Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4800
2005-12-01 13:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

UPDATED STATUS OF IRAQ DETAINEE ABUSE

Tags:  MOPS PHUM PINS PGOV KJUS IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004800 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PGOV KJUS IZ
SUBJECT: UPDATED STATUS OF IRAQ DETAINEE ABUSE
INVESTIGATIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 4745

B. BAGHDAD 4716

C. BAGHDAD 4672

Classified By: Classified by Evan Reade, Acting Counselor for
Political-Military Affairs for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004800

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PGOV KJUS IZ
SUBJECT: UPDATED STATUS OF IRAQ DETAINEE ABUSE
INVESTIGATIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 4745

B. BAGHDAD 4716

C. BAGHDAD 4672

Classified By: Classified by Evan Reade, Acting Counselor for
Political-Military Affairs for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S/NF) Three committees investigating human rights
abuses committed against 168 detainees at the Iraqi
Ministry Interior (MOI) Bunker facility and others at
similar facilities nationwide are making uneven
progress. The mandate of some committees has been
overwhelmed by the political agenda of Shi'a
politicians close to the PM's office and MOI; others
may yet prove productive.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (SBU) In the wake of the November 13 discovery of
168 detainees - many bearing marks of physical abuse -
in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions at an
unofficial MOI detention facility in the Jadriyah
district of Baghdad (the "Bunker"),the Prime Minister
appointed two committees to address allegations of
detainee abuse by Iraqi authorities:

(i) a Bunker Investigation Committee led by Deputy
Prime Minister Rowsh Shaways and comprised of assorted
Iraqi officials and private citizens, tasked with
reporting on Bunker detainees' allegations of abuse;

(ii) a National Investigation Committee led by PM
military assistant Major General Talib al Kinani and
comprised of representatives from the Ministries of
Heath, Justice, and Human Rights, tasked with
inspecting Iraqi detention facilities nationwide.

In addition, a third committee comprised of
investigating judges has been established by Judge
Medhat al Mahmood, Chief of the Iraqi Higher Juridical
Council, to assess the legality of Bunker detainees'
imprisonment, recommend their future disposition,
investigate allegations of abuse and murder, and
consider charges against Iraqi officials involved.


--------------
NOVEMBER 27: INTERVIEWS AT ABU GHRAIB
--------------


3. (SBU) On November 27, members of the Bunker
Investigation Committee visited Abu Ghraib to conduct

interviews with detainees removed on November 13 from
the Jadriyah Bunker (currently housed in a separate
detention compound usually reserved for Coalition
security internees awaiting release). Embassy Rule of
Law (ROL) Coordinator, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, and PolMilOff were present.


4. (S/NF) Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, the committee
leader - Rashid Majid Salih Khattab al Nasiri, a
medical doctor and prominent Da'wa Party member -
selected a small group of detainees from the crowd,
seemingly at random, and ordered that they be brought
to the tent reserved for interviews and seated in rows
of plastic chairs before the committee.


5. (S/NF) Committee members watched as Dr. al Nasiri
asked selected detainees to unzip their jumpsuits to
the waist, then inspected their feet (most were
wearing sandals). Dr. al-Nasiri expressed impatience
with detainees who interrupted the brief examination
to report threatening behavior or other complaints
against MOI officials, exclaiming "I am here to see
scars, not to talk about bad words!"


6. (S/NF) Some committee members - who represented
the Ministry of Transitional National Assembly (TNA)
Affairs and Baghdad City Council, as well as the
Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR) - showed a keener
interest in the cause of detainees' imprisonment than
in their physical treatment, repeatedly asking one
detainee "why have your put your thumbprint confessing
to a crime if you are innocent?".


7. (S/NF) After interviewing three groups of
detainees, a total of 18 from the 166 present, the
committee declared its work done, and packed up. MoHR
Prison Inspector Saad Sultan, present at his own
behest, expressed frustration with the committee
members' performance, saying the they had "no
information and no knowledge" of human rights
investigations.


8. (S/NF) Mr. Sultan was also pessimistic about the
value of the Judicial Committee's review of the
legality of the MOI Bunker detainees' imprisonment,
noting that judges present at the Bunker had failed to
report physical abuse and lack of access to counsel.
"Iraqi judges are involved in illegal detentions," he
said, "and these judges you bring don't have the power
to say other judges are wrong".

--------------
NOVEMBER 28: CONSULTING WITH DPM SHAWAYS
--------------


9. (S/NF) The following day, MNF-I Commander Task
Force 134, Embassy ROL Coordinator, Political
Counselor, and PolMilOff visited DPM Shaways at his
home. ROL Coordinator told the DPM that, speaking
bluntly, the interviews performed by the Bunker
Investigation Committee at Abu Ghraib had been cursory
at best. (Note: the DPM previously expressed concern
about the committee's capability; see Reftel A.)


10. (S/NF) DPM Shaways agreed that the committee's
efforts were inadequate: "I have told the PM we need
much more time," he said, "that we need to repeat
this, that we need to ask individuals about these
matters singly, that we need a list of questions". He
also noted that he had asked the MOI to prevent
officials accused of abuse at the Bunker from
departing Iraq.


11. (S/NF) The DPM was more positive about the role of
the Judicial Committee, saying he had high respect for
Judge Medhat, and agreed with the judges that all
Bunker evacuees should be moved in short order to an
Iraqi facility. He pledged to ask the judges "to
accelerate the investigation into cases of detainees
without charges and to release those against whom
there is no evidence".


12. (S/NF) The DPM advocated more substantial MoHR
involvement in the investigation, and was interested
by the idea of requesting assistance from an
international organization such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross. But he seemed shy of
advocating these proposals himself, suggesting instead
that Post and MNF-I raise these issues with the PM.


13. (S/NF) In closing, the DPM noted the importance
of continued USG engagement with the ITG on the Bunker
issue, and the broader issue of detainee abuse. "There
are some," he said, "like Safa al Safi (Reftel A),who
object to that. But we will ensure that these meetings
are open. I personally think it is necessary."

-------------- --------------
NOVEMBER 29: MG AL KINANI ON NATIONWIDE INSPECTIONS
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Major General Talib al Kinani opened the
first joint USG-ITG meeting on the PM's six-point-plan
proposal for nationwide inspections of all Iraqi
detention facilities with an explanation of his
committee's mandate, and a pledge to start inspections
as quickly as possible - "in'shallah, as soon as one
week".


15. (C) MG al Kinani confirmed that he planned on
surprise inspections, saying "the PM has charged us to
convey the reality of what has happened in these
facilities". His intent, he continued, was to start
with MOI facilities - " there is a lot of corruption"
- and to move next to Ministry of Defense holding
cells. The Ministry of Justice, whose prisons were
already inspected regularly, was a lower priority.


16. (S/NF) While MG al Kinani thanked Post and MNF-I
profusely for their repeated offers of support, he
avoided specific commitments to joint efforts in
planning or execution, aside from assuring us that he
would "share our reports with you, of course" and
saying that "when we need help, we will ask it from
you, in a second".

17. (S/NF) When offered the advice of MNF-I technical
experts in detention conditions and inspections, al
Kinani nodded enthusiastically, saying "we will learn
and benefit from you guys, as a friend." He also
requested access to Coalition intelligence about the
location of additional detention facilities. It was
clear, however, that he saw the USG role as limited.


18. (S/NF) Asked about methods of inspection, al
Kinani said he envisioned small ITG teams posing as
human rights organizations, which would present
themselves unannounced at detention facilities "with
different IDs, in different cars - sometimes even
taxis" in order to avoid "a big event with media
attention, security, where the Americans are going
into this prison".


19. (S/NF) Al Kinani was frank about the likelihood
that additional Bunkers lay undiscovered, saying
"there are places all over, prisons we're looking at -
and the holding areas can be worse than the prisons.
We know that MOI and MOD are doing that right now. And
we have to find these places. Even if they hate us,
that's fine with us."

-------------- --------------
NOVEMBER 29: THE INITIAL REPORT IS (NOT) PRESENTED
-------------- --------------


20. (C) Later that afternoon, CDR TF 134, ROL
Coordinator, COS for Intelligence and PolMilOff
attended a meeting of the Bunker Investigation
Committee, at which the committee was to present its
findings from the Abu Ghraib interviews and its
initial report on abuse allegations. In the absence of
DPM Shaways, whose mother passed away in the Kurdish
region that morning, the meeting was chaired by
Minister of State for TNA Affairs Safa al Safi.


21. (S/NF) Dr. al Safi opened by requesting that USG
officials sit on one side of the table (USG and Iraqi
officials had taken mixed seats, informally). He then
warned Iraqi committee members in Arabic not to talk
about copies of the initial report (which most members
had in front of them on the conference table) "in
front of everybody".


22. (S/NF) Dr. al Safi then launched into accusations
directed at USG officials. The Bunker had held 171
detainees, he said, but MNF-I had only 168 at Abu
Ghraib. The Bunker Director had told him, he said,
that "the Americans took everyone, in one big group,
not in an orderly way. That's why we want to know,
where are these three? Where? They could be anywhere".


23. (S/NF) "When Coalition Forces came in," said Dr.
al Safi, "we removed our hands. The Coalition Forces
took our power. So we ask: were the detainees removed
with or without authorization? Were Iraqi officials
present? Were files removed, and were they signed for?
This poses a problem for us; there is no coordination.
We know files were destroyed."


24. (S/NF) Dr. al Safi brushed aside USG comments
that 168 detainees had been jointly counted by USG and
ITG officials, and that all files had been sealed and
entered into the custody of Iraqi judges. "We're not
saying that tortures took place," he countered, "but
for now, we just have one word against another. We
need for you to give us details and evidence, if you
want us to talk to people about these crimes".


25. (S/NF) Acting Minister of Human Rights Narmin
Othman, seated to Dr. al Safi's right, objected to
comments by committee members echoing Dr. al Safi's
accusations. "You are defending those officials at the
Bunker," she said loudly, turning to face all Iraqi
committee members, "and I will never do that."


26. (S/NF) We pledged to give Dr. al Safi additional
copies of the substantial documentation already
provided to the ITG on abuses - including murder - at
the Bunker. Dr. al-Safi questioned the quality of the
reporting he had seen so far. "These reports cite "a
witness," he said. "What is a witness? In court, you
cannot convict without 100% evidence. It's not enough
to say somebody has heard, that somebody knows."


27. (S/NF) Dr. al Safi closed the session by voicing
unfounded complaints that the USG had released
provocative photographs of abuse to Iraqi TV stations.
"In the media, they're showing a picture of a man who
is supposed to be a torture victim - and he is wearing
a gun on his hip," he said. "The media will ruin this
investigation."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


28. (S/NF) To date, the USG has provided the ITG with
lists of detainees whose legal status is unresolved,
lists of reported deaths in custody, lists of
officials working at the Bunker, and a comprehensive
intelligence picture of the facility's establishment,
history, and the role played by MOI leadership. The
ITG has taken no action to use this information as a
basis for substantive investigation.


29. (S/NF) The incompetence of the Bunker
Investigation Committee and the intransigence of its
Acting Chairman clearly need to be addressed; we will
raise this issue with DPM Shaways as soon as he
returns south, and will take up the replacement or
reconstitution of the committee with the PM if this
proves necessary following DPM-level consultation.


30. (S/NF) Meanwhile, a commitment order has been
issued mandating the transfer of all Bunker evacuees
to the MOJ Rusafa Prison in Baghdad, which is
monitored by U.S. DOJ personnel. We will press Iraqi
investigating judges to set clear timelines for
determining the legality of these detentions and
releasing detainees not subject to criminal charge.


31. (S/NF) We intend to meet with MG al Kinani in the
coming days to clarify his plans for nationwide
inspections, and discuss alternate modi operandi. His
initial mock-NGO espionage inspection proposal is
creative, but is unlikely to produce useful
assessments (and would outrage the humanitarian NGO
community).


32. (S/NF) It is premature to conclude (although we
suspect) that MG Kanini - a Shi'a officer and close
associate of National Security Advisor Abd al Karim al
Anzi - is incapable of mounting a credible national
inspection regime. Post and MNF-I will engage him with
detailed proposals on alternate methods of proceeding,
and will report on further developments septel.
KHALILZAD