TOWNS NEAR SYRIAN BORDER RETURNING TO NORMALCY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004774

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREF EAID ECON EIND MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: TOWNS NEAR SYRIAN BORDER RETURNING TO NORMALCY
AFTER COMBAT OPERATIONS

Classified By: Robert S. Ford, Political Counselor
for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. This is a SET Ramadi Cable. Site visits to
two, separate portions of the Western Euphrates River
valley revealed -- post-combat operations -- a generally
positive climate for the December 15 elections. There are
no immediate humanitarian crises and military planners hope
to expand the number of polling sites near the Syrian
border. Iraqi civilians populated the market place in
hard-hit Husaybah, and interest in civic affairs appears on
the rise in both Husaybah and Barwana to the east. The
region requires ITG attention to rebuild their essential
services infrastructure, eroded both by years of neglect
under Saddam and the recent military operations. End
Summary.


2. (S) PolOff accompanied 2MarDiv Commanding General to
view Haditha Dam operations and discuss political
developments in the Haditha-Hit corridor November 22. On
November 24, PolOff joined the Assistant Division Commander
and drove from al-Qaim to the Syrian border, observing the
resurgence of commerce and normalcy after operations in
Husayba, Karabilah and New Ubaidi. Insurgent activity has
starkly dropped over the last two weeks in Anbar, most
likely in part the result of the concerted effort to
disrupt terrorist support networks along the vital
Euphrates valley. Like squeezing a tube of toothpaste,
insurgent cells may have relocated over the Syrian border;
to the village of Anah, a center point between al-Qaim and
Haditha; and perhaps northwest on the route to Mosul.
Nonetheless, the present drop in attacks provides an
opportunity to kick-start reconstruction in the region and
administer elections in different locations than were
possible in the October referendum.

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Elections Planning; Reemergence of Local Government
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3. (C) Pending a decision by the IECI on whether it has the
capacity to administer the election on its own (the so-
called "Falluja model"),Marine planners are reviewing
potential polling site location for security. Centers are
slated for Haditha, Hit, Baghdadi and Barwana. Nearby
Haqlaniyah is deemed too unstable to allow its own site.
As on October 15, there will be buses to transport voters
to nearby Haditha to vote. According to official IECI
tallies of the October referendum, only 744 voted in
Haditha, 899 in the larger Hit (where 17 of the 22 polling
centers registered zero votes) and 1,014 cast their ballots
in Barwana's three polling centers. The battalion
commander noted that in Barwana, a tiny hamlet on the north
side of the river, a 'festive' atmosphere prevailed on
October 15. The leading sheikh and city council member
from the former insurgent stronghold also recently applied
to the Anbar governor for guidance in selecting a new
mayor. On November 18, the Hit City Council formally
registered their protest of the detention of three of their
members and are boycotting further meetings. After
operation 'Rivergate', CF forces have retained a presence
in downtown Haditha, Haqlaniyah and Barwanah, and civil
affairs teams are active in all three.


4. (C) Toward the Syrian border, CF commanders will
recommend to the IECI additional sites in Husaybah, Sadah,
Karabilah and New Ubaydi. In the October referendum, 1,153
area voters cast ballots in Sadah, near al-Qaim. (Note:
In their official tally, the IECI listed eight polling
centers in al-Qaim, but voting actually took place in the
village of Sadah due to security considerations. End
Note.) Husaybah's mayor has allegedly stepped forward, as
well as the police chief. The latter claims he has 50
officers under his command. PolOff will confirm with the
Provincial government whether these are indeed legitimate
leaders. New Ubaydi is a tight 'company' town consisting
of rows of identical prefab concrete housing. The local
commander believes many of the city's current inhabitants
are squatters. Old Ubaydi, which may not receive a polling
site, is located in the opposite bend of the river.

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Internally Displaced People: Quashing the Rumors
-------------- ---


5. (C) CA teams reported there had been two camps of IDPs
during and shortly after operations. One area, said to
have housed an estimated 2,000 persons fleeing the
operations in Husaybah, was located adjacent to the large,
state-owned (and currently defunct) Super Phosphate plant.
Those who had not returned home may have taken residence in
former plant employees housing (conex looking structures).
Another former camp was just outside New Ubaydi. It too
was abandoned, and only plastic water bottles littered the
yard where 2,000-4,000 IDPs moved in and out, waiting for
the end of the combat phase. It was apparent driving
through Karabilah, the scene of some of the harshest
fighting, that many had not returned (or chose to stay
indoors). It was the only area where the civilians did not
wave or smile at the passing convoy.

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Repairing Infrastructure Damage
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6. (S) CF are focusing on restoring electrical power to
Husaybah in the near term. The hospital suffered damage in
an exchange between insurgents (firing from the grounds of
the hospital),but is open for outpatient services. NGOs
and Ministry of Health are evidently in contact with the
facility. Civilians complain of the lack of potable water,
which is a common complaint in the province, especially in
the capital, Ramadi. Perhaps a remnant of its former
privileged status, New Ubaydi retains power and water
services, and a near-term goal is to restore the telephone
lines. The school, one of the better looking buildings in
Anbar, is intact, yet reportedly has not had a teaching
staff for two years. There is money in this corner of the
province: motorboats ply the river, and many of the houses
in Husaybah (destroyed and otherwise) are enormous, grand
residences. Smuggling, present for centuries, appears to
have benefited the Husaybawis far more than the
Karabilawis, judging from the quality and square footage of
their homes. Amazingly, there seemed no shortage of fuel.
There were minimal lines at several gas stations and even
kerosene is said to be in sufficient supply.

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Atmospherics
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7. (C) It has been a while since an FSO has been able to
survey western portions of the Iraqi Euphrates. Hulking
state-owned factories appear to have dominated the economy
of this stretch. Both the cement factory we flew over
(south of al-Asad) and the second we viewed in al-Qaim were
belching smoke and producing. The Super Phosphate plant
lay dormant, surrounded by mounds of earth, some stained
yellow, perhaps a legacy of chemicals aside from the yellow
cake allegedly produced in the plant's heyday. New Ubaydi,
too, has a large, abandoned factory at its entrance, but
most of the housing was for workers at the Phosphate plant.
The road leading into the town is pockmarked by deep gouges
from detonated IEDs, and people were scarce. The Civil
Military Operation Center was buzzing, however. Iraqi
soldiers and Americans alike noisily refurbished the former
sports hall they occupied. A whitewashed (but legible)
painting of Saddam read, "If there isn't democracy in
sport, there's no democracy". Back on the Syrian border,
the Husaybah markets were bustling. Bright red radishes
the size of a fist and assorted other vegetables and fruits
lined the souk. Most astounding was the reaction of the
people. Nearly all children waved, even from far across a
field. Many 'military aged men' responded to the
Commander's greeting; drivers of cars stopped to allow our
convoy to pass shrugged and gave a wave, dismissing the
inconvenience.

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Comment
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8. (C) Progress is uneven, and the mood varied dramatically
between Karabilah and Husaybah. In the short-term, CF and
USAID-funded NGOs can ameliorate the challenges in the wake
of combat operations. In the medium term, the towns and
villages need to select officials and work with Directors
General to seek funding through the Provincial
Reconstruction and Development Councils. Supposedly, the
ITG announced a 37 million USD fund (like Falluja's special
funds) for Husaybah and its neighbors, and an additional 20
million USD for the Haditha-Hit corridor. It is not clear
about how the fund will be dispersed or which entities
retain oversight. Our experience with the ITG on such
reconstruction funding has been mixed at best. Surprising
amid the collapsing homes of Husaybah's worst hit
neighborhood, there is a buoyancy among the men, women and
children on the street, almost akin to post- al-Fajr
Fallujah. Perhaps sustained attention like Fallujah has
enjoyed could produce a similarly politically active
citizenry on their way to demanding and finding ways to
restore essential services.
KHALILZAD