SAMARA SUNNI ARABS IN DENIAL ABOUT THEIR IP

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004238

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PNAT PHUM PTER IZ
SUBJECT: SAMARA SUNNI ARABS IN DENIAL ABOUT THEIR IP
PROBLEM

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During an October 12 meeting in Samarra
to discuss security and governance, MOD Senior Advisor
General Amer al-Hashimi asked Coalition Force officers to
reduce their security controls in the city. LTC Wald of
the 42ND ID noted that there had been no change in the
demands of the Samarran leaders for many months, and also
no cooperation on security matters. The Samarrans were not
forthcoming with any deliverables. End Summary.


2. (C) On October 12, General Amer al-Hashimi, Senior
Advisor to the Minister of Defense, met in Samarra with
city council members, tribal leaders, local imams, and
officers from the 42ND ID. The meeting was the result of
an invitation from Shaykh Ahmed al-Sammarai, Secretary
General of the Sunni Waqf, who recently approached Minister
of Defense Dulime offering his assistance and that of
Samarra residents to forestall the need for possible MOD
military action due to insurgent activity.


3. (C) The city council had promised a list of Samarrans
willing to sign up for police duty, and another list of
usable intelligence on insurgent activity in the area.
They provided neither. Instead, local notables presented a
list of demands for Coalition Forces to meet, most of which
centered on lessening the Coalition presence in the city.


4. (C) Al-Hashimi urged the Coalition to reopen roads
previously closed due to frequent IED attacks, and to
remove checkpoints on major roads. He was vague when asked
by 42ND ID officers what specific commitments local leaders
would make in return, saying merely that "it will be
better." 42ND ID, which has tracked a strong correlation
between checkpoint management and rate of daily attacks,
was skeptical. LTC Wald noted that there has been no
change in the demands of the Samarran leaders for many
months, and also no cooperation on security matters.


5. (C) Al-Hashimi outlined a plan for the Iraqi Army (IA)
4th Division to take charge of security for the whole city.
Coalition Forces would withdraw or reduce their security
activities but provide support to the IA. The IA would
maintain control only until the Iraqi Police (IP) could
resume full responsibility for the city.


6. (C) Al-Hashimi maintained that a similar process had
worked in Mahmudiyah, and he believed it would work in
Samarra. However, Lt. Colonel Wald said that Sammarrans
themselves first need to they take direct steps to improve
security. The first step, he explained, was to create a
functional Iraqi Police force. He noted that one day after
the last Coalition Force withdrawal from one site in the
city, Al Qaeda websites were broadcasting from the exact
same location a video of a person targeted by insurgents
for assassination walking openly in the streets of Samarra.


8. (C) COMMENT: Reconstruction efforts and Iraqi
assumption of local security responsibility in Samarra have
been bedeviled by endemic corruption and intimidation,
which have trebled project costs, halted construction,
frightened IP officers from the streets, frozen local IP
recruitment, and dampened the development of accountable
local government. The news that the new City Council is
taking a technocratic approach is encouraging, and serious
efforts should be made to engage and assist them. However,
the reluctance of prominent Samarrans to discuss means of
lowering the rate of insurgent attacks is discouraging.


10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED While al-Hashimi's commitment to
assist Samarra is commendable, it is not clear how his
intent to introduce an Iraqi Army battalion into Samarra
correlates with national-level MOD planning. Moreover, his
eagerness to please local sheikhs and clerics by advocating
the dismantling of the current Coalition security apparatus
is troubling. End Comment.
Khalilzad