV commentator Mizhar al-Dulaimi was
murdered while campaigning in Ramadi on December 13.)
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Unified Islamic Alliance Real Campaign
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5. (SBU) During January, IECI workers, candidates, and
party workers worried more about attacks by insurgents and
not by their fellow competitors. Now, campaign attacks are
perpetrated by other parties. Several Shia Islamist
campaign workers were murdered in Baghdad, according to
Iraqi press reports on December 10. In addition, this
campaign has seen the murder of campaign workers for
Allawi's list and a Christian list, the destruction of KIU
offices (ref B) and attacks on Allawi offices in the south.
(We received a call from the Allawi headquarters shortly
before dispatch of this cable that the Allawi list
headquarters in Nasiriyah was attacked midday December 14.)
Other parties have alleged that the Unified Islamisc
Alliance (555) has waged a war of dirty campaign tactics
that include murder and kidnapping (ref C),character
assassination, disinformation, bribes, house raids and de-
Ba'athification. Conclusive evidence is lacking, but most
allegations center on suspicion that the attacks in Baghdad
and the South benefit the UIA and that the attacks in
Kirkuk, Ninewa, and the North, benefit the Kurdish
alliance.


6. In addition, the campaign battle has extended to:

- (U) A POSTER WAR: Posters are an important means of
campaigning in Iraq. (Posters, unlike TV, are not
susceptible to electricity blackouts.) This is the most
frequent complaints by non-Shia Alliance parties. As an
example, negative campaigning in the form of anti-Ayad
Allawi posters and flyers have appeared, comparing Allawi
with Saddam Hussein and associating him with the Ba'athist
regime. One of these posters shows half of Saddam
Hussein's face and half of Ayad Allawi's face and asks,
"Who does this man remind you of?" Allawi's campaign and
Ali al-Dabbagh's campaigns have had their posters
systematically torn down, according to supporters of these
candidates.

- (C) HOUSE RAIDS AND ARRESTS: The Justice and Future
Coalition reported that several of their supporters have
been harassed by Badr Corps (555) policemen who raided
their homes under the guise of illegal weapons search.
Abdulrahim Nasrullah, leader of the Justice and Future
Coalition, added that many of the protective details have
yet to receive weapon permits from the police despite
repeated application. The police, aware of those awaiting
permits, come to their homes and arrest them. Allawi
officials have alleged similar intimidation in the southern
provinces.

- (U) CANDIDATE DEFECTIONS: SCIRI television station al-
Furat started advertising on December 8 that political
candidates from 5 parties had quit the political race in
order to support the Shia Alliance: Free Iraq Forum (503),
First Democratic National Party (617),Iraq Intifada
Gathering (671),Loyalty to Najaf (696),Imam Ali Society
(753).

- (C) PARTY DEFECTIONS: Al-Furat television also claims
that the Rise and Reform (707),Council of Misan Marshes
(655) and the Peace Organization for Shiite Kurds (810)
have dissolved their parties to vote for the Shia Alliance.
Several political contacts alleged that the Shia Alliance
registered these parties as shell parties in order to
defect with days before the elections.

- (C) DE-BA'ATHIFICATION: Answering the most serious
charges by Shia parties is that secular and Sunni parties
will bring back the Baathists if Iraqis vote for them. In
the Iraqi context, this is am explosive charge. Charges of
de-Baathification are a part of this. National De-
Ba'athification Commission board members who are UIA 555
politicians insisted the IECI remove candidates they
identified as Baathists. They went so far as to threaten
the IECI Board of Directors by saying that they would
publicly denounce the IECI for failing to comply with the
applicable De-Ba'athification laws.

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Comment
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7. (C) Over-the-top rhetoric is part of the rough and
tumble of emerging democracy, but in Iraq, this is part of
a larger pattern in which parties with militias have at
times operated more roughly. Solid evidence of who is
behind the assassinations, intimidation, and campaign dirty
tricks is, not surprisingly, hard to come by, but the
Iraqis who are complaining are rivals to the UIA (555) and
the Kurdish Alliance (730). Those complaining are the
weaker parties, and their complaints also could aim to
generate American pressure to even the playing field
somewhat. In any case, acts of violence and intimidation
will not foster democratic development in Iraq. The
Embassy and the United Nations have made public and private
statements against intimidation and fraud, including at the
Ambassador's December 13 press conference.


8. (C) Of particular concern are SCIRI's election-eve
charges of election fraud by the IECI, which has absolutely
no basis in fact of which we are aware. Even charges that
Ba'athists are trying to steal the election seem curious in
light of the limited influence that any Ba'athist elements
could possibly have on security procedures in Anbar and
elsewhere. This rhetoric could simply be a way of
motivating UIA (555) supporters to vote in the election.
However, this could be a prelude to justifying more serious
electoral fraud, in favor of, if notably the UIA, on
election day. The IECI has taken steps to counter election
fraud from any quarter, but the IECI has not shown itself
able to enforce rules against the use of religious symbols.
Our sense is that Iraqis know they have real choices and
they can make their votes count. It will be important on
December 15 for the parties complaining to document their
allegations carefully and for the election commission to
address the allegations seriously. The commission's
disqualification of several hundred thousand fraudulent
votes in Irbil in January 2005 is an example of the kind of
resolve the commission may well need again.

KHALILZAD