FALLUJANS OVERWHELMINGLY REJECT CONSTITUTION IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004290

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM IZ XL
SUBJECT: FALLUJANS OVERWHELMINGLY REJECT CONSTITUTION IN
LARGE TURNOUT; SIGNAL CONTINUED MOBILIZATION

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD, REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Fallujah and neighboring area residents
voted in large numbers during the October 15 referendum.
They overwhelmingly rejected the constitution, according to
initial reports from Fallujah-based IECI staff. The large
turnout in Iraq's "city of mosques", alongside low turnout
in the rest of Al-Anbar, guarantees that the province will
be placed in the reject column. Ra'ad Aboud, IECI director
of operations for Anbar, estimated October 16 that
approximately 170,000 Fallujah-area residents participated
in the constitutional referendum, although IECI
headquarters has yet to release final figures. Most
Fallujans who registered went to the polls. The expected
breakdown will be over 90 percent voting against. There
were no major security incidents at the city's 34 polling
sites; the IECI-approved tribal security plan, with police
support and extensive U.S. Marine oversight and
involvement, worked. Fallujah leaders told Poloff and
Marine FAO referendum day that the city would remain
mobilized for the December election. END SUMMARY.

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FALLUJANS VOTE "NO" IN DROVES
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2. (C) Fallujah's leaders had long predicted high turnout.
They mobilized the local Sunni-Arab vote over many
months. City council members, Imams and tribal leaders
played particularly pro-active roles. Residents largely
followed the clerics' guidance to participate, while
heeding informal advice that the draft would lead to a
division of Iraq. Most Fallujans said they had not seen or
read the draft prior to the vote.


3. (C) Fallujah-based IECI operations director, Ra'ad
Aboud, provided Fallujah Poloff with initial turnout
numbers on the evening of October 15 and more solid returns
throughout October 16. When the IECI team had finished
their first review, they determined that the city voters
overwhelmingly rejected the draft. At some polling sites,
100 percent voted "no" -- with only a few scattered "yes"
votes in other sites. Examples of this dramatically lop-
sided ratio include preliminary stats at three sites (no
vs. yes votes): 3,059 to 37; 2,119 to 20; and, 339
unanimous negative votes at one location. IECI's Ra'ad
Aboud, himself a Sunni-Arab from Ramadi, remarked wryly
that the "yes"" votes reflected the number of "educated
voters" in Fallujah. (Comment: this is the kind of lop-
sided turnout that is drawing IECI/Baghdad attention.
Anbar results could well figure among those re-checked by
the IECI. End Comment.)


4. (C) While city imams did not formally advocate a
negative vote from pulpits, they pursued -- rather
effectively based on the tentative results -- a quiet "vote
no" approach in mosque corridors. Clerics' whispers echoed
the negative aspects of the draft, with "federalism equals
division" as the most prominent mantra. Tribal leaders,
conversely, largely maintained their neutral stance.

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R-DAY ATMOSPHERICS; IECI PERFORMANCE;
TRIBAL SECURITY PLAN A SUCCESS
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5. (C) ATMOSPHERICS: High turnout in the city was spread
over 34 sites. Each neighborhood had its own polling
location (schools often),so residents were able to vote at
their leisure. Fallujah Poloff visited two locations on
referendum day, both schools. Steady voting occurred at
each location, with children gathered in large numbers at
one. The mood was calm and there was a degree of buzz in
the air, as neighborhoods took to the streets to
participate in the referendum.


6. (C) IECI PERFORMANCE: IECI staff had their problems,
but also enjoyed baseline success. U.S. Marine logistical
assistance -- formally requested by IECI -- proved
invaluable, particularly as last-minute issues arose
regarding ballot transportation, etc. The IECI's biggest
disconnect stemmed from confusion over whether residents
could vote at any city site, or only the one in which their
registration record was held (based on the PDS/food ration
system). IECI Chairman Izadin had told Fallujah leaders
that voting would not be restricted to certain locations;
however, on R Day, residents were told the opposite.
Fortunately, IECI staff directed voters to the right sites,
helping to alleviate the problem. IECI also failed to plan
in advance for ISF voting -- a sizable group in Fallujah.
The situation was resolved only late in the day when Iraqi
Army units were finally given IECI go-ahead to vote.


7. (C) TRIBAL SECURITY PLAN: The tribal security plan,
supplemented by local police, worked; there were no major
security incidents. City police performed particularly
well; police searched Poloff at both locations visited.
Fallujans will seek to repeat this arrangement in the
December election, and consideration will likely be given
to expanding this model elsewhere in the province. Future
and wider success will depend on key parameters, to include
an adequate CF presence and related coalition commanders'
assessments, and an ISF role (led by police) with
sufficient training and equipment.


8. (C) COMMENT: One Anbar city's results -- Fallujah's
overwhelming "no" vote -- decisively moved the province
into the reject column. Zarqawi's and associated
extremists' intimidation message failed, in the very city
that only a year ago AMZ treated as a safe haven.
Fallujah's high turnout will undoubtedly be noticed in
other Anbar communities, including in provincial capital
Ramadi. Many Anbaris will understandably begin to ask
whether they want Fallujah to be the vast area's singularly
dominant political voice. Most arguably will not. That
will be a healthy, and overdue, internal Sunni-Arab
dialogue. Fallujah's October 15 surge to polling sites
might even hasten other Sunni-Arab leaders to move more
aggressively against extremist intimidation and toward
similar mobilization. Fallujah, for now, has impressively
laid claim to implicit political leadership at the grass-
roots level. The city's mobilized voting bloc will be a
tempting target in the December election, whoever seeks to
win it. Fallujah leaders already predict even higher
turnout then, flowing from referendum day momentum.
Continued Sunni-Arab political engagement -- not the
overwhelming and predictable "no" vote -- stands as the
most important referendum day headline in one of Iraq's
most well known and volatile cities. END COMMENT.
Khalilzad