Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4865
2005-12-06 12:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FRENCH DCM PESSIMISTIC ABOUT IRAQ PROSPECTS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER FR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004865 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER FR IZ
SUBJECT: FRENCH DCM PESSIMISTIC ABOUT IRAQ PROSPECTS


Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford, for
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004865

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER FR IZ
SUBJECT: FRENCH DCM PESSIMISTIC ABOUT IRAQ PROSPECTS


Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford, for
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY Only the Iraqis will be able to solve their
problems, and the US should stay out of it said French DCM
Franck Gellet in a December 4 meeting with Poloff. The
insurgency will continue for some time even with concessions
to the Sunni Arabs, key among them, according to Gellet, a
definitive statement of intent to withdraw and reconstitution
of Iraq's Army, including its generals. Even then, Iraq will
not be democratic. It will require a strong central
authority, difficult, said Gellet, with the current
"unworkable" federal Constitution. At the same time, Gellet
expressed a desire for regular meetings and offered to assist
with advice and contacts. End Summary


2. (C) French DCM Franck Gellet met with Poloff on December 4
to inquire about US policies in Iraq and to present French
Government views on Iraq's prospects. Gellet said that the
meeting reflected French interest in regular meetings and
readiness to assist with advice and contacts.

France Not Happy with the Iraqi Constitution
--------------


3. (C) Gellet said the Constitution was defective because it
did not incorporate Sunni Arab views. Poloff pointed out
that there is a mechanism to adjust the Constitution after
the election, when the Sunni Arabs are expected to be better
represented in the National Assembly. Gellet then criticized
the decentralization of power in the Constitution. The
French feel such a model is not workable - a strong central
authority is needed, especially in Iraq, a country with
little experience in democracy.

Let the Arabs Decide Among Themselves
--------------


4. (C) The Arab League (AL) Reconciliation effort is a good
start, said Gellet, the Arabs should decide contentious
issues among themselves. Once the parties realize that the
Coalition will leave eventually, they will start to deal
seriously with each other. The U.S. cannot really expect to
make significant progress in stopping the insurgency or in
resolving the key issues separating the Shi'a, Sunni and
Kurds, they must do it themselves. Poloff told Gellet that

the USG is very supportive of the AL process and is keeping a
hands off policy, but without prodding, it is unlikely that
the parties will reach resolution on key issues within a
reasonable time frame. We will continue to dialogue with the
parties and urge resolution of key issues even as they do so
among themselves.

Tactical Error on UNSC Resolution
--------------


5. (C) Gellet said that the USG made a tactical error in
requesting a one-year extension in the Coalition mandate.
All the parties in Iraq want the Coalition to stay in Iraq
for the time being, and if we had asked for a three month
extension, we would have forced the Sunnis to ask us to stay
longer. That would have provided a valuable public relations
bonus for us with little risk. In times of better bilateral
relations, the French would offer this advice directly, but
at this time, Gellet said, the French advice would be
misinterpreted.

The Keys to Sunni Engagement
--------------


6. (C) According to Gellet, Harith Al-Dhari can best broker
an end to the insurgency and two issues are key -- a firm
announcement that the Coalition will withdraw from Iraq, and
reconstitution of the Iraqi Army, including its former
generals. A timetable for withdrawal is not needed but,
despite the repeated public assurances from the USG, the
Sunnis are not yet convinced that the withdrawal will
actually take place. Poloff countered that our Sunni
interlocutors raise other serious issues of concern and
senior former military offices do not expect to be
reinstated. Such a proposal was unlikely to be accepted by
the Shi'a and Kurds. Gellet countered that prisoner
releases are viewed as a sign of weakness by the Sunni Arab
insurgents and win us little leverage. Even with a direct
dialogue with Al-Dhari and other interlocutors, we cannot
expect a quick end to the insurgency. The insurgents view us
as occupiers and cannot collaborate with us. Having never
been occupied, the US cannot appreciate this factor - the
French can, said Gellet. Poloff raised the issue of Iraq's
neighbors, Syria and Iran, who have an interest in continued
instability in Iraq. Gellet warned that the US should not
destabilize Syria, because the implications of such a
destabilization would be far reaching.
Best Case, Iraq will be Stable, but not Democratic
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Once again alluding to France's experience as a
colonial power experienced in battling insurgency, Gellet
said that the US can find a way to exit Iraq while saving
face, but it is unrealistic to expect Iraq to be democratic.
In the best case scenario, Iraq will be stable and at peace,
but that will require a strong central government.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Gellet was unapologetic for his views. Despite his
lecturing tone, he was clear that he hoped dialogue between
the two Embassies will continue. We will use subsequent
conversations with his Mission to continue to urge a more
constructive stance.

KHALILZAD