ACTIONS TO ASSURE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTEGRITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004506

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2010
TAGS: ASEC ECON ENRG EPET ETRD EWWT KCOR KCRM KHLS MCAP MOPS PGOV PINR PTER NATO
SUBJECT: ACTIONS TO ASSURE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTEGRITY

REF: SECSTATE 182688

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) SUMMARY: Failures of Iraq's critical
energy infrastructure have reached unprecedented levels
which are seriously hindering the Iraqi Transitional
Government's (ITG) ability to raise desperately needed
revenues and to deliver basic services such as electricity,
fuel, and water to the Iraqi people. Post has initiated a
multi-agency Critical Infrastructure Integrity Task Force
that has developed an enhanced infrastructure integrity
plan (exact details SEPTEL),based on the original plan
submitted to Washington last summer. This cable describes
the current status of Iraq's fragile infrastructure
(REFTEL) and lays out the immediate steps we are taking in
the context of this plan to fix the problem. END
SUMMARY.

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CURRENT SITUATION
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2. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Acts of sabotage against Iraq's oil
and electricity infrastructure occur regularly. Many of
these attacks are low-tech, fairly inexpensive to execute,
and relatively easy to plan. They usually involve toppling
electricity towers or piercing crude or refined product
pipelines. Such attacks further weaken Iraq's
already-fragile infrastructure systems. They also dampen
public support for the ITG with continued electricity
shortages and blackouts.


3. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) As of Oct 31:

- Refineries in Iraq are operating below capacity due to
the effect of a series of blackouts (each lasting less than
12 hours) on Oct 14, 17 and 18, as well as interruptions in
the supply of crude oil;

- The Oct 13 explosion at the al-Fathah crossing of the
Tigris near Bayji forced the Ministry of Oil (MoO) to move
an increasing amount of crude oil by truck in order to keep
the refineries working. Security concerns by contractors
at al-Fathah have resulted in a large number of them
walking off from their jobs;

- The interdiction of the Kirkuk-Bayji crude oil line on
Oct 20 and resulting fire halted pumping of crude oil
across al-Fathah, cutting off the supply to Bayji refinery
(previously operating at 88% capacity) and exports to
Turkey for the second time in the past month; Bayji
refinery is now out of fuel but is expected to become
operational again in late November;

- Southern exports continue at a seasonally weather reduced
rate. In October, an average of almost 1.6 million barrels
were exported daily, with Basra refinery operating at 99%
capacity. However, Basrah will soon shut down for 30-60
days because proper preventive maintenance has not been
accomplished in past years and systems are now approaching
criticality;

- Electricity supply to Baghdad fluctuates erratically
(averaging between 7 to 13 hrs per day);

- Attacks on oil production not only reduce the revenues
that today's high oil prices would generate, but also lead
to increased product imports at world market prices to meet
domestic demand for fuels.

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IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
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4. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) With the direct participation of MNC-I
Deputy Commander MG Parker in our Task Force, Corps has
demonstrated the priority it places on infrastructure
security, following only fighting the insurgency and
assuring safe and secure electoral processes. Five energy
supply corridors must be protected to maximize the
provision of essential services and revenue production.
Our approach will be to execute the enhanced plan
immediately and comprehensively in discrete geographic
segments in the priority order below:


1. Kirkuk-Bayji pipeline

2. Musayyib-Salman Pak electric power corridor
(new)

3. Bayji-Baghdad refined product and electric
power corridor

4. Bayji-Turkey pipeline

5. Basrah's oil exports and internal distribution
system


5. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) The Kirkuk-Bayji pipeline is the top
priority for immediate execution of the plan for three
reasons. First, securing significant additional oil
exports from the Kirkuk fields is the fastest way to raise
Iraq's revenues substantially. Second, considerable
protective work has already been done in this region, to
include training of the first five Security Infrastructure
Battalions (SIBs). The projected training of 11 SIBs will
be in three phases (five SIBs in Phase 1, four SIBs in
Phase 2, and two SIBs in Phase 3). The ITG has allocated
$80 million for Phase 2 training and sustainment costs.
Third, we expect to be able to complete this segment of the
plan relatively rapidly, thus creating a tangible and
successful model for the Iraqi government, military, and
society to use as a template for the successive segments.

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NEXT STEPS
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6. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) The infrastructure protection plan
includes seven operational aspects with timelines:
Coordination; Security; Counter-Sabotage; MOI Capabilities;
Rule of Law; Rapid Repair Response; Resiliency and
Redundancy. The steps for the next nine months are:

COORDINATION
- Nov 05: Enhancing Iraqi interagency coordination at the
provincial level, urging Ministry of Defense (MoD),
Ministry of Interior (MoI),Ministry of Electricity (MoE),
MoO participation in the Provincial Joint Coordination
Cells (PJCC) in Kirkuk.
- Nov 05: A command post exercise on Nov 8 in Kirkuk to
demonstrate the full and effective use of the PJCC.
- Nov 05: Address coordination requirements in Musayyib-
Salman Pak energy corridor.
- Jan 06: Implement effective coordination system
nationwide within existing resources.

SECURITY
- Nov 05: Enhance Kirkuk-Bayji corridor security.
-- Begin tribal engagement discussions.
-- Integrate new SIBs along the corridor.
-- Contingency plan to stockpile fuels for Baghdad to
avert energy crisis in case a shortage occurs.
- Dec 05: Firmly establish infrastructure security within
Iraqi Army C2 network with clear roles and responsibilities.
- Dec 05: Engage influential tribal leaders across this
region to foster a better economic, social, and security
environment, and to strike the appropriate balances in

establishing security solutions so that all principal
tribes have a stake in the success of the process.
- Jan 06: SIB Phase 2 training (second tranche of 4 SIBs)
completed.
- May 06: SIB Phase 3 training (third tranche of 2 SIBs)
completed.
- Jul 06: MoD to complete construction of 72 guard towers
in the Kirkuk to Bayji corridor.

COUNTER-SABOTAGE
- Mar 06: Demonstrate an effective intelligence gathering
system.
- Mar 06: Iraqi Army offensive operations conducted through
actionable intelligence.

MOI CAPABILITIES
- Dec 05: Automated data base implementation.
- Jan 06: Intelligence gathering systems developed.
- Jan 06: Assume law enforcement/criminal investigative
capacity role.
- Mar 06: Increase police/investigator training in Jordan
and locally.
- Mar 06: MOI under permanent Iraqi government begins
counter-sabotage ops.

RULE OF LAW
- Jan 06: Legal systems begin to form from new
constitution.
- Jan 06: Accountability systems devised in new ministries.
- Feb 06: First new DOJ courthouse (Karkh) complete.
- Mar 06: Functioning courts begin being established,
followed by investigations, warrants, arrests and
prosecutions.
- Apr 06: First prisons (Khan Bani Saad & Nasiriya)
complete.

RAPID REPAIR RESPONSE
- Dec 05: MoO begins stockpiling of spare parts and
establishes a budget to effect energy infrastructure
repair and maintenance.
- Jan 06: MoO assumes Rapid Repair Response burden.
- Jan 06: CF role reduced, but CF continues support and
mentorship.

RESILIENCE AND REDUNDANCY
- Jan 06: Revenue sources identified to fund maintenance
and upgrade of energy infrastructure.
- Jan 06: Budget established to fund energy infrastructure.
- Feb 06: Training begins of managers to maintain
infrastructure.
- Mar 06: Hardening completed along the al-Fathah crossing,
including fences, walls and towers along vulnerable areas.


7. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Once we initiate the implementation of
this plan in the Kirkuk-Bayji corridor, we plan to move
rapidly to replicate the effort in the Musayyib-Salman Pak
corridor, adjusting for individual conditions extant in
that region. We will continue down the list until all
geographic regions are covered. While we are accomplishing
this intensified plan in specific regions, we intend to
maintain all of the current security efforts and
infrastructure enhancement programs in the regions not yet
touched by the plan.

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BASRAH - THE CROWN JEWEL OF IRAQ'S ECONOMY
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8. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Without a doubt, Basrah's oil
infrastructure is the crown jewel of the Iraqi economy.
MND-SE is coordinating improvements to the security
infrastructure, and although violence has not been directed
at these facilities in a long time, they are still
vulnerable and a priority for the Mission.


9. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) The lower frequency and intensity of
infrastructure attacks in the South is likely due to the
fact the Shia populace has vested economic as political
interests in keeping oil exports flowing, and as well as
the smaller physical extent of the region's infrastructure,
compared to that of the central and northern Iraqi
regions. The Shia in the Basrah region have an economic
interest in keeping the oil flowing. Much of the violence
in southern Iraq has revolved around Muqtada al-Sadr's
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM),which has generally abided by
cease-fires reached last year after its two uprisings.
Although some JAM elements have conducted sporadic indirect
fire attacks against CF, JAM probably has largely refrained
from attacking the southern oil structure to avoid
provoking a backlash from the Shia public and harming the
Sadr Movement's potential political aspirations. The
infrastructure attacks that have occurred in the Basrah
area have been of lesser sophistication and less frequency
compared to northern and central Iraq. We will, of course,
continue to monitor very closely the situation in the
Basrah province.

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US-IRAQI STEERING GROUP
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10. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Beyond these immediate steps, we have
created a steering group with the ITG to monitor the
implementation of this action plan. The steering group,
chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi, meets bi-weekly.
Chalabi is joined by the Ministers of Oil, Electricity and
Finance. For the Coalition side are the Political-Military
Counselor, Deputy Commanding General of MNC-I, and the
Director of Operations IRMO. In addition to the steering
group, Chalabi chairs the National Energy Council, a
ministerial-level group, whose meetings are attended by
representatives from the Ministries of Oil, Electricity,
Water Resources, Finance, Defense and Interior. Finally,
the Ambassador, the DCM, and the Commanding Generals of
MNF-I and MNC-I frequently meet with Chalabi and members of
the Iraqi military to discuss infrastructure security and
how to successfully address the problem.
Satterfield