Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4891
2005-12-08 08:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SCIRI LEADER WARNS OF ELECTION FRAUD, BENDS ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINS KISL KDEM IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004891 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SCIRI LEADER WARNS OF ELECTION FRAUD, BENDS ON
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004891

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SCIRI LEADER WARNS OF ELECTION FRAUD, BENDS ON
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Over dinner with the Ambassador on
November 29, SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and
Interior Minister Bayan Jabr alleged the U.S. excludes
Iraqi security forces from operations against
insurgents and also warned of election fraud. Hakim's
aides noted that the constitutional requirement for a
two-thirds majority vote on the next Presidency
Council ensured that a broad coalition government will
emerge. Hakim reluctantly agreed with the Ambassador
that electoral candidates identified by the De-
Ba'athification Commission should be able to review
the evidence against them before being removed from
the election slates. Hakim also agreed that
provincial elections should be held several months
after the December 15 national election. Hakim said
he welcomes the USG decision to engage Iran at the
level of the Ambassador solely on matters relating to
Iraq's security, and he volunteered to pass messages
to further the dialogue. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 29 at his residence, the Ambassador
hosted SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, Interior
Minister Bayan Jabr, and deputy SCIRI leader Humam al-
Hammudi for dinner.


3. (C) SECURITY STRATEGY: Hakim expressed concern
that Iraqis lack a clear leader they could rely on to
improve security in Iraq. Too many officials making
decisions confuses the matter, he said. The
Ambassador and Minister Jabr both agreed that
improving security in Baghdad would be key to
stabilizing Iraq as a whole. Jabr complained that too
often he and Defense Minister Sa'adounDulaimi meet
and agree on policies only to see implementation fall
through at a lower level.


4. (C) Jabr asserted that U.S. commanders also impede
operations; as an example, he pointed to the
deployment of a U.S. brigade to a heavily-populated
area in Baghdad that should have included three times
as many Iraqi forces -- but Iraqi advice was ignored,
he said. Hakim added that U.S. military commanders
blocked a planned Iraqi operation in Diyala. Jabr

said he felt particularly hamstrung by allegations
that he is a sectarian Shia leader, not an Iraqi one.
(NOTE: He implied that this criticism came from both
U.S. and Iraqi sides. END NOTE.) Such criticism has
made him reluctant to dispatch his forces to Sunni
areas, he said, particularly Ramadi. Jabr added that
Election Day security is now his top priority.


5. (C) ELECTION FRAUD FEARS: Looking ahead to the
elections, Hakim told the Ambassador that he is
concerned that fraud will occur when IECI workers plug
their count into a computer program used to tally the
seats. He claimed that fraud of this nature cost the
Shia Alliance some 20 seats in the January elections.
(NOTE: We did not hear such an allegation last
February. END NOTE.) UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi dropped in
on the meeting and Hakim raised this concern directly
with him, requesting a copy of the election software
for review. Qazi pledged to look into the matter and
to arrange a meeting with SCIRI officials to discuss
election preparations in detail. Both Qazi and the
Ambassador emphasized that the surest path to
preventing fraud is sending monitors to polling
centers. Hamudi said the Shia Alliance has plans to
dispatch some 7,000 monitors on Election Day, some of
whom have benefited from National Democratic Institute
training. Qazi said the UN is requesting that the EU
supply monitors for the vote. Qazi also lamented that
the security situation represents a significant
obstacle.


6. (C) SPECULATING ON THE NEXT GOVERNMENT: Despite
entreaties from the Ambassador, Hakim declined to
predict the shape of the next government or the
election outcome. Hammudi noted that the
constitutional requirement for a two-thirds vote on
the next Presidency Council ensures that a broad
coalition government will emerge. Hakim claimed that
the Shia Alliance had been ready to include Ayad
Allawi and his coalition in the transitional
government, but he said Allawi rejected their offers.
Hakim claimed that Allawi insisted on the prime
ministership, and, when he could not attain it, chose
total opposition over cooperation. Jabr predicted
Allawi would win only 15 seats in the coming election,
with Chalabi winning 3-5.


7. (C) DIALOGUE WITH IRAN: Hakim welcomed the U.S.
decision to engage Iran at the level of the Ambassador
on matters relating to Iraq's security. Hakim
volunteered to pass messages to further the dialogue.
He urged the U.S. to continue pursuing a policy of
pressuring Syria in order to achieve control over the
western border.


8. (C) CAIRO IRAQI ACCORD CONFERENCE: Hakim said he
considers the Cairo Conference a success that will
hamper the insurgency's ability to de-legitimize the
Iraqi government. Hammudi, who shook hands with
Muslim Ulema Council leader Harith al-Dari during the
conference, noted that Dari refused to acknowledge
that Sunni and Shia share a religion. Hammudi said
his subsequent meeting with Grand Imam of Al-Azhar al-
Tantawi was much better. Hammudi defended the final
statement from the Cairo Conference as a clear
denunciation of all violence in Iraq. When showed the
exact text and the implication that attacks on
Coalition Forces could be justified, Hammudi made no
attempt to rebut. Jabr agreed that this particular
language had not been helpful.


9. (C) DE-BA'ATHIFICATION OF CANDIDATES: The
Ambassador told Hakim that candidates accused of being
Ba'athists should have the opportunity to review the
evidence against them before being purged from the
candidate lists. Hakim initially argued back. He
said the De-Ba'athification Commission had the
authority to make such judgments on its own. PolCouns
observed that several of the 80 candidates thus far
accused of being senior Ba'athists appeared to be
innocent of the charge. PolCouns asked Hammudi how
his own constitution committee deputy, Adnan al-
Janabi, could be a Ba'athist. Hammudi expressed
surprise that Janabi was on the list and claimed he
was not. When the Ambassador confirmed that Adnan al-
Janabi is on the De-Baathification Commission's list,
Hammudi and Hakim acknowledged that a review of the
evidence would be a fair step before any action is
taken.


10. (C) PROVINCIAL ELECTION TIMING: The Ambassador
suggested that the provincial elections be put off
until several months after the national elections.
The proposed date of February 15 included in some
draft legislation, he said, is too early for proper
security measures to be planned. Hakim agreed and
said he considered conducting the provincial elections
simultaneously with the referendum on constitutional
amendments, which is scheduled for six months after
the stand-up of the next National Assembly. Jabr also
was supportive of moving the election date back.
(NOTE: On December 4, the TNA passed an amended
version of the provincial elections law, which sets
the elections for "two months after the formation of
the new government." END NOTE.)
KHALILZAD