Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4204
2005-10-12 09:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQ - AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD DISCUSSES THE IMF,

Tags:  EFIN ETRD PREL PGOV ECON IZ IMF 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004204 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, E, NEA/I AND EB
STATE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: EFIN ETRD PREL PGOV ECON IZ IMF
SUBJECT: IRAQ - AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD DISCUSSES THE IMF,
CONSTITUTION, AND SECURITY ISSUES WITH DPM CHALABI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004204

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, E, NEA/I AND EB
STATE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: EFIN ETRD PREL PGOV ECON IZ IMF
SUBJECT: IRAQ - AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD DISCUSSES THE IMF,
CONSTITUTION, AND SECURITY ISSUES WITH DPM CHALABI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: DPM Ahmed Chalabi invited Ambassador
Khalilzad to break the Ramadan fast with him October 7.
During wide-ranging discussions, Chalabi expressed
confidence that Iraq will succeed in negotiating a
Standby Arrangement (SBA) with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) before year's end - significantly
helped by new government action to somewhat liberalize
the petroleum sector and reduce food subsidies to
the non-poor. On the Constitution, the Ambassador
described energetic Embassy efforts to secure support
or at least non-opposition to the document from key
groups. In the area of security, Chalabi was concerned
about poor control exercised over certain Ministry of
Interior (MOI) units by the government, leading to
alienation of part of the Sunni population. Regarding
the security budget, Chalabi pegged maximum proposed
expenditures for combined Ministry of Defense (MOD)
and MOI at about $12 B but then mistakenly claimed
that the 2005 budget has a $5 B surplus. The DPM
agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that more
needed to be done in the area of sustainment by the
GOI, admitting that a ministry-by-ministry transition
plan is probably essential. Touching upon post battle
cities' needs, Chalabi acknowledged that more
flexibility was probably required to permit the
shifting of allocated funds to meet pressing needs.
Seeking cost savings in the area of agricultural
imports, Chalabi asked for the USG's support to
negotiate with Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill to
permit wheat imports Free On Board (FOB),allowing
cheaper deliveries through Umm Qasr in the South.
Finally, in the critical area of corruption, Chalabi
stressed his commitment to fully investigate MOD
procurement scandals and asked for Embassy assistance
in obtaining Jordanian bank records of a key suspect.
END SUMMARY.



2. (C) Dr. Chalabi invited Ambassador Khalilzad to
break the Ramadan fast at the Chalabi family farm on
Friday, October 7, 2005. The attendees were Econ
MinCouns, IRMO Director, Treasury Attache7 and members
of Chalabi's family (including nephew Hussein Al-Uzri,
President of the Trade Bank of Iraq).


3. (C) IMF Standby Arrangement (SBA): Dr. Chalabi was
confident that Iraq will succeed in negotiating its
SBA with the IMF before the end of the year. He said
steps are being made to liberalize Iraq's market for
the private sector to refine and market oil products.
A new law to open the market to private refiners is
being drafted. BP, Royal Dutch Shell and Chinese oil
refining interests have already expressed interest in
starting ventures in Iraq. On October 6, Iraq's
Council of Ministers accepted recommendations by the
Minister of Finance (MOF) Allawi to reduce fuel
subsidies by raising the price of regular and premium
gasoline, respectively, from 20 to 50 and from 50 to
150 Iraqi Dinars per liter. The DPM was confident that
Iraq would meet IMF expectations for making 'good
faith progress' in its negotiations with non-Paris Club
creditors such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In the case
of Saudi Arabia, however, he noted that very little of
the $46 B in debt claimed by the Saudis is actually
documented, but rather the money was given to Iraq in the
form of transfers that might as well be viewed as grants.
4 C) Dr. Chalab also felt hat Ia woud be
ableto met IF expectations for it to move away from
its universal entitlements (e.g., the fuel and food
subsidies) to a system for 'means-tested' welfare. He
said that the 2006 budget would include an allocation of
$500 M to be distributed "only to Iraq's poor people."
He said defining who is 'poor' should be easy. It would
exclude anyone who has a government job or receives a
pension or stipend and anyone who owns property. He doubts,
however, whether the census needed to quantify poverty in
Iraq could be done before October 2006.


5. (C) Constitution: Ambassador Khalilzad asked Dr.
Chalabi's support for a number of small changes that would
help to improve support for the Constitution. He noted
that he had already gained from the Kurds acceptance for
language to reinforce that Iraq is and would remain one
country. He suggested that the Constitution should defer
the creation of new federal units until six months after
the new Iraqi National Assembly is seated, under a fair
and open set of executive procedures for establishing such
units. He also suggested that citizenship should be
automatic for people whose parents are both Iraqi and
otherwise should be regulated by law. On
de-Baathification, the DPM and the Ambassador agreed that
a distinction should be drawn between the former Ba'athists
who were very senior in the party or had criminal records
and junior members who had no criminal involvement. Dr.
Chalabi requested that the Embassy provide an example of
language for the Constitution that could draw that
distinction. Both men agreed that it was important for
the Constitution to be viewed as a national compact, and
the Ambassador agreed to provide Dr. Chalabi with a
write-up covering all the final changes to the Constitution.


6. (C) Internal Security: Dr. Chalabi expressed
concerns over whether certain elements of the security
forces were being properly controlled and coordinated.
He focused on the 'Zoological Brigades' - such as the
elite 'Wolf Brigade' of the Police Commando Battalions.
He pointed to an incident in Mahmodiyah as an
example where the brigade appeared to have been out of
control. He also pointed to problems with certain police
chiefs and said more care needed to be taken in their
selection. He urged MNF-I to do more to protect
electric power lines, as well as oil infrastructure.


7. (C) Sustainment: Chalabi said that some ministries
are probably already planning to sustain the many
reconstruction and development projects that are being
completed and transferred to Iraq, while others are not.
The Ministry of Electricity (MOE),for example, is probably
doing well to include sustainment needs in its budget
estimates while the Ministry of Public Works and Municipal
Affairs is probably not. He said that to ensure that all
sustainment needs are met there will need to be a
ministry-by-ministry transition plan.


8. (C) Security and the Budget: Dr. Chalabi said that
various figures had been discussed for the 2006 budgets of
the MOD and MOI, ranging on the high side to about $7 B
and $5 B, respectively. He added that the budgets of
about $4 B each for the food and fuel subsidies programs
would be cut. He said that the 2005 budget "has a $5 B
surplus." (COMMENT: DPM Chalabi misspoke about there being
a "$5 B surplus." MOF Allawi told the Treasury Attache7
and the IRMO Director on October 9 that Iraq has no such
surplus. He explained that DPM Chalabi was probably
referring to the MOF's available balance in the Development
Fund for Iraq (DFI) account at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. That balance totals about $6 B. After allowing
for keeping a $1 B minimum balance, this points to an
available balance of $5 B. The $5 B, however, is already
obligated to pay for items in the 2005 budget. Taking all
into account, the Finance Minister now expects that there
will be a $1-2 B deficit for 2005 -- down from the $5 B
estimated deficit that appeared in the 2005 budget plan --
but nevertheless a deficit. Total budget expenditures will
be about $22 B (about 10 percent below planned expenditures
of about $24 B). Total 2005 budget revenues will be
$20-21 B ($1-2 B above planned revenues of about $19 B).
According to the Central Bank of Iraq's records of actual
payments into the DFI covering January-September 2005,
budget oil revenues totaled $15.8 B and averaged about
$1.8 B per month. If this monthly average is sustained
through the fourth quarter, 2005 budget oil revenues will
total $21.2 B, leaving a deficit of $1 B to be financed
mainly by recoveries from the now defunct Oil for Food
program. END COMMENT.)


9. (C) Quality of Life Projects: Dr. Chalabi urged the
Embassy to support re-opening and cleaning-up the Basrah
canals as an example of the kind of project which, for
relatively little expenditure, would substantially improve
the quality of life of Iraqi citizens.


10. (C) Tal Afar and Other Post Battle Cities: Dr.
Chalabi said that an amendment to the Financial Management
Law would be sought to give the MOF greater flexibility to
reapportion funds to meet the needs of post-stabilization
action compensation and reconstruction. He said the
present law's 5 percent limit on reallocations is too
restrictive. He also said that many of the terrorists
that had occupied Tal Afar appear to have fled south
toward Baghdad and are encamped on the shores of Lake
Thar Thar, not far from Balad and Taji.


11. (C) Imports of U.S. Grains: Chalabi asked for the
Embassy's help to work with Archer Daniels Midland and
Cargill to permit Iraq to negotiate wheat imports on an
FOB basis (i.e., exclusive of shipping costs). Previously,
the contracts were written on a cost, insurance, plus
freight (CIF) basis (i.e., inclusive of shipping costs),
with the result that the grain was shipped to ports in
Syria and Jordan and then trucked overland, leading to
major delays at the borders. In addition, he offered that
the shift in shipping pattern would hurt the insurgency.
(COMMENT: Chalabi appeared to be alluding to eliminating
the possibility of cargo seizures and/or shakedowns of
shippers. However, reality is more complex. Chalabi
and many of his close associates are from Basrah province,
also the location of Umm Qasr, making this something of a
probable pitch for his home base. Moreover, Chalabi has
a longstanding problem with the Jordanians, in part
linked to allegations of financial impropriety and a
conviction by a Jordanian Court in the matter of a
$200 M banking scandal. END COMMENT.) By ordering the
grain FOB and then providing its own transportation,
Iraq could import the grains into Umm Qasr in the
South, thereby avoiding delays and perhaps paying less
for shipping. Trade Bank of Iraq President Al-Uzri
mentioned that the food import program would be improved
if the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) dropped its
requirement for food exporters to post performance bonds
and if inspection requirements were dropped as condition
for letters of credit payments in favor of a
pre-certification requirement. Such MOT requirements
complicate contracting in ways that add to Iraq's costs
and delay shipments, as well as delaying payments to the
exporters.


12. (C) Anti-Corruption: The DPM described at length
what he believes to be a conspiracy under former Minister
of Defense Sha'alan to misuse more than $1 billion. He
accused several of the Minister's closest aides of being
co-conspirators. He noted that the Central Criminal
Court of Iraq has issued some 23 arrest warrants aimed
at the conspirators at the request of Iraq's Commission on
Public Integrity. He asked for U.S. assistance to obtain
the account records from the Housing Bank of Amman of one
of the central figures in the alleged conspiracy, one
Naaer Ahmed Ali Jumali, owner of Al Saybb Brokerage Company.
(COMMENT: Embassy IRS Attache is looking into this matter.
END COMMENT.) Chalabi also alleged that evidence pointed
toward price manipulation in the Iraqi oil exports market,
implicating both well-placed Iraqi officials and at least
one Middle Eastern private concern, Crescent Oil, a UAE
headquartered firm. Chalabi will chair a committee
looking into the specific problem of corruption in oil
contracts.


13. (C) COMMENT: Chalabi was particularly satisfied at
being able to point to the Council of Ministers' decision
in favor of raising gasoline prices and to the other ways
Iraq would be able to meet the IMF's expectations for an
SBA. He was amenable to the Ambassador's suggestions for
improving the Constitution and appeared confident that it
would be accepted by the upcoming referendum. He did not
hesitate to ask for the Embassy's help to shape the
security ministries and their activities as he would like
them. In the anti-corruption area, he appears to have
found a prominent platform for pressing grievances
against his political rivals, which at the same time
would conform with Embassy urgings that Iraq do more to
ensure the integrity of its leaders and governance.
END COMMENT.
Khalilzad