Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4511
2005-11-03 15:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

TALABANI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN SYRIA

Tags:  PREL SY LE IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004511 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN SYRIA

REF: DAMASCUS 5499

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David M. Satterfield,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN SYRIA

REF: DAMASCUS 5499

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David M. Satterfield,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) On October 31 (other topics septels),President
Jalal Talabani commented to Charge that the SARG had
been sending emissaries to make its case to foreign
governments since the issuance of the Mehlis report.
(Note: Indeed, on several occasions prior to the
report, Talabani has noted to us "private contacts"
via intermediaries with the SARG, all proffering
progress on Iraq-related issues in exchange for a
Talabani or other senior level Iraqi visit to
Damascus. End Note.) Charge underscored the gravity
of the information in the report, including direct
charges of Syrian regime obstruction of justice, and
cautioned strongly against acceptance of any Syrian
overtures. Damascus should be isolated, Charge
emphasized, until it complied with the will of the
international community on Mehlis and on other issues.
Talabani assured that he had no intention of
responding to any Syrian approaches.


2. (C) Talabani told Charge that he had in fact read
the Mehlis report. He expressed amazement that
President Bashar al-Asad had threatened Rafik Hariri,
having said: "I will break Lebanon on your head and
Jumblatt's head." (Charge recounted that Hariri had
called him shortly after that meeting, deeply upset,
to recount the Asad threat.) Talabani said he knew
from his own contacts that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
had been against re-appointing Lebanese President
Emile Lahoud, as had been the late Syrian Interior
Minister Ghazi Kanaan. It was unlikely, Talabani
thought, that Kanaan had wanted Hariri assassinated,
but noted that the inner workings of the Alawite
ruling clique were very difficult to discern.


3. (C) Talabani asserted that the Damascus Statement
(reftel) had helped publicly weaken the SARG and that,
with former Syrian COS Hikmat Shahabi and former VP
Khaddam now in Paris, the Syrian opposition had an
opportunity to demand President al-Asad's resignation.
With major players gone from the SARG ranks, the might
of the Alawites (Bashar's family and the old guard)
had diminished.


4. (C) On the Kurdish front, Talabani reported that
the SARG recently gave Syrian citizenship to 250,000
Kurds, allowing them the right to vote in future
elections. With two million Kurds living in Syria,
they could play a more active role. Talabani added
that the Kurds were well organized and were reaching
out to moderate Sunni elements in an effort to provide
an "alternative" to the current Syrian regime. The
extension of Syrian citizenship to formerly stateless
Kurds would enable the community to act "as Syrians,
not as Kurds or Iraqis."

Satterfield