Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4147
2005-10-08 14:04:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI MCNS MEETS TO DISCUSS TRANSFER OF SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV MOPS IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004147 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015
TAGS: PGOV MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI MCNS MEETS TO DISCUSS TRANSFER OF SECURITY
RESPONSIBILITIES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3853

B. BAGHDAD 3731

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d
)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004147

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015
TAGS: PGOV MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI MCNS MEETS TO DISCUSS TRANSFER OF SECURITY
RESPONSIBILITIES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3853

B. BAGHDAD 3731

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d
)


1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: The Iraqi Ministerial
Committee on National Security (MCNS) met on October 4 to
discuss, among other subjects, the conditions for the
transfer of security responsibilities from the Coalition to
Iraqi civil authorities. Prime Minister Jaafari stated a
preference for a "go slow" approach on the transfer of
security responsibility. Before Iraqi authorities can assume
responsibility for security, he noted, the militia problem
must be addressed and more locals must be recruited into the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to serve in their own cities or
regions. In addition, Jaafari stressed that the chain of
command for Iraqi forces, both military and police, must be
articulated clearly in the plan. He clearly will not agree
to any plan that gives provincial governors authority over
national forces. This cable focuses on the conditions for
transfer of security responsibility; other issues discussed
at the meeting will be addressed in a septel. END SUMMARY.


2. (S//REL GBR AUS) The MCNS met at the home of Prime
Minister Jaafari the night of October 4. Present were
Jaafari; Minister of Defense Saadoun al-Dulime; Minister of
Interior Bayan Jabr; National Security Advisor Mowaffak
al-Rubaie; the Prime Minister's Spokesman Laith Kubba; the
Ambassador; MNF-I Commanding General Casey; British Charge
d'Affaires Tim Torlot; and MNF-I Deputy Commanding General
Brims. A translator and notetakers also attended. Minister
of State for National Security Affairs Karem al-Anzi was
absent.

-------------- --------------
CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY
-------------- --------------


3. (S//REL GBR AUS) First on the agenda was the presentation
to the Prime Minister of the final report of the Joint
Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR)
Principals Group. The Principals Group, which comprises most
members of the MCNS save Jaafari and al-Anzi, was originally
scheduled to deliver its report on September 25, but their
presentation was postponed when Jaafari called an emergency
meeting of the MCNS (septel). Briefly, the report sets forth

the conditions which must be met before security
responsibilities for urban and/or provincial areas may be
handed over by the Coalition to Iraqi civil authorities.
These conditions are described in reftels.


4. (S//REL GBR AUS) This was the first time Jaafari had seen
the report. His initial reaction was to suggest that
everyone look through it over the next day or so and then
reconvene the MCNS to reach a decision. NSA Rubaie wanted a
quick resolution and described in general terms the contents
of the report. Minister of Interior Jabr described how it
had been completed in close cooperation between Iraqi and
Coalition leaders and that after some initial disagreements,
it now fully reflected the views of all parties.

--------------
JAAFARI'S CONDITIONS
--------------


4. (S//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari responded that he has spoken to
President Bush about this topic and the President assured him
that U.S. forces will not leave Iraqi cities until the Iraqis
are fully capable of handling all security problems. Jaafari
explained that, in his opinion, the following three
conditions must be met prior to the transfer of security
responsibility:

--There must be sufficient Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
available to handle any problems that arise, and if
additional forces must be called from other areas to assist,
these forces must be able to respond without leaving their
own areas of responsibility unprotected;

--The militias, which are a "two-edged sword," must be
absorbed into the ISF before the MNF turns over security
responsibility;

--The security forces in each city must comprise at least
some members who come from that area, as they will be more
likely to preserve security in their own cities and also
because a city,s population will be less inclined to make
trouble or distrust the ISF if their sons are among the
police and army assigned there.


6. (S//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari stated that he is not ashamed
to say in the media that the MNF must stay until the Iraqis
are fully capable of handling all problems. He is not yet
confident that the ISF are at that point. Jabr assured him
that the plan for transfer specifies that the MNF will remain
nearby and prepared to respond if needed, so there is no need
to worry about leaving other parts of the country exposed by
bringing in ISF reinforcements from elsewhere. He and Rubaie
also stressed that a transfer of responsibility will take
place only in areas that are considered to be safe and where
the threat level is low. Jaafari brushed this aside and
asked what will happen if conditions in an area subsequently
change for the worse. He then returned to the need to
integrate the militias into the ISF and to recruit more
locals. Rubaie reiterated that he was confident that the
report addresses all of Jaafari's concerns.

--------------
QUESTIONS OF INTRA-IRAQI COMMAND AND CONTROL
--------------


7. (S//REL GBR AUS) Minister of Defense Dulime raised the
issue of the lack of clearly defined lines of authority and
chain of command for national forces called to assist local
police forces controlled by each province,s governor. Under
the plan, security responsibility will be turned over to
committees headed by the provincial governors. Dulime said
he does not trust the judgment of the governors on security
matters and stated that firm command and control procedures
must be clearly established before security responsibilities
are accepted. Jaafari strongly concurred, saying that he
wants everyone to clearly realize that Iraq is not a "vast
democracy or Scandinavian country." There are serious
problems, Jaafari said, between the central government and
the provincial governments. In some past cases the ISF has
taken sides when such problems arose, he continued, and this
cannot be tolerated. The recent incident in Basrah in which
local police arrested two British soldiers and then handed
them over to militiamen, which the Prime Minister mentioned
several times, loomed large in Jaafari's thinking. Jaafari
stressed that there can be no question about lines of
authority and chains of command: the police must respond to
the commands of the Minister of Interior, the army to the
Minister of Defense, and both of those ministers to the
commander-in-chief -- the Prime Minister. He stressed, "If
it were up to the governor of Basrah, he would declare war on
the British. We cannot let the governors decide when to call
in ISF or, on the other hand, give them the authority to
prevent ISF from entering their provinces when security needs
arise."


8. (S//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey noted that Jaafari's concern is
fundamental: "What is the role of the central government in
providing security in the provinces?" He suggested that
language be added to the conditions to specify that MOD
forces would be under the command of the Minister of Defense.
All present agreed that this should not be a problem.
However, a more difficult issue is how to define who has the
authority over the police, given the provisions of the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that give the authority
to appoint chiefs of police to local councils and not to the
MOI. Rubaie and the Ambassador echoed that taking control
over local police away from a governor potentially violates
the TAL and possibly the new constitution, which guarantees
to the provinces some rights over security matters.


9. (S//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari stressed that when he talks about
difficulties between the provinces and the central government
he is not talking about simple matters such as local crime.
Rather, he continued, he is speaking of issues that have
national consequences, namely the fight against terrorists
who would see the government and democracy defeated. Command
and control issues, he said, must be clearly defined in favor
of national authority. In addition, he added, the militia
issue must be addressed and plans must be made to ensure that
portions of the ISF in each area include members indigenous
to that region. It was agreed that the JCTSR needs to
address these fundamental points in more detail before the
plan can be accepted.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (S//REL GBR AUS) COMMENT: Many of Jaafari's concerns
about the transfer of responsibility are clearly addressed in
the report, which he had not had the opportunity to review
prior to the meeting. These concerns include provisions for
MNF troops to reinforce Iraqi units should the need for
assistance arise. Coalition members of the JCTSR foresaw the
command and control issue. Much effort was expended to get
the Iraqis to address this question during the committee
meetings. The underlying problem appears to be an immature
and yet to be fully-developed governmental system from the
local level through the provinces to the national level. An
example is the basic distrust between local and provincial
governments and leaders in some areas. In fact, the nature
of these relationships was at the heart of some of the most
difficult issues during the constitutional drafting process
and have yet to be fully resolved. The Working Group of the
JCTSR continues to meet and work on an implementing
arrangement memorandum of understanding based on the
conditions specified in the final report, which would clarify
the command and control relationships that are needed to
allay Jaafari's concerns.


11. (S//REL GBR AUS) COMMENT continued: Jaafari's
insistence that the militia problem be addressed before MNF
relinquishes control is a new twist, as is his call for more
local recruitment. In fact, they are probably linked since
Jaafari hopes to see militiamen absorbed into the security
forces. However, the integration of the Peshmerga and/or the
Badr Corps into the regular ISF is not something we see
happening in the near future. (NOTE: Jabr pointed out that
he is working already on recruiting locals for police forces
assigned to certain regions. Dulime said that his budget
will need to be augmented if Jaafari expects him to recruit,
train, and integrate locals into already formed units. END
NOTE.) Jaafari's "go slow" approach seemed to surprise Iraqi
members of the JCTSR, particularly Rubaie, who has been
pushing for the rapid transfer of security responsibilities
in certain areas. The JCTSR will continue to work on a plan
that will address Jaafari's concerns. END COMMENT.
Khalilzad