Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4847
2005-12-05 08:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

LEADING SUNNI ARAB SLATE REP ON ELECTIONS, U.S.

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KISL MOPS IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004847 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/15
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: LEADING SUNNI ARAB SLATE REP ON ELECTIONS, U.S.
ROLE IN IRAQ

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004847

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/15
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: LEADING SUNNI ARAB SLATE REP ON ELECTIONS, U.S.
ROLE IN IRAQ

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: A leading Sunni Arab coalition
representative recounted the Sunni Arab sense of grievance
and estrangement from the political transition process, and
asserted the solution to the security problem is a "balanced"
government (read: more Sunni officials) and "professional"
security forces devoid of sectarian bias. While lamenting
the "deficiencies" of the American "occupation" of Iraq, he
acknowledged USG advocacy for Sunni participation and
proposed a process for withdrawal that he claimed would
culminate in a positive relationship between the United
States and Iraq. He predicted 90 percent of the Sunni
community would vote in the December 15 elections, but feared
ballot-stuffing. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloff met December 3 with Imad Mohamed Ali, the
secretary general of the Sunni political party, the General

SIPDIS
Conference for the Iraqi People. Ali said he was speaking on
behalf of the Iraqi Consensus Coalition (Tawafoq),the
leading Sunni list, which also includes the Iraqi Islamic
Party (IIP) and the Iraqi National Dialogue Council. Ali
denied that Tawafoq has a religious coloration. Although
admittedly the IIP has a religious orientation, he claimed
the Conference and Council parties are composed of secular,
liberal, tribal and religious Iraqis. Ali estimated that 90
percent of the Sunni community would vote in the December 15
elections. Tawafoq expects to pick up much of this support,
although Ali said Sunni tribal leaders would draw support
from their respective tribes (e.g., Dulaymi, Jabbouri, and
Shammar). He predicted the list headed by Mithal al-Alusi
would do poorly, because of his visit to Israel and because
many in the Sunni Arab community perceive him as holding them
responsible for terrorism following the murder of his sons.
Ali said Tawafoq has close ties with Iyad Allawi. While
claiming good relations with Barzani, he said Tawafoq
calculates that the Kurds will make decisions based on their
own interests, rather than the nation's.


Election Assessment
--------------


3. (C) Ali criticized the IECI as anti-Sunni. He also
characterized the commission as weak, alleging the IECI could
not stop inappropriate campaign symbols (e.g., photos of
Sistani) and actions to deface campaign material. He
complained that the parties were not receiving equal air time
on television. He recommended three steps to ensure a
successful election. First, describing the challenges voters
faced in reaching polling centers, especially in hostile
environments like Anbar province, he recommended the IECI
permit maximum flexibility in voting location, arguing the
practice of dyeing a voter's finger would prevent fraud.
Second, he stressed the importance of the widespread presence
of observers, especially foreign observers, particularly
during the ballot counting phase. Third, he sought
reassurances on the integrity of the process of transporting
ballot boxes. He said these last two steps would be designed
to prevent ballot-stuffing.

Prospects for New Government
--------------


4. (C) Ali said the USG must use its influence to ensure the
new government is "balanced" and "strong." He claimed the
Governing Council and Interim Government had been appointed
on a sectarian basis, and insisted the new cabinet eschew
this practice. The Sunni community, he threatened, would not
accept a Shia Minister of Defense or a Shia Minister of
Interior (i.e., the resistance would continue). When poloff
protested that a policy of excluding Shia from these specific
positions would itself be sectarian, he clarified that these
ministerial portfolios must not be held by anybody who acts
in a sectarian manner. He observed that the Sunni community
supports Allawi, although he is a Shia, because he does not
allow religion to interfere in matters of the state.

Views of Sunni Community
--------------


5. (C) Ali described a gulf in understanding between the
Iraqi and American people. He said the Americans believe
they have liberated Iraq, whereas the Iraqis believe they are
suffering from an alternatively inept and brutal occupation.
Ali claimed American forces that had reached Baghdad and
Sunni majority provinces in spring 2003 encountered no
resistance. The resistance developed, he claimed, once it
became clear to the Sunni community that they were being
excluded from the political process. For example, he said,
few Sunni Iraqis even knew Pachachi, because of his age and
long exile. (When poloff pointed out that the IIP had been a
member of the Governing Council, he said a single seat was
insufficient representation of the Sunni community.) Ali
said the situation was aggravated by cultural errors made by
uninformed soldiers and ineptitude in restoring basic
utilities and meeting economic needs.


6. (C) Ali accused the U.S. of "dereliction of duty" through
"encouragement" of sectarian policies and an unchecked Shia
government leadership. He recounted a familiar litany of
complaints, including: the assertion that a Sunni cannot
obtain a job in a government ministry; the drop in the number
of seats to the National Assembly allocated to Anbar
province; and the reports of abduction of Sunni men by
Shia-led police who are then tortured and killed. "Have you
seen the photos," he asked, "where you can see how they
drilled holes into their heads?" He dismissed the view that
terrorists dressed in police clothing; he argued that given
the curfew only the police could drive around in vehicle
convoys at night. The result, said Ali, is that Sunni men
sleep at a different house each night to avoid detention. He
exclaimed that the maltreatment has been so bad that Sunni
men would prefer to be detained by American forces than Iraqi
forces. The extrajudicial practices of Shia police in Anbar
province, he insisted, fueled the insurgency.

Plan for Withdrawal
--------------


7. (C) Ali said the Sunni community recognized that the USG
is engaged in a serious effort to promote Sunni involvement
in the political process. He lauded the USG for ensuring
Sunni participation in the drafting of the constitution; for
brokering the amendment package to the constitution; and for
reaching out to regional Sunni Arab states. He said he had
participated in the Arab League conference in Cairo, and
praised the participation of the "neutral" United Nations as
well as the final statement.


8. (C) Asked about Tawafoq's policy toward the issue of
withdrawal, Ali said the issue should be handled in stages.
In the short-term, coalition forces should release the
thousands of detainees (He claimed that "no one even knows
the number") and withdraw from cities. Coalition forces
should reduce "excesses" in use of force; Ali claimed his
three-year old daughter believes the sight of the American
military means she will be killed. During this initial time
period, the security services should be transformed into a
professional force; under no circumstances should militias be
incorporated into the security forces. Ali, who described
himself and Tawafoq as part of the "political resistance,"
asserted that the political resistance could convince the
"armed resistance" to desist if they could present a
withdrawal plan tied to a timetable. Otherwise, he said, the
armed resistance would remain active as long as coalition
forces were in Iraq, as their goal is to eject them. He
claimed Tawafoq seeks to establish a positive bilateral
relationship between a sovereign Iraq and the United States.


9. (C) Ali solicited poloff's view of the presence of
coalition forces. Drawing on the President's recent speech,
she noted that many of Ali's ideas tracked with current
policy, chiefly the need to develop Iraqi security forces.
Poloff described the considerable efforts devoted to this
process. She urged Ali to use his influence to encourage
Sunni men, particularly in Anbar, to join the ISF.
Explaining the United States is conscious of cultural and
national sensitivities to a foreign military presence, she
urged Ali to be realistic. Al-Qaeda terrorist elements, who
are exploiting Iraq's situation for their own purpose, would
overwhelm the young Iraqi democracy if left unchecked by
coalition forces. The result would have negative
consequences for Iraq, neighboring countries, and the United
States. She urged Ali to continue his dialogue with the
embassy and to introduce us to other prominent Sunni leaders.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) This was Ali's first meeting with an American
diplomat, and he explicitly sought to confirm that his
viewpoint would be conveyed, albeit discretely, to the
American government. He agreed to travel to the green zone
for the meeting, although he said he was reluctant to enter
the area because the continued American "occupation" of the
palace is proof that Iraq does not control its own country.
When asked about his profession prior to politics, Ali said
he has a degree in Islamic jurisprudence from Baghdad
University, and his manners were that of a religious man. He
said he had never worked for the government. Originally from
Diyala, he considers himself a Baghdadi. At one point he
abruptly asked poloff if she was a "fanatical" Christian, and
characterized Iraqis as Muslims and Americans as Christians
and Jews, but asserted that there could be a fruitful
dialogue between the two countries.
KHALILZAD