CHALABI PLAN FOR ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004378

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PNAT KCOR IZ
SUBJECT: CHALABI PLAN FOR ELECTIONS

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. One of Ahmad Chalabi's senior
advisors indicated to PolOffs willingness to form an
alliance with Ayad Allawi to form one liberal,
moderate, centrist coalition. If an agreement cannot
be reached before the coalition registration deadline
-- and we doubt an agreement would be possible --
Nabil Mousawi anticipates Chalabi would seek his own
moderate coalition that will include Sunnis. Mousawi
does not expect, however, that a Chalabi coalition can
rival an all Shia Islamist list. If the all-Shia
Islamist list re-emerges, Chalabi would likely rejoin
it. End Summary.

Possible Allawi/Chalabi Deal
--------------


2. (C) Transitional National Assembly (TNA) member
and senior official in the Iraqi National Congress
(INC) Nabil Hasan Ahmad Mousawi met with PolOffs on
October 23 to discuss Ahmad Chalabi's plans for the
national elections. Mousawi explained that the best
chance for moderates to win the election is to have
one large, moderate and liberal coalition - a
coalition that included both Allawi and Chalabi.
Mousawi claimed that Chalabi's circle consists of four
advisors - Chalabi's eldest brother Jawad in London,
Aras (NFI) in Baghdad, American contractor Francis
Brooke and Mousawi. He claimed that Chalabi's
advisors have been urging Chalabi to broker a deal
with Allawi because they see it as the moderates' best
chance of winning. Mousawi, however, described the
relationship between Allawi and Chalabi as difficult.
They have known each other since the age of two, and
Mousawi added that they are related on several levels
and tend to kill each other with "politeness."


3. (C) Mousawi admitted that neither Allawi nor
Chalabi are perfect. He added that Allawi is tainted
by his circle of advisors and Chalabi is tainted by
hints of corruption. Both men have problems following
through with commitments and any alliance between the
two would result in Allawi taking the top position and
Chalabi the second. Mousawi said that Chalabi has
remained a relative mystery to PolOffs in Baghdad
because he still feels the sting of what happened
during the CPA days. Chalabi sometimes listens to
longtime friends and colleagues, but is more swayed by
analytical arguments than personal appeals.


4. (C) In response to PolOff's query, Mousawi did not
deny that Chalabi is the source of information leaked
on corruption in the ministries to the press.
Chalabi's intent was not to defame Allawi, he said,
but to clear out those who are fully guilty of the
charges. Mousawi commented on how angry Chalabi got
when UK Ambassador Patey last week urged him to cease
and desist. Mousawi added that Chalabi considered the
UK Ambassador's request a veiled threat.


5. (C) If an Allawi/Chalabi deal does not
materialize, Mousawi expects the INC to establish its
own liberal and moderate coalition by the IECI
coalition October 28 registration deadline. He was
insistent that the party would include moderate Sunnis
and added that he has been negotiating with members of
the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). He said that INC was
also in negotiations with Fadeela Party's Nadeem al-
Jabiri, Shia Independent Qassim Daoud, Monarchist
Faisal Qaraogholi and moderate Dawa members. Mousawi
reported that there is a serious split between Dawa
and Jaafari and added that everyone knows Jaafari has
been clandestinely setting up his own offices in the
governorates to run separately. (Comment: that would
be news to us, and a surprise given Jaafari's general
approach to management. End Comment.)


6. (C) Mousawi added that there would be need to
recruit Kurdish parties for the coalition. In his
view, most Shia consider Jalal Talabani a 'good guy
whom we all like.' Mousawi doubted that anyone would
really object if Talabani kept his position as
President.


7. (C) Mousawi lamented that the 7-day extension for
coalition registration could result in an all Shia
list. He added that several entities want to re-
construct Sistani's 169 list. Mousawi said if this
happens, the INC would be compelled to rejoin because
it has Sistani's seal of approval.

Prediction about Iraq's Iranian future
--------------


8. (C) Mousawi told PolOffs that most people do not
understand that the upcoming national election is the
only opportunity for a moderate and centrist
government to take hold. He warned if Shia Islamists
win the election, they would have four years to
consolidate power and break the Iraqi moderates
movement. With the Islamists in power, Mousawi
predicts that SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim will
return to Najaf to pursue his religious career leaving
Badr Corps head Hadi al-Amari in his stead as head of
SCIRI's political arm, allowing a shadow Iranian
government to reign.


9. (C) On a personal note, Mousawi told PolOffs that
he will not enter the upcoming elections. He added
that his experience as a TNA member did not suit him.
Mousawi said he would prefer to be an executive
working behind the scenes for a politician. He also
plans to spend more time with his 3 children in
London.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) We find it a hard to imagine a Chalabi-Allawi
electoral alliance since Chalabi himself is spurring
on the hounds investigating corruption that are
causing Allawi advisors to squirm. Allawi is moving
ahead on his election coalition (septel) and Chalabi
is trying to calculate the best angles. We found it
particularly interesting that Mousawi thought Chalabi
would rejoin a Shia Islamist unity list if that list
appears coming to fruition again.


Satterfield